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Foreword 
 
 
 
A country’s ability to pass laws that will protect the health and wellbeing of its 
citizens, without intimidation by large multinationals who claim they are due 
compensation if the law is changed, is core to the democratic process in most 
developed countries.  
 
Recently, Ireland has used legislation to curtail the ability of the tobacco industry to recruit child 
smokers. The leadership shown by the Irish Government is being challenged in Ireland’s court system 
by the tobacco companies who fear their profits will drop. They are arguing that their business 
interests have been negatively affected and should be paid compensation. The reality is that tobacco 
companies already force the State to spend millions of Euro in health costs; it is unthinkable that they 
believe they are due money because fewer people are choosing to smoke. 
 
The Irish Cancer Society is confident that in a domestic court of law, public health will trump the rights 
of such companies.  
 
The introduction of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United 
States and the European Union, however, potentially allows multinational companies, such as the 
tobacco industry, another avenue by which they can challenge public health law introduced by 
democratically elected parliamentarians.  As part of the TTIP negotiations, the ‘investor protection’ 
mechanism known as the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has been mooted.  
 
The ISDS mechanism is different from the judicial system because instead of a judge making a decision 
on a case, a three-member panel made up of representatives from both sides, plus an agreed third 
member, arrives at an agreement. The introduction of ISDS allows multinational companies to 
circumvent the domestic courts system and effectively sue the country through the confidential 
arbitration mechanism that has been criticised by academics as being ‘broken’.  
 
It is via ISDS that Australia is being sued by tobacco companies for their extremely successful 
introduction of standardised packaging of tobacco, and why in turn other countries who want to 
introduce the measure have delayed their plans thanks to the threat of expensive litigation.  
 
This has brought about a heated debate across Europe about what rights national parliaments should 
have to introduce public health measures and has resulted in a European Commission consultation 
which saw an overwhelmingly negative response to ISDS.  
 
As negotiations continue, on 8 July 2015 the European Parliament passed a ‘compromise text’ on TTIP 
that promises to ‘to replace the ISDS-system with a new system […] where private interests cannot 
undermine public policy objectives’.  
 
While this may address many of the issues around ISDS, it remains to be seen whether it will address 
the major imbalance in such arbitration cases.  
 
The Society believes that TTIP can exist without a commercial arbitration mechanism. Latin American 
countries are actively seeking to withdraw from trade agreements with ISDS. South Africa has 
cancelled trade agreements with Germany, Spain and Belgium in a backlash against ISDS. Australia has 
decided not to include an investor dispute mechanism in some of its future trade negotiations.   
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It is for this reason the Irish Cancer Society commissioned Dr Joshua Curtis and Dr John Reynolds to 
investigate the effect of such a mechanism on public health policy in Ireland.  I would like to thank 
them for their comprehensive piece of work which will inform not only the response of the Society to 
the ongoing negotiations, but the response of European civil society.  
 
 
 
 
 
Kathleen O’Meara 
Head of Advocacy and Communications 
Irish Cancer Society 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 – Overview and Objectives of the Study 
 
Free trade agreements and investment treaties have the stated aims of promoting economic activity 
and growth through increased global trade and investment flows. The presumptions that broader 
societal benefits—such as improved population health—will trickle down from such market 
liberalisation are increasingly called into question by deepening levels of social and economic inequality 
around the world. Against this backdrop, the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) has generated concern as to its 
potential effects on public health policy and standards. The present study seeks to build on and deepen 
the existing research and analysis in this regard, with the specific purpose of clarifying and evaluating 
TTIP’s implications on health policy in Ireland.  
 
The study is sensitive to Ireland’s specific economic situation; that is, its economic model, current 
financial, regulatory and social situation, medium-term economic prospects and its institutional and 
policy structure with regard to public health. It is suggested that peripheral EU States like Ireland can 
benefit from an understanding of the experience of global South countries with respect to trade 
liberalisation and the evolution of investor protection through international treaties. In light of historical 
and recent developments in international trade and investment law and policy, the study addresses the 
likely implications of TTIP on public health policy in Ireland under three categories:  
o general or cross-cutting considerations such as government regulatory space, social costs 
and the obstacles that TTIP may pose to alternative models of public health governance;  
o the impact of investment provisions; 
o and the impact of trade provisions.   
 
The overarching aims of the study are to:  
o map the likely effects of TTIP in the Irish health sector context and critically evaluate the 
health-related risks and benefits; 
o inform debate over the relationship between transnational modes of trade and 
investment governance on the one hand, and democratic control over localised and 
national public health policy on the other; 
o provide an evidentiary and analytic framework that may better inform public engagement, 
advocacy strategy and policy-making with respect to economic liberalisation and health 
policy in Ireland and beyond.  
 
 
1.2 – A Brief History of International Trade and Investment Regulation 
 
In terms of its potential coverage of the global economy, the proposed TTIP constitutes the most 
extensive free trade and investment agreement of its kind, and would create the world’s largest free 
trade zone. In its bilateral/regional approach it represents the latest stage in a series of international 
trade and investment liberalisation processes that have been underway in various forms over recent 
years.  
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International trade law has been constituted primarily by a multilateral State-based framework in the 
form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from 1947, and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) since 1994. The early focus on lowering tariffs on cross-border trade has over time 
largely shifted to collectively removing ‘non-tariff barriers’ to trade including domestic laws, regulations 
and standards.  
 
International investment law, by contrast, does not have a comparable multilateral institution or legal 
framework, but is made up instead primarily of a more fragmented system of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) between States. A central and controversial feature of this system is the investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) process whereby foreign investors—i.e. multinational corporations—who 
perceive their interests to have been adversely affected by a host State policy can bypass the domestic 
legal system in that State entirely and bring their claim before an ad hoc investment arbitration tribunal.  
 
This system has generally functioned to open up global South resources and markets to investment 
from the global North, to develop high standards of protection for investors without comparable 
responsibilities, and to limit the regulatory space of host States. Under ISDS, corporate investors can 
bring legal claims against States, but not the other way round. Investment arbitration tribunals tend to 
be favourably disposed towards commercial interests, and developing countries have been ordered to 
pay large damages claims to foreign investors, even where important public interest factors such as 
health, the environment or socio-economic rights underpinned the disputed government measure.  
 
Due to increasing resistance from the global South, both to further trade and investment  liberalisation 
measures at the WTO and to investor protection under BITs and ISDS, the recent trend within the global 
North in particular has been to construct new bilateral, regional or plurilateral agreements that contain 
both trade and investment components together. This trend, however, is not limited to pure 
North/South agreements as can be seen in the form of TTIP, as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). 
 
 
1.3 – The TTIP Negotiations in Context 
 
Deeper economic integration has been raised progressively higher on the agenda of transatlantic 
relations since the end of the Cold War, and has come to take on particular significance in recent years 
given the rise of developing economies and a loss of influence in the WTO. The EU and the US have 
come to view closer economic relations and transatlantic regional development as an important 
counterweight to the growing influence of Asia in the global marketplace. In 2007, the Transatlantic 
Economic Council was created, with the aim of intensifying cooperation in the areas of investment, 
trade, and regulatory cooperation. The signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 expanded the EU’s 
competences in relation to trade and foreign investment. In 2011 the EU and US appointed a High-Level 
Working Group of senior government officials investigate the scope for a possible trade and investment 
agreement. Negotiations for TTIP were initiated in 2013, with both parties also investing faith in its 
possibility to bolster recovery from a deep and persistent post-2008 recession.  
 
The negotiating mandate given by the Council of the European Union to the European Commission 
refers to the aims of job creation and economic growth through increased market access and greater 
regulatory compatibility. The market liberalisation agenda and the ISDS mechanism in particular have 
attracted much scepticism in Europe, prompting the Commission to initiate a public consultation on 
the ISDS element in 2014.  While the overwhelming majority of the response was opposed to the 
inclusion of ISDS, the Commission is continuing to operate under the expectation that it should seek to 
negotiate its inclusion in some form. 
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1.4 – TTIP and Public Health 
 
Despite a certain amount of privatisation of the health sector in many countries, health care in the EU 
is still seen as a fundamentally public service that is provided and regulated according to a social 
rationale, rather than as a primarily market-based or economic enterprise. Public health is therefore 
inseparable from the idea of democratic autonomy exercised through representative government, free 
to develop and implement policy according to the changing health needs of the population and 
available scientific knowledge and technologies.  
 
Proponents of TTIP claim that the agreement will deliver economic growth and better regulation, which 
will ultimately benefit social sectors such as health. Critics argue that the empirical evidence linking 
trade and investment agreements to economic growth is lacking, and that far from raising social 
protections, regulatory harmonisation has been shown to reduce regulatory standards to the lower 
common denominator, restricting the ability of the state to regulate in the public interest. 
Harmonisation with a country such as the US, where healthcare is heavily susceptible to private and 
market interests, presents major risks for the EU. State autonomy in determining public health policy 
may also be limited by investor protection under ISDS, the liberalisation of trade in health services, and 
the protection of intellectual property rights (of pharmaceutical companies and tobacco companies, 
among others). 
 
 
2.  GENERAL IMPACTS OF TTIP ON PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY IN IRELAND 
 
2.1 – Net Economic Benefits and Fundamental Rationale of TTIP  
 
The main benefits of TTIP to the people of the EU and Ireland, as projected by its proponents, are 
economic. Theoretically, these benefits accrue through a process whereby the direct financial and other 
benefits to multinationals and investors are transmitted downwards in a variety of ways – through the 
creation of employment, local re-investment of extra earnings, increased tax revenue, and increased 
demand for secondary goods and services brought about by the presence of foreign investment. The 
trickle-down theory of economics upon which the bulk of TTIP’s presumed socio-economic benefits for 
the broader population ultimately depend, however, has been widely rejected by leading economists. 
If a trickle down does occur the key factor is government intervention and management, to actively 
steer the gains accruing to multinationals into productive benefits for the broader society.  This requires 
the maintenance of government capacity to act and regulate. 
 
This describes TTIP’s ironic ‘double-bind’. On the one hand the government will need to regulate to 
ensure the equitable and productive distribution of any benefits; and on the other hand TTIP 
proponents argue that there will be no benefits unless government regulations are restricted in 
accordance with the core thrust of the agreement. However, this double-bind only arises if there are 
clear potential economic benefits from the agreement. Otherwise government capacity is lost for no 
valid reason and it would make little sense to accept the trade-off. 
 
Yet, even the most optimistic projections in studies cited by the European Commission indicate that the 
overall economic growth across the EU directly accruing from TTIP will be minimal at best, suggesting 
that this capacity would indeed be lost for no good reason.  
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2.2 – US Foreign Investment in Ireland  
 
TTIP also contains potential economic and financial losses for individual EU States through trade and 
investment diversion to other EU States, as well as financial liability under the ISDS mechanism. This is 
particularly the case for States that presently receive relatively high volumes of US investment. Ireland’s 
level of US foreign investment as a percentage of GDP is the highest of any EU country, and at seven 
times the EU average is hugely disproportionate relative to the vast majority of the Member States. 
This leaves Ireland particularly vulnerable to trade and investment diversion and ISDS claims arising 
from TTIP. At the same time, it demonstrates quite clearly that Ireland does not need TTIP or an 
investment chapter to attract US investment, as it is currently attracting very large quantities without 
such potential liabilities. 
 
2.3 – Public Health and the Right to Health in Ireland 
 
Ireland has legal obligations under international human rights treaties to progressively realise the 
human right to health for all within its jurisdiction. This entails the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health, and obliges States to ensure a variety of facilities, goods, services, 
conditions and democratic processes necessary to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health of the 
population, including access to medical services and essential medicines. This in turns implies that 
governments need to maintain an ability to intervene in the economy to such a degree as is necessary 
to realise these obligations, thereby intrinsically connecting the right to health to the State’s capacity 
to regulate. Initiatives to redress the sub-standard and steadily deteriorating nature of Irish public 
health care provision, particularly if based on greater competition and more private actors in the health 
sector and insurance market, will require close government oversight and regulation of the system to 
ensure equitable benefits, attention to marginalised sections of the population and a high quality of 
services and products. TTIP presents potential obstacles in that regard. International human rights 
bodies have increasingly highlighted that trade and investment agreements present structural 
opposition to the States’ ability to vindicate socio-economic rights, and are problematic as such. The 
Irish government should therefore, at a minimum and with some urgency, undertake a comprehensive 
human rights impact assessment of TTIP before committing the State any further to the agreement. 
 
2.4 – Social Costs and General Impact on Public Health 
 
The potential social costs of TTIP are represented by threats to social security, labour rights and public 
health standards through the closing of regulatory space and challenges to government action under 
the ISDS mechanism, the prioritisation of intellectual property rights, and the lowering of standards 
through regulatory harmonisation or non-tariff barriers to trade. Overall, TTIP may lead to a 
deterioration in democratic governance, and a potentially decreased respect for human rights without 
the potential for significant economic benefits that would provide any balance. This is the likely 
conclusion for the EU as a whole, yet for Ireland in particular the prognosis is far worse than the EU 
average. For Ireland the likely social costs are significantly higher due to the severity of the financial and 
public health challenges it currently faces, and the likely economic costs are the highest out of all EU 
Member States. 
 
 
  
 14 
 
3.  INVESTMENT IMPACTS  
 
3.1 – Explaining the Investment Law Regime and ISDS 
 
The substantive provisions of international investment law confer high levels of protection on foreign 
investors, including: 
 
o ‘national treatment’ principles which mandate that foreign investors must be treated the same 
as nationals of the host State, thus precluding certain forms of legislation or policies aimed at 
redressing societal imbalances, attending to human rights, or protecting domestic industry and 
interests;  
o full compensation in the event of expropriation, which is broadly construed as including 
‘indirect expropriation’ in the form of regulation that has a significant negative impact on an 
investment’s economic value, even if it is, by nature, enacted through due process of law, is 
non-discriminatory and is for a public purpose; 
o minimum standards of treatment including “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection 
and security”, which are vague and subjective standards that have been interpreted broadly by 
ISDS tribunals as providing very high, and often unintended, levels of investor protection, 
including an obligation on the State not to violate an investor’s “legitimate expectations”. 
 
Where they are not satisfied that these protections have been upheld, foreign investors have recourse 
to take the host State directly to ISDS arbitration. This can generally be done without the requirement 
of any attempt to resolve the dispute within the domestic legal system. National jurisdiction and the 
normal rules requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies before recourse to international 
adjudication are circumvented in a manner that departs from customary practice in almost all other 
comparable regimes of international law. 
 
As such, investment agreements are in a sense inherently unbalanced in that they confer substantial 
and powerful rights on foreign investors yet do not bind them to any substantive obligations. Investors 
must observe certain minimal procedural obligations, such as waiting a set period of time before 
bringing an ISDS claim against a State, and are under a general expectation to establish and conduct 
their activities in accordance with the domestic law of the host State. However, contravention of the 
law is not necessarily a bar to having their rights vindicated by an international tribunal. In the case of 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador, for example, the oil company was awarded US$ 1.77 
billion in damages by an investment tribunal, despite a finding that the company had clearly violated 
Ecuadorian law, because the government’s response to such violation was adjudged to have been 
“disproportionate”.  
 
It is widely accepted that the majority of ISDS arbitrators come from a background in commercial 
arbitration and arguably are influenced by the interests and viewpoint of investors. The structural biases 
and imbalances in the system have led to a backlash against it in recent years. Latin American countries 
have begun to withdraw from the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals, South Africa and Indonesia have 
cancelled BITs with a number of European States, and Australia has moved to exclude ISDS from some 
of its investment agreements.  
 
 
3.2 – Investment Liberalisation and Social Policy  
 
Over the last 30 years, reductions of State intervention in the economy and a decline in public funding 
for social programmes and economic assistance both nationally and internationally have led to an 
increasing dependence of States on foreign investment and trade opportunities to underwrite growth 
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and living standards. By various measures—economic, fiscal and social—Ireland’s approach to 
development and liberalisation in this regard may be difficult to sustain. Social protections will be 
placed under increasing strain by the further marketisation of a socio-economic model already defined 
by relatively low tax and low spending on public services. The evidence also suggests that investment 
liberalisation and ISDS pose substantial risks for a peripheral and investment-dependent country like 
Ireland, in terms of the restriction of regulatory space and exposure to damages claims. As such, any 
further trade or investment liberalisation measures that are to be legally locked in by a treaty such as 
TTIP must be scrutinised extremely closely with regard to their social impact.  
 
 
3.3 – ISDS and Public Health  
 
Trade and investment liberalisation has granted investors a range of legal tools that can be used to 
influence political and regulatory processes in host States to their advantage. Such tools are not 
absolute, however, and can be subject to qualification or exception on public health grounds. When it 
comes to implementation, much will turn on the interpretations and weighting given to such 
qualifications or exceptions by ISDS arbitrators.  
 
Tobacco company Philip Morris is currently pursuing two separate ISDS claims, against Australia and 
Uruguay, on the basis that tobacco plain packaging legislation in those countries infringes on the 
company’s intellectual property rights, violates the “fair and equitable treatment” standard, has a 
negative impact on its economic interests amounting to expropriation, devalues its trademark, and is 
disproportionate to the stated aim of protecting public health. With both cases pending, it remains to 
be seen how plain packaging regulation will fare under ISDS. What is clear is the effect of a ‘regulatory 
chill’, with concrete evidence showing that some countries which are subject to BIT protections for 
tobacco multinationals are awaiting the results of the Philip Morris ISDS claims before deciding whether 
and to what extent to pursue their own legislative proposals on plain packaging. If Philip Morris wins its 
claims, the regulatory chill on plain packaging will be consolidated and far-reaching. Ireland is not 
currently bound under any international investment treaties and so does not have to consider such 
concerns to date, but ISDS jurisdiction under TTIP would change this completely.  
 
Investment protections under TTIP are also likely to impact the health sector through the secondary 
health impacts arising from investors challenging environmental regulation and food standards, as well 
as from the liberalisation of health insurance markets. These and other cases highlight the ongoing 
controversy and unpredictability as to the nature and extent of investor protections on the one hand, 
and States’ regulatory autonomy on the other. The implementation of an ISDS mechanism that allows 
investors to circumvent domestic and regional judicial processes (which have more holistic mandates 
than ISDS tribunals whose primary mandate is investment protection) will be detrimental to the 
protection of public health, in the context of tobacco regulation and more broadly. As such, if an 
investment chapter is to be included in TTIP, the explicit exclusion of tobacco control measures and 
other public health priorities should be considered. 
 
 
3.4 – Assessing the Case For Investor Protection and ISDS in TTIP 
 
The arguments made in favour of the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP include the following: 
 
o ISDS depoliticises disputes and overcomes deficient domestic legal systems, thereby giving 
aggrieved foreign investors a fair hearing and contributing to the development of an 
international rule of law. This suggestion that investment arbitration reduces the exposure of 
 16 
 
investors to politicised processes and provides increased legal certainty as compared with 
domestic judicial systems in the EU or US appears unfounded at best and disingenuous at worst. 
 
o The security afforded by justiciable investment protections leads to increased investment and 
economic benefits. There is a notable lack of empirical evidence, however, to positively link 
investment protection provisions and ISDS to increased levels of foreign investment. In 
Ireland’s case, the country is quite evidently already viewed as a highly desirable destination 
for US investment for a number of reasons, despite the absence of specific protection under 
international investment law. On the available evidence, therefore, it is unlikely that investor 
protection under TTIP will bring discernible economic benefits to Ireland.  
 
 
3.5 – The Major Cost of Investor Protection and ISDS – Freedom to Regulate 
 
Claims by investors can be raised and vindicated through the established domestic courts and legal 
systems in the US and the EU. As such, the institution of a supra-national legal structure and claims 
mechanism, with all of the uncertainties that it entails, appears unwarranted. The primary costs 
associated with this are the constricting of the State’s freedom to regulate in the public interest, and 
the related chilling effect of investment provisions and arbitration. Within the EU, such costs must be 
balanced against a status quo situation where the threat of arbitration claims by US investors do not 
exist.    
 
3.6 – Assessing the EU Position and TTIP’s Investment Provisions in Relation to Public Health 
Policy 
 
The study finds that the existing EU proposals are insufficient to adequately protect public health. There 
is far too much uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the proposals to satisfy the requirements of 
an overall precautionary approach, and unless or until that situation changes the risks must be taken 
as outweighing the benefits. As such, ISDS should be definitively excluded from TTIP, and in this case it 
would be of little sense to include any substantive provisions on investment. Many if not most of the 
reform proposals are essentially bets that the system will thereby be improved and that the regulatory 
space and other responsibilities of States will be accorded due weight. Such bets are far too risky to 
proceed with international treaty rules as far-reaching as TTIP’s investment chapter. 
 
3.7 – Revenue and Budgetary Implications 
 
The costs of arbitration awards can be high, representing a significant drain on public funds. Awards 
have typically been in the hundreds of thousands of US dollars, but awards upwards of US$1 billion are 
becoming more regular. In addition to the damages awarded, the State will incur costs for the litigation 
process of around US$ 8 million per arbitration. There is no reliable ‘loser-pays’ rule operating in ISDS, 
and most tribunals have left the State to pay its costs even when it has ‘won’ the arbitration. These 
facts put into question the oft-repeated claim that ISDS represents a fast and cheap solution to disputes 
relative to the workings of domestic courts. In addition, the size of the outlay in defending a case can 
be a strong incentive for governments to make settlements and pay off dissatisfied investors even when 
a claim may not have much chance of succeeding. These effects are particularly strong with respect to 
large claims made by investors with deep pockets and comparatively little to lose relative to the possible 
gains from arbitration. This potentially significant financial drain on government resources is 
heightened in countries with high concentrations of foreign investment such as Ireland. 
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3.8 – An Investment Court? 
 
Debate over ISDS has intensified as its effects begin to be felt closer to the metropolitan centres of the 
global North through CETA and TPP as well as TTIP. The deep public concern in the EU has brought 
about a temporary halt to the negotiations with respect to ISDS. In early 2014, the European 
Commission initiated a public consultation on the issue and received a highly skeptical response, with 
an overwhelming majority backing the exclusion of ISDS from the negotiations completely and calling 
for a serious reappraisal of its fundamental rationale. The Commission has responded with a new 
proposal, outlining a move towards the establishment of an International Arbitration Court. This idea 
has been in circulation in the broader sphere of international investment law for some time, and may 
be able to solve some of the deep problems and imbalances of investment arbitration. The 
Commission’s plans have yet to take full shape and much remains to be seen, however. Other proposals 
have been mooted, including an alternative draft investment chapter that limits the scope of foreign 
investor protection quite severely, while still ensuring equality of protection with that afforded to 
domestic investors. These options represent steps in the right direction, but need to be fleshed out and 
may still remain wed to a significant and unjustified shift in power from democratically accountable 
governments and domestic judicial systems to supra-national commercial arbitrators.  
 
 
4.  TRADE IMPACTS 
 
4.1 – WTO Tobacco Plain Packaging Cases  
 
Challenges to Australia’s tobacco plain packaging legislation have been brought in the WTO in tandem 
with the ISDS claims made by Philip Morris against the same legislation under international investment 
law. In contrast to the investment law ISDS system, claims against States under the WTO trade law 
system can only be brought by other States, not by corporations. Such claims are however typically 
brought by States for the benefit, if not at the behest, of influential corporations. Over the course of 
2012-2013, five countries (Ukraine, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Cuba and Indonesia) initiated 
proceedings against Australia in the WTO over its plain packaging legislation – all major tobacco 
exporters acting at the behest of their domestic tobacco manufacturing industries and/or multinational 
tobacco companies that operate within their jurisdiction.  
 
International trade law primarily imposes obligations on States to liberalise trade conditions. It does 
not explicitly provide for a State’s right to regulate in the public interest, but does allow for specific 
exceptions from the general rule of removing barriers to trade, including on public health grounds. The 
burden of proof will be on Australia to demonstrate that its legislation is as good as  ‘indispensable’ to 
the protection of human life or health, and the WTO dispute resolution body will assess whether such 
interference with trading conditions, branding methods and intellectual property rights is proportional 
to the health aims being pursued. Given the explicit public health exceptions in trade treaties, such 
legislation may be more likely to be upheld in the WTO judicial process than it might be in an ISDS 
investment tribunal. However, decisions weighing public health considerations favourably over the 
imperative to reduce barriers to trade are far from guaranteed. In 2011, for example, Thailand’s tax 
regulation of tobacco imports was successfully challenged at the WTO by the Philippines, at the behest 
of Philip Morris.  
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4.2 – Intellectual Property Rights  
 
TTIP is intended to complement and build on the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Any such expansion of the protection of intellectual property rights 
will be of major benefit to the pharmaceutical industry in both the US and the EU, and will have a 
tangible effect on healthcare costs. As it is, the existing TRIPS system itself is widely viewed as 
problematic, representing an unfair balance between the interests of pharmaceutical corporations and 
the value placed on public health. The TRIPS framework has contributed variously to increasing 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals, longer periods of pharmaceutical patent protection, and the denial of 
timely access to generic medicines. In this light, the efforts of the EU and the US to strengthen and 
extend intellectual property rights are likely to have negative rather than positive public health 
outcomes.  
 
 
4.3 – Technical Barriers to Trade (Non-Tariff Barriers) – Regulatory Harmonisation 
 
Regulatory convergence, cooperation and harmonisation are one of the most central issues in the TTIP 
negotiations. With tariffs between the US and EU largely eliminated, attention has shifted over time 
towards ‘technical barriers to trade’ – in essence, domestic rules and regulations. This category of 
barriers to trade is potentially extremely broad and not well defined, but as the chief source of 
frustration for business, technical barriers are now the primary focus of the drive for continued trade 
liberalisation. Yet many such regulations have evolved out of processes of long and arduous civil 
campaigns and legislative debates. They exist at a critical point where common economic conceptions 
of efficiency and other social conceptions of efficiency and socio-economic justice come into direct 
contact, and can often collide. An approach to regulatory harmonisation that does not take the social 
value of regulations to heart runs a serious risk of damaging the public interest, and public health in 
particular.  
 
Many are now deeply concerned that the unclear but extensive influence that a proposed new 
Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB), currently proposed within the framework of TTIP, will internalise 
an unbalanced approach to regulations. If care is not taken to ensure the continued policy space of 
States to regulate when necessary, in a timely manner and in a way that respects democratically 
determined preferences regarding approaches to risk assessment and risk management, public health 
and democratic self-determination will clearly be threatened. A re-think may be required in relation to 
setting up a new supra-national regulatory harmonisation regime that does not adequately provide for 
equitable and full public participation. The fate of the EU’s highly valued ‘precautionary principle’ may 
hang in the balance, and the question of whose voice will seek to influence the future direction of 
standard setting at the global level is open to serious debate.  
 
 
4.4 – Trade in Services 
 
The primary area of concern in relation to the services chapter of TTIP relates to the potential for the 
agreement to require that public health care services be opened up to private healthcare providers in 
the interests of market liberalisation and competition. As such, the risk exists that by facilitating greater 
privatisation of the health services sector, TTIP may lead to an increasing loss of government control, 
service quality and democratic accountability in this area. TTIP will ultimately contain an option for 
States to exempt public services, and those pertaining to health in particular, from the relevant 
provisions of the agreement. In this case, it is recommended that, in addition to the appropriate 
exclusions at the EU level, Ireland exclude its health services to the full extent possible. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The clear conclusion drawn from this study is that the predicted economic benefits from TTIP are too 
small or speculative to justify the associated social risks. The underlying structural causes of the 2008 
global financial crisis—and its ongoing impacts—were defined and exacerbated in large part by 
excessive power being granted to the market, as well as by failures to foreground the social effects of 
government policy and regulation, and, more importantly, the disastrous social effects of a lack of 
government regulation. The TTIP process ultimately risks the further disintegration of social fabrics, 
rather than their restitution. The study finds that the economic, social, legal and democratic cases for 
the imperative of TTIP are weak overall. As such, available political avenues should be pursued to bring 
about the suspension of its negotiation and a fundamental reappraisal of its basic justification and 
rationale. 
 
In the event that the political momentum in the negotiations ultimately continues, we set out a series 
of detailed recommendations at the end of the study with respect to all of the important sections of 
the agreement and all the main actors, delineating the basic safeguards necessary for any concluded 
TTIP agreement to have the least possible negative effect on public health.  
 
Some of the key recommendations in this regard are highlighted here. 
 
Key Recommendations 
It is recommended that, at the least, certain aspects of the current framework of the agreement be 
removed from the negotiations. These include the ISDS mechanism (in any form) and the Regulatory 
Cooperation Body. Both establish the new nature of TTIP among trade agreements as a so-called ‘living 
agreement’, allowing for the further extension of its disciplining effects on social and public interests 
well into the future, and in ways that cannot be predicted or foreseen. Given the broad range of threats 
to government regulatory autonomy and the democratic self-determination of peoples, this evolving 
aspect of TTIP, which may escape democratic control, should be rejected.  
 
In any eventual agreement, the following minimum safeguards should be established: 
o With regard to any dispute settlement system that may be included, there should be a provision 
requiring the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, and the adjudication process should be fully 
judicialised in line with the structure of WTO dispute settlement, including full transparency, a 
rule of precedent, ethical guidelines on the conduct of adjudicators, criteria for appointment 
equal to that of domestic judges, and the establishment of an appellate body with full review 
powers; 
o With respect to any Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) that may be included, there should be 
provision for a multi-stakeholder advisory committee, complete transparency, meaningful 
democratic oversight and accountability, with clear provision for approval from the European 
Parliament for any expansion in the regulatory agenda of the RCB and any adaptations to existing 
regulations and regulatory processes that may subsequently be incorporated into law; 
o A clause should be included that legally establishes the State’s right to regulate in the public 
interest, incorporating the principles of the WTO Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, with application to TTIP in its entirety;  
o A provision requiring the agreement to be interpreted and implemented in consistency with the 
obligations of States and the responsibilities of corporations and investors under international 
human rights law; 
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o A clause making clear that any regulatory harmonisation between the EU and the US must be in 
an upward direction to the level of the highest available standards of safety and security of the 
public interest; 
o A general exception clause should be included that does not adopt a test of necessity but employs 
a lower standard of causal connection for the exception of government measures ‘related to’ or 
‘reasonably understood as required for’ the stated public aims, also expressly excepting measures 
taken to fulfil States’ human rights obligations under international and domestic law. 
 
The following recommendations are made with respect to the main actors addressed in this study. 
The European Commission should: 
o Conduct a fully independent human rights impact assessment of TTIP as a whole, in addition to 
social and environmental impact assessments, as soon as possible to guide and inform future 
negotiations; 
o Provide complete transparency to the public in the conduct of negotiations, with respect to all 
documents and communications.  
 
The European Parliament should: 
o Take all available measures to exclude ISDS in any form from the agreement, reflecting the strong 
public opposition evident in the response to the Commission’s 2014 consultation; 
o Ensure that any dispute settlement system in TTIP mandates the prior exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, as indicated by the Parliament’s own resolution of 8 July 2015 requiring that “the 
jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States is respected”. 
 
The Irish government should:  
o Conduct national human rights, social and environmental impact assessments of TTIP; 
o Formulate a clear policy advocating exclusion of ISDS in any form from TTIP, given the country’s 
high risk of incurring serious costs from ISDS and its evident success in attracting US investment 
without taking this risk; 
o Establish an inter-departmental committee to assess the coherence of government policy on TTIP 
with respect to impacts on health, social issues and the environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 –Overview and Objectives of the Study 
 
The onset of negotiations between the EU and the US over a proposed Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) have coincided, for better or worse, with a period of deepening 
academic and public disillusionment regarding the economic and ideological underpinnings of such 
agreements. The aim, modalities and promises of trade liberalisation have now been subject to 
sustained criticism for nearly two decades, and more recently the investment liberalisation regime, 
which arguably has more extensive effects, has been similarly subjected to widespread dissent. A 
global financial and economic crisis on par with the Great Depression has deeply shaken faith in the 
Washington Consensus, neo-liberal free trade dogma and socially dis-embedded market-based 
paradigms of governance. Depressed economies, high unemployment and falling levels of social 
security, especially within the EU, have stoked public discontent with the dominant economic ideology 
and fanned popular frustrations. In a sense TTIP has found itself in a perfect storm, where even a 
liberalisation agreement between supposedly like-minded States of the global North is in danger of 
running aground.1 
The debate within the EU over the potential effects and implications of TTIP, especially with regard to 
the provision of public services and issues of social security broadly understood, has been fraught. 
There exists a high degree of uncertainty regarding facts, information and impacts at all levels; 
European institutions, national government, civil service, civil society, the public, the media, and the 
private sector. A large part of this stems from the lack of transparency in the European Commission’s 
approach to the agreement and its negotiations, and the disproportionate influence with the 
corporate sector appears to have wielded over the process to date.  
Widespread public concern, together with research and studies published to date, reflect the 
likelihood of distinct effects on public health in the EU from the advent of TTIP. Trade and investment 
agreements can have an impact on public health essentially because they exist to restrict the scope of 
government intervention in relation to specific areas of the economy. According to certain economic 
theories, this can be for good reasons – enabling freer economic activity across borders and inside 
domestic economies, which can lead to overall growth and higher living standards. Setting debates 
over economic theory and ideology aside, difficulties with the restriction of State economic action 
arise essentially because the idea of clear division between the economy as such and broader societal 
interests is ultimately a false construct. The two spheres are deeply interrelated and interdependent. 
Government action or inaction in one sphere will typically impact in multiple direct and indirect ways 
on the other. This situation is further complicated by the fact that the interests of the main actors in 
each sphere will often conflict.  
                                                          
1 As noted by Sauvé and Soprana, the last significant multilateral liberalisation agreement instituting the WTO in 1994 “was 
quite clearly the byproduct of a peculiar, “end of history” moment. It is doubtful that such disciplines could easily be replicated 
today given the vastly more questioning attitudes that pervade public policy debates on trade and investment liberalization 
relative to those characterizing the heyday of the Washington Consensus.” Pierre Sauvé and Marta Soprana, ‘Learning by Not 
Doing: Subsidy Disciplines in Services Trade’, E15 Task Force on Rethinking International Subsidies Disciplines Think Piece,  
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development/ World Economic Forum, April 2015, p. 11.  
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What becomes important then is the ability of government to balance the spheres and the interests 
of the actors. Trade and investment agreements affect that ability. By placing restrictions on 
governments in the area of the economy they inevitably have repercussions on the broader society. 
This is often understood as the effect these agreements have on the government’s ‘right to regulate’. 
The right to regulate in what is referred to as the ‘public interest’ is a central tenet of democratic rule, 
and public health, in turn, is one of the most important aspects of the public interest.  
This study seeks to build on and deepen the analysis of TTIP’s implications, with a specific focus on the 
proposed agreement’s implications on public health in Ireland. The majority of the research conducted 
to date on TTIP’s implications within Europe has been at a more abstracted EU level. Where previous 
studies have differentiated between EU and Member State impacts of TTIP the analysis has been 
focused on differences in purely economic impacts and does not adequately account for divergences 
in social impacts. One review for the European Parliament notes that “the economic structure of the 
EU is so differentiated that the likely impact of the any transatlantic deal will not be the same in all 
Member States. Member States' starting positions are not the same.”2 In fact, the review notes that 
“all studies converge in forecasting unequal gains for individual countries – as well as greater gains for 
the US than for the EU.”3 However, the 8 differentiated studies reviewed are all economic studies, 
which are of much value but do not provide the full picture, as social concerns are not properly 
accounted for. This is especially so in relation to the social value of regulations that are directly in 
TTIP’s firing line. Most of these regulations exist in the public interest and many directly protect public 
health. Yet the removal or ‘harmonisation’ of regulations accounts for almost all of the projected 
economic gains that are claimed to arise from various levels of liberalisation; the more regulatory 
differences removed the greater the purported economic benefits. Without an analysis of the social 
risks and costs, there can be no accurate picture of the overall implications of TTIP.  
The study is sensitive to Ireland’s specific economic situation; that is, its economic model, current 
financial, regulatory and social situation, medium-term economic prospects and its current 
institutional and policy structure in regard to public health. Ireland is heavily reliant on foreign direct 
investment and other inflows of foreign capital. Its economy is based on a strong export orientation, 
yet a disproportionate amount of export income accrues to foreign interests in the Irish economy, and 
is therefore of marginal value to the social sphere given an extraordinarily low corporate tax rate and 
an even lower effective tax rate. Ireland’s economic model is also based on high levels of openness to 
regional and global economies, and hence it is intimately affected by external shock or crisis as 
demonstrated in 2008. Furthermore, Ireland’s ongoing systemic economic crisis, though apparently 
lessening, has left it in a precarious financial situation with a significant if not unsustainable debt 
burden that is rooted in the socialisation of private bank debt.  
Perhaps more importantly, having implemented severe austerity measures that have significantly 
depressed social security and well-being, Ireland will now be under significant pressure to recover and 
expand social protections and public health provision in the future. In order to satisfy public demand, 
and to meet its international legal obligations to progressively realise the human right to health, 
peripheral European countries like Ireland will need a proportionately greater degree of policy space 
than core EU Member States which have not undergone structural adjustment programmes imposed 
by international lenders, and retain more robust public finances. Due to its dependence on external 
sources of capital, curtailed domestic finances, weak economic position and high susceptibility to 
external financial and economic fluctuations, Ireland will be more affected by the advent of TTIP in 
                                                          
2 Roberto Bendini and Pasquale De Micco, ‘The Expected Impact of the TTIP on EU Member States and Selected Third 
Countries’, European Parliament, DG for External Policies, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_119, September 2014, p. 4.  
3 Ibid, p. 21.  
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relative terms. As such, it is suggested that Ireland must pay particularly close attention to the 
potential social and financial costs of TTIP, as well as the special implications of lost policy space.  
The study is also attendant to the ideological dimension of TTIP that may be its main driving force. 
There is a strong desire among those positively disposed to TTIP to believe, despite very little evidence, 
that TTIP can save the US and the EU from economic stagnation and catapult a new transatlantic 
economy into a higher gear. Without a foundation for such broad economic hopes, TTIP may 
ultimately lead only to deeper inequality, social division and political instability. At the very least, TTIP 
represents a large risk as a novel and far-reaching piece of international legislation. It may result in 
quite dramatic social changes in the EU and US, as well as further entrenching powerful interests in 
the global North to the detriment of socio-economic development in the global South. An 
international legislative step with such potentially profound economic and social consequences should 
not be taken in the absence of very clear indications of concrete and dependable benefits.  
Finally, to a certain degree this study incorporates a perspective on public health systems and 
governance grounded in a human rights-based approach, but does not base its analysis solely on this 
approach. The study itself does not explicitly advocate for this or any other particular approach to 
public health, beyond one that is sufficiently inclusive, well-considered and evidence-based to 
properly encompass the social dimensions. Instead, the study utilises some rights-based perspectives 
and arguments to illuminate and highlight certain impacts that might otherwise be considered 
marginal, and easily, though wrongly, passed over. This is particularly useful in terms of broader 
structural issues and impacts. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is under an obligation to ensure 
respect for human rights in its actions and policy-making, including the negotiation and 
implementation of international agreements. In addition, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is now 
binding on the EU. As such, a rights-based approach to government policy-making may now be 
considered mandatory, and the ability of Member States to exercise policy space in this regard should 
not be compromised. This must be taken into account in negotiations on international instruments 
such as TTIP that have a strong potential to impinge on the ability of States to meet their international 
legal obligations, specifically in relation to economic, social and cultural rights. If TTIP goes ahead as 
planned, this will become a more difficult and expensive exercise, as such policy space will be heavily 
contested by foreign investors and complicated by a process of regulatory harmonisation.  
In this light, the study addresses the likely implications of TTIP on public health in Ireland under three 
categories:  
- general or cross-cutting considerations on benefits and costs from both economic and social 
perspectives (Chapter 2);  
- the impact of investment provisions (Chapter 3); 
- the impact of trade provisions (Chapter 4).   
 
Proportionately more space is devoted to the impact of investment provisions, due to the fact that 
investor protection and the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system represents one of the 
areas that will have the most impact on public health, and is perhaps the most controversial. There is 
general consensus in the field of international economic law that, taken as a whole, the international 
investment law regime is even more restrictive of the policy space of governments to regulate in the 
public interest than the trade regime.4 Investment and ISDS is therefore dealt with in the greatest 
detail. The other area of greatest likely impact is regulatory cooperation, which is addressed within 
                                                          
4 Markus Wagner, ‘Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law’ 36 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2014), p. 2.  
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the chapter on the impact of trade provisions. This analysis includes close attention to intellectual 
property, trade in services and, due to its direct relation to public health, the implications and lessons 
to be learned from the current challenges in the WTO to Australia’s tobacco plain packaging 
legislation. The broader effects of TTIP on the future directions of government health policy are 
discussed in Chapter 2.   
On the basis of this analysis, recommendations are formulated and directed to three categories of 
addressees; civil society, the Irish Government and relevant EU Institutions. The study is ultimately 
intended to provide an evidentiary and analytic framework that may better inform public 
engagement, advocacy strategy and government policy-making with respect to economic 
liberalisation and public health within Ireland and further afield.  
 
1.2 – A Brief History of International Trade and Investment Regulation 
 
Traditionally, the regulation of economic activity within a State’s borders was subject mostly to the 
discretion of the government of the day. States retained a high degree of autonomy in the 
management of their domestic economies, which was subject almost entirely to domestic legal and 
political constraints alone, including with respect to foreign economic actors. Few limits in the form 
of international legal obligations existed to restrict what was a very significant scope of ‘regulatory 
space’, especially with respect to decision making on social or non-economic issues including those 
related to important public interests such as health, the environment and economic redistribution.      
This situation began to change markedly with the establishment of new international institutions and 
legal regimes following the Second World War. In the late 1940s, efforts intensified to construct an 
international trade and investment regime that would have deep implications for State regulatory 
space. These efforts culminated in the form of the Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organisation,5 which treated international trade and foreign investment collectively and sought to 
establish an international institution that would govern both. The organisation never came into being, 
primarily due to US reluctance and concerns over sovereignty, but the trade section of the agreement 
survived and became the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was widely adopted.  
At this point the evolution of international trade and investment regulation was split in two. Trade 
regulation evolved through the framework of GATT, which set a legal and institutional framework that, 
although weak and amorphous and structurally biased in many respects, served to contain and to 
some extent mitigate fundamental divergences in the interests of developed and developing 
countries. This has resulted in the international trade law regime adopting balancing elements to 
account for national, public and social interests that may oppose the regime’s primary goal of trade 
liberalisation. Because of its long institutionalisation and its multilateral nature, involving almost all 
States, the trade regime has had to reconcile many diverging viewpoints. Although far from perfect, it 
has succeeded in establishing some significant in-built mechanisms for weighing and adjudicating 
between competing national, social and economic goals.  
The GATT was eventually replaced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994, which solidified 
the institutional structure of the trade regime and added significantly to the scope of its regulation 
and the depth of its enforcement. The GATT itself covered both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
                                                          
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, 21 November 1947 – 27 March 1948, Final Act and 
Related Documents (Havana Charter), UN Doc. E/CONF.2/78, April 1948. 
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in goods, yet its implementation in practice was initially centred on tariffs and only later did States 
begin to focus on removing non-tariff barriers. With the advent of the WTO this trend accelerated, 
and ever more disputes are related to non-tariff or ‘regulatory barriers’ to trade, particularly in the 
areas of health and the environment. In response to pressure from the global North, the WTO also 
added rules and instruments in a number of other areas, including trade in services, intellectual 
property rights and trade-related investment measures. It also introduced a comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism in the form of the WTO Dispute Settlement system, consisting of panels that 
adjudicate disputes between States related to any of the WTO agreements, as well as an Appellate 
Body that is fully empowered to review the panel’s decisions and uphold or discard them.  
Following the establishment of the WTO, further multilateral trade liberalisation has become 
increasingly difficult for a number of reasons. These are mostly related to old themes involving a basic 
conflict between demand from global North members for greater liberalisation that by nature further 
reduces domestic regulatory space, and resistance from global South members in an effort to retain 
what control over their domestic economies they have. Developing countries as a whole have become 
increasingly burdened and dissatisfied with the system, while developed countries are increasingly 
frustrated with the resistance of the developing world to further trade liberalisation and the 
establishment of additional rules in new areas. North/South cleavages have widened over time and 
the latest Doha Round of negotiations, which is nominally devoted to the idea of development, has 
been effectively stalled for 15 years. From the North’s point of view, this ‘failure’ at the multilateral 
level, enabled by the weight of numbers being on the side of the South, has been to some extent 
redeemable through a surge in establishing bilateral and regional trade agreements (which also 
include investment treaty components). The TTIP negotiations, as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), are prime examples 
of this, aiming to extend further WTO-plus liberalisation in a piecemeal and uneven fashion.  
It bears emphasising that while the evolution of trade agreements has led to a certain accommodation 
of social interests through a minimal recognition of the right to regulate, this is highly limited. In this 
regard it is worth paying attention to a passage from Krajewski and Kynast.  Accordingly, all free trade 
agreements 
perceive regulatory or quantitative restrictions on trade as trade barriers that must be 
dismantled. Free trade agreements are thus not oriented towards protecting certain 
quality standards or organisational models of public services or making them binding. 
Rather free trade agreements typically contain provisions that seek to restrict the scope 
of state regulation, including with regard to public services. This yields the important 
insight that elements of free trade agreements ostensibly aimed at protecting public 
services are structurally defensive instruments. They as a rule do not impose positive 
state obligations concerning the provision and regulation of public services, but contain 
definitions of derogations and justifications. This is an important point because 
derogation and justification clauses are generally interpreted strictly. If a state invokes 
them it bears the burden of demonstration and proof that the regulations in question are 
relevant and can be applied.6 
On the other hand, investment regulation has developed in a very different manner. Of central 
significance is the fact that it has evolved, and continues to evolve, without the benefit of any 
                                                          
6 Markus Krajewski and Britta Kynast, ‘Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on the Legal 
Framework for Public Services in Europe’, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1 October 
2014, pp. 14-15.  
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multilateral institution. It is arguably for this central reason that it has not, as yet, reached the same 
level of balance and accommodation as the trade regime, especially with respect to potential 
divergence between investment liberalisation and the public interest, notably including health policy.  
In short, the fundamental obstacles to both trade and investment liberalisation are at base linked to 
differences in interests between global North and South. These differences proved easier to overcome 
or circumvent in the trade context, and allowed the institution of a multilateral regime. However, even 
that is now widely believed to be under some threat.  
In the investment context, the vastly diverging interests of traditional capital-importing and capital-
exporting States could not be overcome at a global level. The fate of the Havana Charter was the first 
manifestation of this, and it was followed by a period where protections for foreign investors were 
relatively weak and largely limited to customary international law and diplomatic protection. Although 
disputed, again along North/South lines, the customary standard allows a wide latitude for domestic 
control over the activities of foreign investors, and has traditionally allowed States to implement a 
wide range of appropriate safeguards necessary to protect their national policies and priorities, short 
of outright expropriation without compensation. These minimal standards were confirmed in the 
1960s and 70s through a series of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions aimed at the creation 
of a New International Economic Order,7 which were nonetheless opposed by most of the global 
North’s capital-exporting States. Notably, these resolutions set out an understanding that any dispute 
between a foreign investor and the host State must be resolved in the domestic courts of that State.8  
Again demonstrating deep disagreement over the desired shape of investment protection, a Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property was produced by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1967.9 However, the Convention did not get sufficient 
support within the OECD to be opened for signature. This is a significant point as it demonstrates the 
longstanding refusal of developed countries to enter into the constraints of investment treaties where 
developing countries are not similarly constrained. Nevertheless, the principles and structure of the 
Draft Convention went on to directly inform the basis of later BITs, explaining their current relative 
homogeneity.10 
Another attempt at the multilateral level was made in the late 1990s, again under the auspices of the 
OECD, in the form of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which also ultimately ran 
aground. Once the negotiations and the text became public knowledge, an unprecedented wave of 
global popular opinion rose in opposition.11 The UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities also expressed deep misgivings:  
                                                          
7 The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN Doc. A/Res/S-6/3201, 1 May 1974; 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN Doc. A/5217, 14 December 1962; and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, UN Doc. A/Res/29/3281, 12 December 1974. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic 
Order (Holmes and Meier, New York, 1979). 
8 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN Doc. A/5217, 14 December 1962, para 4. 
9 Resolution of the OECD on the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, OECD Publication No. 23081, 7 ILM 
117, 12 October 1967. This convention was based on the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, named 
after its principle creators; Herman Joseph Abs was then Chairman of Deutsche Bank, and Lord Hartley Shawcross was then 
Director of the Shell Petroleum Company.  
10 Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1995), p. 3.  
11 Encompassing many of the objections, one Canadian NGO, for example, took a court action aimed at stopping the Canadian 
government from being involved in negotiations on the MAI, arguing that the proposed agreement was contrary to the 
Canadian constitution. Michel Chossudovsky, ‘Fighting MAIgalomania: Canadian Citizens Sue their Government’ 29 The 
Ecologist 8 (1999), pp. 449-51. 
 27 
 
particularly about the extent to which the Agreement might limit the capacity of States to take 
proactive steps to ensure the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by all people, 
creating benefits for a small privileged minority at the expense of an increasingly 
disenfranchised majority.12 
OECD members were unable to agree on certain fundamental issues, such as Canadian and French 
proposals of exceptions for cultural protection and German calls for “social and ecological 
compatibility.”13 One expert observes that: 
the long years of negotiation of the MAI showed the developed states that the rules they seek 
to impose on the developing world may prove too onerous to bear when applied to themselves. 
They could not brook the loss of sovereignty that the MAI entailed.14  
In addition, developing countries were also understandably uninterested in any possible future 
accession to a multilateral treaty which they had absolutely no part in formulating.  
Following the failure of the MAI, the issue was taken up by global North States in the WTO.15  The WTO 
already contained some limited provisions on investment in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), but a Working Group on Investment was set up in 1997 to push for 
further investment protections. Most developing countries, led by India, did not wish to negotiate 
further on investment within the WTO at all,16 and ultimately these plans have been stalled for the 
duration of the Doha Round.  
In response to the ongoing struggle over the shape of protection for their investors and the difficulty 
of bypassing global South resistance in multilateral settings, global North States began to pursue 
concerted programmes in the mid-1980s to conclude a web of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 
developing countries. BIT programmes were designed as a strategy of the dominant developed 
countries “to change the dynamics of this struggle and protect the interests of their companies and 
investors.”17 This bilateral treaty programme was accelerated significantly in the 1990s. Central to the 
enhancment of protection for investors in developing countries was the construction of an ISDS 
regime whereby, in the event that their interests were adversely affected by host State policy or 
regulation, foreign investors could bypass the domestic legal system in the host State entirely and 
bring their claim before an international investment aribtration tribunal such as the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington. The development of the 
international investment law regime and ISDS is outlined in further detail in Chapter 3.  
This strategic shift by the global North to bilateralism and regionalism in the investment sphere has 
now been mirrored by a similar move in the trade context, as noted above. The two have begun to 
merge, and increasingly we are seeing the conclusion of bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements 
containing provisions on both trade and investment together, led by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and culminating now in the TPP, CETA and TTIP.  
                                                          
12 Quoted in Christopher Harding, Uta Kohl and Naomi Salmon, Human Rights in the Market Place: The Exploitation of Rights 
Protection by Economic Actors (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008), p. 195.   
13 Aaron Cosbey (et al), ‘Investment and Sustainable Development: A Guide to the Use and Potential of International 
Investment Agreements’, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, 2004, p. 22.  
14 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, Third Edition (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010), p. 261.  
15 Aaron Cosbey (et al), ‘Investment and Sustainable Development: A Guide to the Use and Potential of International 
Investment Agreements’, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, 2004, pp.24-5.  
16 Bhagirath Lal Das, ‘Comments on the Forthcoming Work on Investment in the WTO’ 6 SEATINI Bulletin 7 (2003).  
17 Jeswald Salacuse, ‘The Treatification of International Investment Law’ 13 Law & Business Review of the Americas 1 (2007), 
p. 156.  
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This may be seen as demonstrating a rough ‘closing of the circle’ from the Havana Charter, but only 
to a very limited extent. The two regimes of trade and investment law have grown in very different 
directions, and the many ways in which they diverge will not be masked over simply by placing a BIT 
next to a free trade agreement. Besides the difference in balance mentioned above in relation to 
State’s regulatory space, there are also differences in the methods of enforcement, remedies, and 
between the basic uniformity of agreements in trade versus the high fragmentation in investment. 
And perhaps the most fundamental difference relates to the respective construction of legal subjects: 
world trade law remaining a State-centric field, while international investment law now directly 
elevates foreign investors and multinational corporations. Many see the root of this divergence in the 
vastly different modes of dispute settlement. Where the trade law regime employs a court-like 
structure of standing or permanent adjudicators and an appellate body, the investment law regime 
depends on a shifting system of ad hoc tribunals consisting of arbitrators newly chosen by the parties 
in every dispute, with no appellate body. In getting at the core of the current divergence in these 
regimes, academic commentators have suggested that while trade is about “overall welfare, 
efficiency, liberalization, state-to-state exchanges of market access, and trade opportunities”, 
investment is “about protection”.18 Yet despite their differences, “they both raise similar questions 
with respect to the amount of regulatory space that is accorded to domestic decision-makers.”19 
In this context, global South resistance to the international investment law regime in particular, in 
both bilateral and multilateral settings, has increased due to greater awareness of the problematic 
nature of BITs and other international investment agreements, raised by the increasing number of 
claims being made by investors against States under these treaties in cases where important public 
interests such as health, the environment and human rights are at issue.20 In addition, these countries 
have begun to reconsider the wisdom of surrendering sovereignty in this area in the face of a 
continued lack of solid evidence supporting their underlying promise, that entry into investment 
treaties results in greater inflows of foreign investment.21 Latin American countries in particular have 
begun to withdraw in recent years from bilateral investment treaties and the jurisdiction of ISDS 
mechanisms. The experience of the global South in this regard provides a cautionary tale in the context 
of TTIP, especially for the EU’s peripheral members. 
 
1.3 – The TTIP Negotiations in Context 
 
The question of democratic control is central to the debates and controversies over TTIP. Proponents 
argue that even if it entails a slight dilution of democratic control, on balance this can be justified in 
terms of economic gain. On both sides of the Atlantic, economic integration between the EU and US 
has been viewed for some time as highly desirable by powerful interests, albeit difficult to carry out 
in some respects given persistent points of difference amidst the general consensus. Regulatory 
harmonisation has been perhaps the most significant stumbling block. Deeper integration has been 
raised progressively higher on the agenda of transatlantic relations since the end of the Cold War, and 
                                                          
18 Nicholas Di Mascio and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of 
the Same Coin?’ 102 American Journal of International Law (2008), pp. 54, 56.  
19 Markus Wagner, ‘Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law’ 36 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2014), p. 14.  
20 Yash Tandon, ‘Negotiations on the Singapore Issues Should not Begin’ 6 SEATINI Bulletin 7 (2003). 
21 The weight of evidence suggests that BITs do not increase investment inflows, and that their presence or absence does not 
significantly factor into executive investment decisions of multinationals or into calculations by political risk insurance 
companies. Jason Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative 
Evidence’ 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 2 (2011).  
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has come to take on particular significance in recent years given the rise of developing economies and 
a loss of influence in the WTO. The EU and the US have come to view closer economic relations and 
transatlantic regional development as an important counterweight to the growing influence of Asia in 
the global marketplace.   
In 2007, the Transatlantic Economic Council was created, with the aim of intensifying cooperation in 
the areas of investment, trade, regulatory cooperation, intellectual property, technological innovation 
and financial markets. Following the global financial crisis, both sides of the Atlantic were preoccupied 
with fighting deep recessions and protectionist impulses, with little time or inclination towards 
cooperation beyond that necessary to stabilise financial systems and salvage national economies and 
financial institutions in freefall. In November 2011, the EU and US appointed a High-Level Working 
Group of senior government officials to reinvigorate cooperation and investigate the scope for a 
possible trade and investment pact. In 2013, with stability attained and new norms of economic 
malaise and creeping growth established, the EU and the US decided to begin negotiations to create 
a new transatlantic free trade area. 
The EU’s negotiating mandate states that the objective of TTIP: 
is to increase trade and investment between the EU and the US by realising the untapped 
potential of a truly transatlantic market place, generating new economic opportunities for the 
creation of jobs and growth through increased market access and greater regulatory 
compatibility and setting the path for global standards.22 
Together the EU and the US account for more than 50% of the world’s GDP, and the current 
transatlantic marketplace already generates 15 million jobs and US$5.3 billion in commercial sales.23 
Tariffs on the transatlantic goods trade are already very low. The main gains from TTIP are expected 
to come from removing bureaucratic hurdles and better aligning product standards and other 
regulations. The market access that the EU mandate mentions mainly refers to the aims of the 
agreement to further open services and government procurement markets, but the advances in these 
areas are not expected to be overly large. Through the inclusion of investment provisions and ISDS, 
the hope is also to induce greater foreign investment through providing higher protections, although 
again this is not a particularly significant expected source of gains. It is believed that deeper economic 
integration will have an impact on global markets and provide greater gravity to the centralisation of 
world economic activity around the transatlantic axis, providing the EU and the US together with more 
influence over crucial standard setting procedures that could provide notable economic and status 
gains. This projection is highly speculative, however. 
As such, the main focus of negotiations is on: 1) regulatory issues and bureaucratic alignment; 2) 
opening services and procurement markets; and 3) investment protection. On the trade side of TTIP, 
issues of regulatory cooperation and efforts to open services markets will have a large potential effect 
on the lives of EU citizens. Of perhaps greatest significance is the mooted creation of a new supra-
national regulatory oversight body with an open-ended mandate. The potential long-term influence 
of this body would seem to be very large. On the investment side, the inclusion of the ISDS procedure 
would similarly entail significant long-term effects. And much as some proponents hope that advances 
in trade negotiations between the two parties outside the context of the WTO will catalyse a renewed 
                                                          
22 Council of the European Union, ‘Directives for the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the European Union and the United States’, Brussels, 11103/13, 17 June 2013, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf. 
23 Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan, ‘The Transatlantic Economy 2013: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment’, 
Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2013.  
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vigour for further global trade liberalisation at the multilateral level, some also entertain the notion 
that advances in investment treaty making in TTIP will prompt much-needed reform of the 
international investment law regime. These presumed institutional advances reflect the idea TTIP as 
a so-called ‘living agreement’, extending its liberalisation agenda beyond the actual terms of the 
agreement itself.  
This market liberalisation agenda in general has attracted significant criticism for its potential to 
undermine democracy and government agency.24 In the public sphere, negotiations on TTIP have 
sparked widespread and numerous demonstrations, with scepticism proliferating among citizens and 
law-makers on both sides of the Atlantic as more information about the agreement and its likely 
impacts comes into the public domain and consciousness. Such scepticism has underpinned President 
Obama’s difficulties in obtaining Trade Promotion Authority from the US legislative houses,25 and the 
postponement of a crucial vote on TTIP in the European Parliament due to deep disagreement over 
the inclusion of ISDS.26  
It is important to note the extent to which TTIP would expand the reach of ISDS. There are over 3,000 
BITs currently in existence, but which only cover approximately 16% coverage of total foreign 
investment around the world. This is because the vast majority of treaties are between one global 
North (investor) State and one global South (host) State, while the bulk of foreign investment flows in 
financial terms remains within the global North. To date, only relatively low levels of North-North 
flows are covered, because of the lack of bilateral investment agreements between Northern States. 
Only 15-20% of US outward foreign investment is currently covered by an investment agreement; TTIP 
would increase that coverage by an additional 50-60%.27  
ISDS is certainly the most controversial element in the debates within the EU around TTIP. Public 
opposition is particularly strong in Germany, and the German government may be leaning towards 
the view that ISDS is not necessary in an agreement between the US and the EU,28 with many arguing 
that the protections afforded by domestic courts are sufficient. In response to such a level of concern, 
and in accord with its negotiating mandate,29 the European Commission suspended negotiations on 
this element and initiated a public consultation in March 2014. The guiding question was essentially 
whether the EU’s proposed approach to the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP would achieve a just balance 
between the aim of increased investor protection and the safeguarding of governmental ability to 
regulate in the public interest. The consultation drew the highest amount of responses of any 
previously held (almost 150,000), from a broad cross-section of stakeholders, the overwhelming 
                                                          
24 Dani Rodrik, The Globalisation Paradox: Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can’t Coexist (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011) 
25 Ben Jacobs, ‘Defeat for Obama on trade as Democrats vote against him’, The Guardian, 12 June 2015; Dan Roberts and Paul 
Lewis, ‘Obama's bid for 'fast track' negotiating authority survives key Senate vote’, The Guardian, 23 June 2015 
26 Suzanne Lynch, ‘European Parliament Postpones Transatlantic Trade Vote’, Irish Times, 9 June 2015.  
27 Gus Van Harten, ‘Comments on the European Commission’s Approach to Investor-State Arbitration in TTIP and CETA’, 
Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 59, Volume 10, Issue 13, 2014, pp. 30-31. 
28 Letter of Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel to Commissioner Karel de Gucht, dated 26 March 2014. However, it must be said 
that Germany’s overall position on this question is somewhat ambiguous, as Gabriel has also commissioned a study by a 
prominent expert in international economic law, Professor Markus Krajewski, setting out a proposed investment chapter that 
includes ISDS; Markus Krajewski, ‘Project No. 83/15 of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Model bilateral 
investment treaty with investor-state dispute settlement for industrial countries, giving consideration to the U.S.’ There is 
some speculation over whether this proposal may inform a new German position. Nevertheless, there have been reports that 
Germany and France may be discussing a joint opposition to the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP; Cécile Barbière, ‘France and 
Germany to form united front against ISDS’, Euractiv.com, 15 January 2015..  
29 “If the commission considers it necessary it may postpone the negotiation process after a hearing to engage in a more 
extensive consultation process.” Council of the European Union, ‘Directives for the Negotiation of a Comprehensive Trade and 
Investment Agreement, Called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, between the European Union and the 
United States of America’, Brussels, 17 June 2013, para 5.  
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majority of which advocated against the inclusion of ISDS. European Trade Commissioner, Cecilia 
Malmström, admitted that “[t]he consultation clearly shows that there is a huge scepticism against 
the ISDS instrument.”30  
The Commission’s Report on the consultation indicated that “[i]n general, many respondents 
recognise the EU’s efforts to improve the investment protection system, but consider for various 
reasons that the approach is insufficient. A significant number of trade unions and a large group of 
NGOs stress the need to strengthen the right to regulate in the public interest.”31 Within the business 
community, on the other hand, “despite overall support for a more inclusive and coherent ISDS 
system, characterised by transparency and ethics”, there were concerns that “this could make the EU 
less attractive to foreign investment.”32 
The Commission seems to view this consultation only as a first step, envisaging “further discussions” 
with the other EU institutions and stakeholders. The following four central areas were identified for 
special further improvement: 
- the protection of the right to regulate; 
- the supervision and functioning of arbitral tribunals; 
- the relationship between ISDS arbitration and domestic remedies; 
- the review of ISDS decisions for legal correctness through an appellate mechanism. 
According to the Commission, “negotiations on investment in TTIP … will only resume once the 
Commission has come to the assessment that its new proposals guarantee among other things that 
the jurisdiction of courts in the EU Member States will not be limited by special regimes for investor-
to-state-disputes.”33 On the surface, this would seem to be a very difficult guarantee to make unless 
an exhaustion of domestic remedies rule is put in place.  
The difficulty lies in the fact that the very aim to restrict EU and Member State legal, regulatory and 
policy space is effectively the raison d’etre of the TTIP and other such trade and investment 
liberalisation agreements. The idea is to limit State and EU intervention, entailing reduced regulatory 
capacity and national sovereignty. The question as such, especially if ISDS is to be included, is not 
whether EU and Member State law and policy will be restricted, but by how much it will be restricted.   
In the meantime, there have been no formal adjustments to the mandate of the Commission, which 
remains under the expectation that it will continue to negotiate the inclusion of ISDS and to secure 
agreement on the outstanding issues. The ultimate decision on ISDS will be left until “the final phase 
of the negotiations.”34  
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Christian Oliver, ‘Public backlash threatens EU trade deal with the US’, Financial Times, 13 January 2015.  
31  EU Commission, Report on the online consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement in 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement, Memo/14/560, 13 January 2015, p. 3.  
32 Ibid, p. 3.  
33 Ibid, p. 1. 
34 Ibid, p. 4.  
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1.4 – TTIP and Public Health 
 
Despite a certain amount of privatisation of the health sector in many countries, health care in the EU 
is still seen as a fundamentally public service that is provided and regulated according to a social and 
ethical rationale, rather than a primarily market-based or economic enterprise. Public health is 
therefore inseparable from the idea of democratic autonomy exercised through representative 
government, free to develop and implement policy according to the changing health needs of the 
population and available scientific knowledge and technologies. The fact of changing needs is 
important. What may be required by sound public health policy in 10 years time may well differ in 
significant ways from that required today. Government freedom to respond to the evolving needs and 
wishes of the people is a critical attribute of government itself.  
Two fundamental aspects of trade and investment agreements act to limit this freedom. In the first 
instance, the agreements are there for precisely that purpose - the whole idea is that these 
agreements are commitment devices, where the government of the day commits to bind the hands 
of future governments. To be clear, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Placing checks on State power 
can have great benefits in many areas, and indeed this is the rationale underpinning the socially 
progressive aspects of international law. However, the ultimate benefits of these commitments will 
depend on the nature of the areas at issue and the details of the rules created and flexibilities allowed.  
Secondly, by nature these are liberalisation instruments that seek to open up previously government 
regulated or otherwise protected sections of the economy to the private sector and to foreign 
investment and market access. Extreme caution needs to be exercised here. While increased private 
and foreign economic activity may be beneficial in certain regards, it is also potentially highly 
detrimental in others. The interests of ‘stakeholders’ will vary significantly, especially in what are 
referred to in trade terms as ‘sensitive sectors’, such as the health sector. Public services may be 
transformed and eroded through the process of liberalisation and privatisation. In the absence of an 
international trade or investment agreement, this may be done domestically on a voluntary basis with 
the assent of the people, but it may also be easily reversed if that assent is withdrawn in the future. 
Binding international trade and investment agreements change that situation significantly, by acting 
to make it far more difficult to reverse course in response to popular wishes, new evidence, adverse 
experiences or even public emergencies. As noted by one prominent specialist in the field:  
if regulatory frameworks are not developed or fully implemented before private companies 
begin supplying a particular service it may become difficult to introduce regulations and 
activity controls once private actors have started to operate on the market. This situation may 
also give rise to claims under standards of international economic law such as national 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment or market access.35 
Trade and investment agreements confer new rights and protections on the foreign economic actors 
that enter a liberalised sector if and when it is opened. The rights and protections are conferred 
directly on foreign investors by investment provisions, while trade provisions enable corporate actors 
to pressure host States through the advocacy of their case by their home State, which can also take 
legal action against the host on the corporate actor’s behalf. The result is often referred to as the 
                                                          
35 Markus Krajewski, ‘Investment Law and Public Services’, 1 April 2012, p. 5, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038514. 
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‘locking-in’ effect of the trade and investment regimes,36 or alternatively the ‘disciplining’ effect,37 and 
it is demonstrated clearly in the case of Argentina. Here, the attempted State reversal of a decade of 
extensive trade and investment liberalisation measures in the 1990s, in response to the country’s 
severe economic crisis from 1999, was successfully challenged by numerous foreign investors who 
were awarded large amounts of damages by ad-hoc international investment tribunals.38  
Public health has numerous elements, from health services and medicines, to the quality of food and 
water. Because of the broad scope of both public health and trade and investment agreements, there 
are many points of intersection. At each of these points the State’s right to regulate becomes crucial 
in order to balance the competing interests involved. The international trade law regime has long been 
subject to critique on the basis that many of its provisions negatively affect this right, potentially 
leading to lower standards of public health and an erosion of the capacity of governments to 
implement the will of the people.  
Reflecting the importance of health services, criticism has centred around the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).39 The liberalisation of services, which is facilitated by GATS 
and subsequent free trade agreements, can have consequences for the government’s ability to control 
new entries into the marketplace for health services, depending on how open to foreign and private 
service providers that market is in the first place, and how carefully subsequent regulations are drawn 
up.40 The substantive or binding provisions of these international agreements on services will 
ultimately affect the permissible shape of domestic regulations. Flexibilities and exclusionary 
mechanisms exist to protect certain sectors and regulatory space, but much depends on the details, 
and clauses need to be worded and positioned precisely to allow proper protection of the State’s 
capacity to regulate in the interests of public health. 
Public health policy may also be affected by sections in trade agreements establishing rules in the 
areas of intellectual property and, perhaps most importantly, regulatory cooperation. These are 
addressed in detail in Chapter 4. Intellectual property provisions have an effect on the price and 
availability of medicines, the activities of pharmaceutical companies and the freedom of information 
necessary to produce the goods needed to improve public health standards.  Rules on sanitary 
methods have obvious effects on public health through setting or relaxing standards for the supply of 
food and beverages on the market. And rules on regulatory cooperation, alignment and harmonisation 
will have extensive and direct effects on the State’s right to regulate.  
As noted, however, trade agreements typically do have a number of built-in flexibilities, through 
exclusionary and exception devices with respect to substantive rules, which help to protect the State’s 
regulatory discretion in certain circumstances. The right to regulate is expressly mentioned in trade 
agreements, albeit in a negative fashion as something to be preserved, not activiely progressively 
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enforced. Investment agreements, on the other hand, do not tend to contain such exception clauses 
or specifically mention the State’s right to regulate. While this may be changing slowly,41 existing 
investment agreements are fundamentally unbalanced in the sense that on the one hand they place 
only duties on States but do not confer rights, while on the other hand they confer only rights on 
foreign investors but do not impose any specific duties (other than assumed duties already existing 
under domestic law). Under these unbalanced conditions, it is not difficult to see how trade and 
investment agreements, and disputes thereunder, could easily compromise the State’s right to 
regulate in the interests of public health.42  
The most problematic clauses in these agreements have related to the ‘minimum standards of 
treatment’, specifically the requirement that the government accord ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to 
foreign investors, and the clause on expropriation, particularly the notion of ‘indirect’ or ‘creeping’ 
expropriation. These phrases provide broad protections for foreign investors that have been widened 
even further by expansive interpretations of ad-hoc arbitral tribunals. Claims have been brought 
challenging government regulation on the location of hazardous waste dumps, municipal water 
concessions, environmental regulations, and the patenting of medicines, on the basis of investor 
protection. There are indeed a myriad of ways in which investment agreements may affect public 
health, and there is reason to believe that the many ISDS claims already seen are merely tip of the 
iceberg. This fundamental challenge to regulatory activity provides the backdrop against which TTIP is 
being negotiated.  
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2. GENERAL IMPACTS OF TTIP ON PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY IN 
IRELAND 
  
 
According to the general theory, the benefits of TTIP are expected to materialise primarily in the form 
of increased profitability, economic opportunities, market sales and revenues for EU multinationals and 
investors in the US and US investors in the EU. Benefits for domestic exporters will arise from reductions 
or eliminations of tariffs. However, as mentioned, the relevant tariffs are already quite low therefore 
gains for domestic exporters will not be especially significant. There are other subsidiary benefits that 
are claimed to arise from trade and investment agreements, for example in the form of greater 
efficiency of domestic businesses through increased competition, general improvements in 
government management and the rule of law, and purported gains in the quality of democratic 
governance and respect for human rights. However, these theoretical subsidiary benefits are posited 
mostly in relation to the action of these agreements in developing countries, and are in any case 
disputed. Both the EU and US economies have been liberalised and democratic for long enough that 
these subsidiary gains are not expected to be significant from TTIP. On the contrary, as this study shows, 
there are substantial reasons to conclude that TTIP may lead to a deterioration in democratic 
governance and management, and a potentially decreased respect for human rights.  
The main benefits to the people of the EU and Ireland are therefore economic or financial. Theoretically 
these will accrue through a trickle-down process whereby the direct financial and other benefits to 
multinationals and investors are transmitted downwards. This may occur in many ways. Most directly 
it may happen through increased employment if new investors are enticed to cross the Atlantic and 
start new businesses, creating increased employment opportunities. Alternatively, already established 
investors may reinvest their extra earnings in local job creation. In another scenario trickle-down may 
occur through increased tax revenue to the State from the extra financial gains and economic activity 
of investors, which may then be spent on social services and public projects. The final major form of 
trickle-down is potentially through linkages between foreign owned businesses and local companies 
that supply them with goods and services or otherwise benefit from their presence. The general idea is 
that governments should minimise their intervention in, and regulation of, this process, and let the 
markets and efficient market actors distribute the benefits naturally.  
It must be noted that an automatic trickle-down theory of economics, upon which the bulk of benefits 
from TTIP ultimately depend in the above theory, has been thoroughly rejected by many of the world’s 
most prominent economists and even by IMF research.43 If a trickle down does occur the key factor is 
government intervention and management, to actively steer some of the gains accruing to 
multinationals into productive benefits for local industry, labour and the broader society.44 This requires 
the maintenance of government capacity to act and regulate, not just to protect non-economic social 
interests but also to correct for market failures, and in some circumstances this may require the actual 
extension of such government capacity to intervene and regulate.  
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It is here that TTIP’s ‘double-bind’ comes into clear view: On the one hand the government will need to 
regulate to ensure the equitable and productive distribution of any benefits that may accrue from the 
agreement; and on the other hand TTIP proponents argue that there will be no benefits unless 
government regulations are removed, harmonised or otherwise restricted in accordance with the core 
thrust of the agreement. However, this double-bind only arises if there are clear potential economic 
benefits from the agreement in the first place. If there are not, then reduced government capacity is 
traded for no reason.  
TTIP also has the potential to lead to economic and financial losses. The two main ways this could occur 
are through trade and investment diversion and the financial liability of governments represented by 
the ISDS mechanism. Within the EU, even if overall trade and investment to the region as a whole 
increases through TTIP this may still involve substantial changes in its precise national destination. It 
could be the case that if the attractiveness of some countries rises more substantially as a result of TTIP 
than others then investors could relocate from one to the other. Alternatively, investors previously 
committed to investing in one country may subsequently chose another. This situation is complicated 
by the probability of added trade and investment diversion effects between EU Member States. Thus 
TTIP will almost inevitably involve diversion and shifts in the relative economic benefits to each EU 
Member State.  
Secondly, the ISDS mechanism would open national governments to new sources of liability that did 
not previously exist in the form of financial awards for damages that foreign investors incur due to 
government actions, regulations and policies. Both of these factors could represent very significant 
financial losses to EU Member States, particularly those presently enjoying a highly favoured status in 
the eyes of US investors, such as Ireland, and in those which are host to high volumes of US investment 
relative to their GDP, again Ireland being one such example. The next two sections of this chapter 
address the economic and financial benefits and costs of TTIP from this viewpoint.  
TTIP is not widely expected to provide any direct social benefits. Social benefits will possibly accrue only 
indirectly through the trickle-down mechanisms described above, involving mainly higher living 
standards from greater employment opportunities and higher levels of social protection through 
increased revenue from taxation. However, there may also be social costs. These are represented 
mostly by threats to social security and public health from the ISDS mechanism and challenges to 
government action in this area that may dissuade or ‘chill’ progressive social and environmental policy, 
as well as regulatory harmonisation and other specific aspects of the trade section of TTIP. In addition, 
TTIP may involve a threat to the fulfilment of the human rights of the Irish people, specifically the 
progressive fulfilment of the right to health. The broad impact of TTIP in terms of these potential social 
costs is attended to in the last two sections and a more detailed appraisal is delved into in the 
subsequent chapters of this study.  
  
2.1 – Net Economic Benefits and Fundamental Rationale of TTIP 
 
The launch of negotiations on TTIP in 2013 was accompanied by a series of studies that predicted 
potentially positive economic gains from the agreement. Chief among these was a study by the Centre 
for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),45 which was based on modelling aggregate effects for the EU as 
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a whole and did not provide information on the divergent effects on the Member States. Taking its 
most positive liberalisation scenario, the study predicted that TTIP could result in a 0.5% increase in 
GDP for the EU as a whole, or € 120 billion annually, once it became fully operational.46 The report 
recognises that these are the most optimistic figures, yet they are heavily relied upon by the European 
Commission in justifying TTIP. This scenario is widely regarded as most unlikely, as it would require the 
final text of TTIP to reflect the most ambitious levels of liberalisation. This would mean the complete 
removal of tariffs, many of which, such as those in the agriculture sector, are politically sensitive.  
It would also mean what is termed ‘full integration’, meaning the highest level of regulatory 
harmonisation and removal of non-tariff barriers. The greatest benefits (80%) would come from 
regulatory harmonisation, which the EU and US have been attempting for many years with 
unimpressive results. Nevertheless, the CEPR’s self-titled ‘ambitious scenario’ assumes that 50% of the 
existing non-tariff barriers that can possibly be removed will be removed. The low likelihood of this 
scenario is acknowledged: “It should be stressed that in contrast to reducing tariffs, the removal of 
NTBs is not as straightforward. In fact, it is unlikely that all areas of regulatory divergence identified 
actually can be addressed.”47 While the predictions of other studies vary, this conclusion on roughly 
80% of any benefits coming from the removal of non-tariff barriers is shared by all of them.48   
However, the fine print specifies that this is the high point on a possible range that starts with half the 
most ambitious gains: “Under a comprehensive agreement, GDP is estimated to increase by between 
68.2 and 119.2 billion euros for the EU”.49 The € 68 billion figure may be taken as more likely, yet it 
would still require a 25% reduction in those non-tariff barriers that could be removed (so-called 
‘actionable’ non-tariff barriers). Many who have watched the slow progress of regulatory convergence 
over the last 20-30 years would see this as still quite optimistic. In any case, this more likely scenario 
would represent a 0.27% GDP increase. As has been pointed out elsewhere, this amounts to € 2.60 per 
European per week, or an extra cup of coffee every 7 days.50 On its most conservative estimates and 
assumptions, where there is no removal of non-tariff barriers, the CEPR states that gains would be 
insignificant, ranging from 0.02% GDP to 0.10% GDP.  
Importantly, CEPR note that “non-tariff barriers are the highest for food and beverage products … [and 
with respect to] services, financial services are one of the sectors with the highest estimated NTBs”.51 
This is in fact critical from the viewpoint of the social benefits of regulations, which the CEPR study does 
not account for. The regulations that the study relies on removing here relate to two sectors that have 
a very high potential to negatively affect the public interest. Food and beverage regulations are critical 
to public health and, as the last global financial crisis demonstrated, financial regulation is critical to 
almost everything, beginning with the entire economy of nations States. The CEPR study in no way 
allows for the very serious social consequences of removing these seemingly innocuous ‘NTBs’. It would 
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seem evidently highly likely however, that the weak economic gains predicted from their removal would 
far outweighed by the likely social costs.52   
The CEPR also predicts that in the most ambitious scenario there would be minimal job displacement, 
although it must be noted that this is based on a very questionable assumption that unemployment 
rates would remain unchanged. This makes a conclusion of minimal job displacement all but an 
assumption itself. As one contrary study notes,  
[o]ne need only look at the experience of Europe in the last decade to see that full 
employment does not re-establish itself even if job seekers are willing to work informally 
and at relatively low pay.53 
In another major study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung two scenarios were tested, limited and deep trade 
liberalisation.54 In the first scenario their model predicted a 0.27% GDP increase for the whole of the 
EU. This was based only on tariff reduction and did not assume any removal of regulatory barriers. In 
the deep trade liberalisation scenario there is a projected 4.95% GDP gain for the EU as a whole, 
however, this scenario involves “removal of tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers” and would seem to 
employ a very broad definition of a ‘removable trade barrier’.55 In any case, the predictions would seem 
to rely on the removal of them all, which accounts for the high results, but also makes them extremely 
unlikely. This study is widely viewed as an outlier.   
Another study by the Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales (CEPII) also relies 
on a scenario that entails an “across-the-board 25% cut” in non-tariff barriers, which would equate to 
the 50% reduction of actionable non-tariff barriers in the CEPR scenario, that is their most optimistic 
scenario.56 In this ‘reference scenario’ the CEPII predict a GDP gain of 0.3% for the EU. Even greater 
reduction of these barriers would deliver up to 0.5% extra GDP, but more realistic scenarios only deliver 
0.1 or 0.2% GDP gains. Somewhat tautologically, the analysts conclude that “negotiating countries will 
reap the largest benefits from the most difficult negotiations”.57  
Finally, an ECORYS study from 2009 is also widely referenced.58 This study also applies a 25% overall 
reduction in non-tariff barriers and a 100% reduction in tariffs, and is therefore also highly optimistic. 
In this scenario ECORYS predicts a 0.13 - 0.28% gain in GDP for the EU. This again amounts to the same 
extra cup of coffee per week, at best.  
What is also obscured in these headline growth estimates is that the figures refer to growth forecasts 
over a ten year period.59 A generous average of the upward estimates in these studies would put extra 
GDP gains at 0.3%, but this is on the assumption that an ambitious TTIP has been in operation for 10 
years. That means that the studies actually predict only an additional 0.03% in GDP per year, or 1.43% 
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instead of the 1.40% growth recorded for the EU in 2014.60 The concrete gains are therefore extremely 
small, even on the optimistic estimates. To put this another way, the extra cup of coffee for every 
European every week only materialises after 10 years. In the meanwhile there would be a gain more 
along the lines of an extra apple a week.   
Most of these studies rely on a process called Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling, which 
is heavily criticised and widely viewed as unreliable within the economics profession.61 The main 
problems lie in the assumptions that underpin the data inputs into the models to generate the 
predictions cited. Some of these questionable assumptions have already been mentioned, such as the 
stable rate of unemployment, and, more importantly, the inflated expectations regarding reductions in 
regulatory barriers. Others involve what are called ‘price elasticities’, or estimates of the efficiency by 
which fluctuation in prices will transmit gains through the economy, which are set quite high in these 
modelling scenarios. Typically in the studies above they are assumed to be “double the size compared 
to the macroeconomic literature.”62 The unreasonableness of price elasticity estimates in the studies 
has a significant effect, driving up the associated estimated gains by a significant margin. In addition, 
the maintenance of balanced budgets is assumed, which is also not very likely in light of historical 
evidence. Furthermore, the modelling takes a long run perspective of 10 years, therefore all of these 
assumptions have to hold for that long. No account is taken of the probably existence of unforeseen or 
adverse effects in the short to medium term.  
In addition, these studies have attracted widespread criticism on numerous other less technical 
grounds. A report from the Austrian Foundation of Development Research (AFDR) sets out the main 
themes of this criticism. Firstly there are the costs of macroeconomic adjustment, which are either not 
accounted for or significantly downplayed in the studies. These costs arise from the likely effects of TTIP 
on national current account balances, losses to public revenues due to lower tariffs and more lax 
regulations, and changes in the level of unemployment. Ireland should pay particular heed to the 
following passage from the AFDR report, which states: 
If, for instance, imports rise disproportionately vis-à-vis exports immediately after trade 
liberalization, a trade deficit might emerge. Strong FDI inflows might lead to a structural 
drain on the current account due to profit repatriation. Short-term speculative capital in- 
and outflows might lead to balance of payments problems. While for the EU in toto this 
will arguably present no major problem, for individual member states such occurrences 
might prove problematic.63 
Ireland’s economy is particularly susceptible to speculative and large flows of capital, as detailed further 
below, which can have large negative effects on a nation’s macroeconomic balance. This has further 
effects regarding its credit-worthiness, liquidity and ability to loan on international capital markets, 
amongst various other downsides.64 In some cases these effects can precipitate economic crises.65 In 
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addition, one economic study of the impact of TTIP on Ireland predicts that imports will rise more than 
exports, resulting in an overall trade ‘deficit’ from TTIP.66 These unaccounted factors would certainly 
have sizeable effects on the Irish economy.  
Losses to public revenue from tariffs and other effects of TTIP should not be underestimated either. 
The AFDR consider these to be in the order of € 20 billion over 10 years. In addition, they challenge the 
assumption of full employment, highlighting the unreasonableness of an expectation that all those who 
lose work due to TTIP will immediately be re-hired in a new job that TTIP is presumed to create in 
another area or sector. The AFDR estimate the costs to the EU of job dislocation, from financial support 
in transition periods that may extend to the medium or long term and the loss of taxation revenue, to 
be between € 9 – 24 billion.67 This does not include costs for the necessary re-training of workers.  
However, the major cost identified by the AFDR report, echoing the analysis above, is the highly likely, 
but unaccounted, social cost. As will be noted repeatedly throughout the present study, the main 
economic gains from TTIP are set to be at the expense primarily of government regulatory control in 
areas crucial to public wellbeing, areas such as public health, and consumer and environmental safety. 
The analysis in the studies above completely ignores this fact and treats all non-tariff barriers as 
functionally identical and equally objectionable. There is no analysis or mechanism for distinguishing 
between barriers that are insignificant from a public welfare standpoint and those that are not. The 
only distinction is between ‘actionable’ and ‘non-actionable’ barriers, which refers to the political 
probability of their removal. In an indirect way ‘non-actionable’ may imply the existence of a public 
interest in relation to the particular regulatory barrier at issue, but it certainly does not delineate this 
distinction in any adequate sense. Many barriers considered actionable, or politically viable, may have 
very negative social consequences, but be actionable nonetheless due to low public understanding of 
the issues, government or industry obfuscation, or lack of scientific knowledge and general ignorance.  
The AFDR study concludes that the above studies, and any other analogous econometric 
methodologies,  
have largely neglected a careful analysis of adjustment costs and the social costs of 
regulatory change. ... The social costs of regulatory change are by their very nature 
difficult, if not impossible to quantify. Nevertheless, they can be very large and thus 
require careful analysis, in particular in those areas where they relate to public security & 
health as well as environmental safety.68 
Furthermore, it is probably not surprising to note that prior estimations of the economic benefits of 
trade agreements have historically been overly optimistic. For example, the AFDR highlight the fact that 
while prior estimates of the effects of NAFTA “projected net gains for all NAFTA parties, but particularly 
for Mexico and Canada with real GDP increases up to 11 %, employment gains of up to 11 %, and real 
wages increases of up to 16 %”, these impact projections were later found to be “substantially 
overestimated”.69 In fact, for the US, subsequent impact assessments after the implementation of 
NAFTA have demonstrated only negligible benefits. In the case of Mexico, many subsequent studies 
have demonstrated negative effects on GDP, wages and the distribution of income, and those that do 
find gains make actual estimations that are far below the prior optimistic estimates. While Mexico 
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experienced some gains in manufacturing employment it suffered large losses in agriculture, most 
notably in the area of corn production where approximately 1 million jobs were lost in the first 10 years 
of NAFTA.70  These considerations should again temper actual expectations from TTIP regardless of 
headline economic gains that are nevertheless already very small.  
Whatever economic gains may accrue from TTIP will also be lessened in another significant way. TTIP 
will have negative effects on many other third countries due to the phenomenon of trade diversion, 
whereby access to EU and US markets currently enjoyed by many countries will be displaced to a certain 
extent, in many cases resulting in large trade losses for some countries. This applies particularly to 
Mexico, Canada and Australia who will take large losses in the US market, and Turkey, Norway and sub-
Saharan countries with respect to the EU market.71 In anticipation of this well-established fact, these 
countries have already applied to the US and the EU for compensation. Any agreement to provide 
compensation to these injured third countries, which will be politically difficult to refuse, will be a drain 
on the possible economic benefits from TTIP. 
Conflicting directly with the main studies relied on by the European Commission, a report from Tufts 
University written by a staff member of the UN International Labour Organisation concludes that TTIP 
will have significantly negative economic effects.72 The Tufts study employs a different modelling 
system that was developed at the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs to avoid some of the 
pitfalls of CGE modelling. It utilises “more sensible assumptions on macroeconomic adjustment, 
employment dynamics, and global trade”.73 As such it does not assume full employment, makes more 
reasonable assumptions regarding price elasticities, and pays closer attention to the effects of lowered 
demand in the economy due to job losses. It concludes that TTIP will lead to export losses, lower GDP 
growth rates (on average a drop in GDP growth rates of -0.26%), a loss of 600,000 jobs across the EU, 
increased financial instability, and lower overall government revenues.  
The study warns that the current pressures of austerity, high unemployment and low growth in the EU 
will be heightened under increased competition with the US under TTIP, which will place even further 
downward pressure on wages. This will have further negative effects in terms of reduced demand in 
the economy and intensify the likelihood of another downward spiral, which would be even worse than 
the current stagnation. It also states that increased integration with the US will make all EU Member 
States more vulnerable to possible financial crisis through increased transmission mechanisms and the 
threat of lower regulation in the financial industry. This should be of major concern not just to the EU 
as a whole but specifically to Ireland given its recent experience of extreme vulnerability to external 
economic fluctuations.  
As the Tufts study concludes, “[a]t a minimum, this shows that official studies do not offer a solid basis 
for an informed decision on TTIP”.74 This conclusion is supported by a review of the methodologies of 
the major positive studies commissioned by the European Parliament, which states that modelling a 
trade and investment agreement with such complex effects, as would be attached to TTIP, may in the 
end simply amount to “sophisticated guesswork.”75 
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With respect to projected economic benefits for Ireland in particular, some studies that differentiate 
between the EU Member States suggest that gains may be larger for the Northern peripheral countries 
of Europe such as the UK, Sweden and Ireland. On the only realistic scenario employed by the 
Bertelsman Stiftung study Ireland was predicted to make a 0.22% GDP gain,76 which is actually in line 
with the average for the EU in the studies above, and still insignificant. However, there are suggestions 
in the literature that 
[s]maller countries that are more involved in the international division of labour and that 
gain greater benefits from lower trade costs tend to gain more than larger countries. Those 
Member States that are more export oriented or that already benefit from privileged trade 
relations with the US also obtain relatively higher gains.77 
This would sound positive for Ireland, yet, as mentioned, the one dedicated study for Ireland that the 
authors could find concluded that there would be an ultimate trade deficit from TTIP. This study, from 
Copenhagen Economics, nevertheless predicts an overall 1.1% GDP increase.78 However, this study 
replicates the methodology of the CEPR study above, and so is subject to all of the same criticisms 
already enumerated. As such, because the estimate is over a 10 year period the actual increase in GDP 
per year would be 0.11% per year. Ireland’s reported 4.8% GDP growth in 2014 would have been 4.9% 
with TTIP.79 This is hardly a headline. In addition the warning above, regarding the negative affect on 
Ireland’s balance of payments and overall economic stability, should not be disregarded.  
From a social viewpoint it is also essential to note that the economic benefits predicted are always 
aggregate benefits for the EU as a whole, or Ireland as a whole. They do not say anything about 
distribution, leaving the high possibility, given past experience with liberalisation, that the vast majority 
will flow to the richest top percentage of the population. This will most likely leave the middle and lower 
classes either stagnant in the positive scenario, or overall losers. Little more can be done but to point 
to the wealth of evidence complied by the economists,80 sociologists81 and anthropologists82 on this 
fact already. Distribution is an issue for government. Markets have been clearly demonstrated as 
incapable of equitable distribution. Therefore the structural interference of TTIP with the capacities of 
government, which extends deeply into areas integral to an aim of equitable social distribution, and 
which extends ever more deeply according to the extent of economic gains sought, are of grave 
concern.  
Taking average overall GDP increases on face value does not give an accurate picture of the net benefits 
to the Irish people. The vast majority of the benefits will accrue to foreign investors in Ireland because 
of their dominance of the Irish economy. The gains to the Irish people will be mostly indirect, through 
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employment and corporate taxation. Employment cannot be denied as a large positive factor for the 
Irish people. Foreign investors provide a reasonable percentage of jobs, and by all accounts fairly good 
conditions and remuneration. However, the benefits through tax are not likely to be as significant. 
Ireland has a very low corporate tax rate of 12.5%. This compares to the average in Europe of more 
than double this level at 26%.83 What is more, the effective tax rate, or the average rate of actually paid 
tax is around 7%.84 Foreign investors also have access to significant tax benefits beside this low rate, 
such as tax holidays, exemptions for fixed costs and development costs, and a number of other 
concessions.   
As such, the greatest benefits predicted, if they materialise, will lie in job creation. There will be 
opportunities for the export industries, however, these again are dominated by foreign firms, 
particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, which makes up the vast majority of Irelands exports. This 
would indicate that in terms of benefits for the Irish people specifically, we are back to the capability of 
the government to redistribute the benefits directly accrued by foreign investors. Other indirect 
financial benefits to the Irish people are highly questionable and likely to be quite low. Much of the 
increase in GDP predicted by these models will be siphoned out of the country and back to the parent 
companies of the Irish subsidiaries, often through well-recognised tax havens outside of Ireland thereby 
significantly reducing the ultimate tax take for any public authority.85  
In sum, with respect to the economic benefits of TTIP, the projections and predictions would seem to 
vary substantially, reflecting the complexity of guessing at the underlying assumptions that must be 
made in order to make any prediction at all. However, this amounts essentially to the “management of 
fictional expectations”,86 whereby a simulated model might tell a person whatever they want to hear. 
To take a position for the sake of overall analysis we would accept that, at best, there is a potential for 
slight economic benefits from TTIP but the most likely outcome from the evidence is no change at all.  
On the basis of this evidence it is worth revisiting the danger expressed above, of concluding TTIP in a 
psychological environment of hope that it will save the EU economy and significantly boost growth. This 
is a very understandable desire shared not just by the business community that clearly stands to gain 
directly and primarily from the agreement, but also extends to governments and large sections of the 
public for whom potential gains are only indirect and far less likely. As the study shows, on the available 
economic evidence it is only sensible to conclude that however understandable this desire is, it makes 
many people highly susceptible to a belief that lacks foundation.87 TTIP is most likely not going to deliver 
on many of the hopes that are being placed in it, even if negotiations fulfil the optimistic assumptions 
and predictions of maximum ambition.  
It is necessary to consider the long-term risks of further extending and deepening the reach of 
international trade and investment law under conditions where the evidence suggests that, at best, any 
gains will be unnoticeable in the short-term and very little will concretely change in the long-term. But 
at worst this could all be ‘achieved’ at a far greater social cost. Against this background, expectations 
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of a boost of confidence in financial and other markets from TTIP, leading to a hopeful spurt of 
economic activity and growth, are highly speculative and overly optimistic. The actors in these markets 
are not gullible. They are not likely to be impressed with the predicted gains of TTIP. They most likely 
will not see them as particularly credible either, and as such, they are unlikely to significantly change 
their behaviour. If they are slow to invest in the EU now, then TTIP is not going to change this.  
In this context the cost of foregone opportunities, or ‘opportunity cost’ as economists call it, should be 
dwelt on. TTIP is very likely to incur a large number of opportunity costs, particularly from the 
standpoint of possible alternative forms of economic and social management, or what economists refer 
to as ‘heterodox’ economic approaches. Other lost alternatives may relate to the ability of governments 
both to realise their human rights obligations, particularly in the area of socio-economic rights, and to 
organise their economies in ways that enable these rights to be taken seriously. These considerations 
relate directly to issues of public health governance. The possible loss of such opportunities and 
alternative models, or the increased difficulty and decreased likelihood of their implementation, should 
also be counted as impacts of TTIP, and are considered further below.  
 
 
2.2 – US Foreign Investment in Ireland 
 
In 2012 the total US investment in Ireland (FDI Stock) stood at €258 billion, having increased 
impressively over the previous year by 15% or €33 billion.88 44% of the total stock is invested in the 
financial intermediation sector.89 Despite the small size of its economy Ireland is the fourth largest 
destination for US FDI in the EU.90 There are 700 US companies based in Ireland, which now employ 
130,000 people.91 
The overall potential costs and benefits of ISDS in TTIP are addressed in detail in the next chapter, 
however, it is necessary to make some introductory points. Whatever benefits may arise from an 
investment chapter in TTIP in terms of increased investment flows, the possibility of significant cost is 
instituted by the inclusion of the ISDS mechanism. This system enables foreign investors to bring States 
to international arbitration for allegedly violating the terms of investment protections set out in the 
agreement. If a violation is found the tribunal has the power to order an award of monetary 
compensation for any damage incurred. These awards are enforceable under international law and the 
domestic law of most States. The ISDS mechanism therefore represents a potential economic cost to 
EU Member States under TTIP that would not exist in its absence. The cost would not be limited to the 
award of compensation but includes substantial costs related to the litigation and the operation of the 
tribunals.  Awards are regularly made in the hundreds of millions of US dollars, and awards of billions 
are becoming more regular. In addition, average costs of litigating one case are around US$ 8 million 
per claim per disputant, and have been as high as US$ 30 million (or €7.3 and €27.3 million respectively).  
This section provides an estimation of Ireland’s prospective liability under an ISDS mechanism in TTIP. 
To be clear, this is a rough and qualitative estimation, however, it is a highly indicative one.  
                                                          
88 US Department of State, Investment Climate Statement 2014 – Ireland, p. 17, at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227208.htm.  
89 Ibid. “Currently, there are approximately 700 U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland operating primarily in the following sectors: 
chemicals; bio-pharmaceuticals and medical devices; computer hardware and software; electronics; and financial services.” 
90 After the Netherlands, UK and Luxembourg. US Department of State, Investment Climate Statement 2014 – European Union, 
at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/231435.htm. 
91 Charlie Taylor, Ireland the main beneficiary of US foreign direct investment, Irish Times, 5 March 2015.  
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Estimating a country’s liability under the ISDS regime is complex and there is no established 
methodology, however, the literature on investment arbitration is unanimous in assuming that the 
more foreign investment in a country that is covered by the ISDS system then the greater is the 
likelihood of investment claims against the government, and therefore the greater the likelihood of 
financial losses. We make the same assumption and on this basis compile and compare the ‘stocks’, or 
gross amounts, in US$ terms, of US investment in each EU Member State. This gives an idea of which 
States are more at risk of adverse awards under ISDS in TTIP than others.  
However, to clarify the risk in terms of the likely relative drain on the resources of each State we add 
one extra dimension to the estimation of liability risk by comparing the amount of US foreign 
investment in each country with the country’s GDP. The idea is that while the total stock of US 
investment is a proxy for the likelihood of claims and awards, a country’s GDP is a proxy for its ability to 
pay those awards, or the severity of the potential impact on public budgets.  
The second measure is then related to the degree of overall financial difficulty the State would incur 
because of potential payments of compensation to US investors.  As such, the ratio of stocks of US 
investment to a country’s GDP provides a clearer idea of the overall financial risk to the country 
concerned. This also enables a comparison not just of risk per se, but of the ‘quality’ of financial risk to 
each Member State.  
GDP values are taken from the World Bank,92 and values on stocks of US foreign investment from the 
US State Department.93 The data is in US$ from the most recent year available.  It is important to note 
that there are high variations in both measures (GDP and stocks of foreign investment) when diverse 
sources of statistics are compared. The following is then to be taken only as a rough indicative estimate. 
It is widely accepted that due to varied methods of data collection and analysis “FDI statistics have to 
be interpreted with caution”.94 Furthermore, only US ‘FDI’ is considered, which does not include US 
portfolio investments. These investments would also be covered if current investment treaty practice 
is followed, meaning that the actual levels of US investment creating potential liability would in fact be 
much higher. This is especially so as Ireland is often considered as one of Europe’s ‘tax havens’, 
therefore attracting higher than average quantities of portfolio capital.  
The results are set out in the table and figure below.  
 
  
                                                          
92 http://data.worldbank.org/country .  
93 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/index.htm. Note that satisfactory data could not be found from this source 
for Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Portugal. Estimates for these countries are based 
on national data sources, except for Luxembourg, Slovakia, Portugal and Romania which has been excluded from the 
calculations.   
94 Lauge Poulsen, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Costs and Benefits of EU-USA Investment Protection Treaty’, 
Study for the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, LSE Enterprise, April 2013, p. 1.  
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Table 1 – Estimation of the comparative financial risk for selected EU Member States from the 
establishment of ISDS through TTIP.  
Country/Region Year GDP (in US-$) US FDI Stock (in 
US-$) 
US FDI as a 
percentage of 
GDP (in %) 
EU 2013 17,960 billion 2,350 billion 13.1 
Ireland 2012 222 billion 203.8 billion 91.8 
United Kingdom 2012 2,615 billion 331 billion 12.7 
Italy 2012 2,092 billion 15.3 billion 0.7 
Germany 2012 3,533 billion 121.2 billion 3.4 
France 2012 2,687 billion 82.6 billion 3.1 
Greece 2012 250 billion 1 billion 0.4 
Austria 2012 408 billion 15.6 billion 3.8 
Belgium 2012 499 billion 53.8 billion 10.8 
Bulgaria 2012 53 billion 1.5 billion 2.8 
Croatia 2012 56 billion 0.15 billion 0.27 
Cyprus 2012 23 billion 4.1 billion 17.8 
Czech Republic 2012 207 billion 4.4 billion 2.1 
Denmark 2012 322 billion 10 billion 3.1 
Estonia 2012 23 billion 0.46 billion 2 
Finland 2012 256 billion 2 billion 0.8 
Hungary 2012 127 billion 0.006 billion 0.005 
Latvia 2012 28 billion 0.013 billion 0.05 
Lithuania 2012 42 billion 0.17 billion  0.4 
Malta 2013 9.6 billion 0.012 billion 0.1 
Netherlands 2012 823 billion 645 billion 78.4 
Poland 2012 496 billion 14 billion 2.2 
Romania 2013 190 billion 1.2 billion  0.6 
Slovenia 2012 46 billion 0.041 billion  0.09 
Spain 2013 1,393 billion 1.3 billion  0.09 
Sweden 2012 544 billion 32 billion 5.9 
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Figure 1. – Estimation of the comparative financial risk for selected EU Member States from the 
establishment of ISDS through TTIP. 
 
 
The general point, which emerges very clearly, is that there are disproportionately high levels of US 
investment in Ireland relative to other EU member States, making Ireland particularly liable under an 
ISDS mechanism in TTIP. However, this risk is significantly heightened again in ‘quality’ due to Ireland’s 
relatively low GDP. Figure 1 could be taken as offering a comparative indicator of the risk of ISDS in TTIP 
for each Member State of the EU. As such, for Ireland this financial risk is roughly 7 times higher than 
the EU average, 13%, which is represented roughly by the UK. The risk for Ireland is therefore also 7 
times higher than its immediate neighbour, 26 times higher than Germany, and 126 times higher than 
Italy. The only EU Member State that compares is the Netherlands.  
This also confirms how extraordinarily dependent Ireland is on US investment, perhaps explaining a 
desire to include ISDS in TTIP to encourage more. At the same time it also demonstrates that Ireland 
obviously does not need TTIP or an investment chapter to attract US investment, as it is attracting very 
large quantities without such possible liabilities. It quite evidently does not need to push for ISDS in 
TTIP to encourage more investment from the US. This is confirmed by the very favourable assessment 
of the ‘investment climate’ for US investors in Ireland made, and advertised, by the US State 
Department.95   
                                                          
95 US Department of State, ‘Investment Climate Statements 2015’, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/.  
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It is important to note that Ireland does not have one single BIT in force.  It is currently almost free from 
the international investment regime and claims from foreign investors, with the exception of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. Ireland has not had a claim against it under this treaty to date. Therefore the jump to 
having all of its US investment covered by the ISDS system would expose Ireland to a significant 
potential legal liability.  
From a methodological perspective, the authors recognise that this calculation is a rudimentary 
measure and does not attend to a number of other variables that would have an effect on Member 
States’ liability. For example, the quality of a country’s judicial institutions is not accounted for.  As such, 
the high rating Ireland would get with respect to the quality of its courts would reduce the risk factor, 
and conversely a lower rating for another country would raise its risk factor. Other important variables 
such as political risk and immobility of assets are also not accounted for. This estimate of liability from 
ISDS in TTIP could be characterised as a crude indication, or a ‘rule of thumb’. However, it serves to 
make a very important point in the case of Ireland, which unless concrete evidence is presented to the 
contrary appears significant and meaningful even allowing for statistical adjustments based on the 
aforementioned factors.  
These results should be borne in mind throughout the discussion in the next chapter.  
 
2.3 – Public Health and the Right to Health in Ireland 
 
This section is intended to provide a general overview of the state of public health in Ireland that takes 
a perspective from the obligations of the Irish government under international human rights law. This 
body of international law has long been considered to be in tension with the constraints placed on 
States by trade and investment agreements. Since the large-scale protests in Seattle against the WTO 
in 1999 the trade regime has been a focus of human rights proponents in academia,96 civil society97 and 
intergovernmental organisations.98 Many conclude that trade agreements and their associated dispute 
resolution systems are currently failing to accommodate or facilitate human rights,99 or are otherwise 
actively opposed to their protection and fulfilment.100 More recently, the international investment 
regime has come under similar scrutiny,101 and here the conclusions are often more closely aligned with 
                                                          
96 Janet Dine, Companies, International Trade and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005); Thomas 
Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth Burgi (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005).  
97 Armin Paasch, ‘Human Rights in EU Trade Policy: Between Ambition and Reality’, An Ecofair Trade Dialogue Discussion Paper, 
Misereor, Aachen, December 2011.   
98 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads – Aid, 
Trade and Security in an Unequal World (UNDP, New York, 2005); United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Human Rights and Trade, 5th WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 10-14 September 2003.  
99 Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, ‘The WTO Constitution and Human Rights’ 3 Journal of International Economic Law (2000); Robert 
Howse, ‘Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann’ 13 European Journal of 
International Law (2002).  
100 Frank Garcia, ‘The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights Principle’ 25 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law (1999).  
101 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, and Francesco Francioni (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment 
Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009).  
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a theory of structural opposition.102 To a number of commentators the current investment regime 
“seems to be leaning toward separation of human rights and investors’ rights like oil and water.”103  
Although human rights are not the primary focus of this study it is important to note this structural 
opposition. Any further institution of the trade and investment regimes that does not account for 
human rights, or their underlying social protection purpose, will deepen an already significant gulf 
between the potentially competing obligations of States under these divergent legal regimes. A 
perspective from the human right to health also provides a concise method for analysing the specific 
potential social costs of TTIP in the area of public health. However, it must be borne in mind that the 
notion of ‘public health’ is broader than the ‘human right to health’.104  
The right to health is not directly protected under the Irish Constitution, however the government is 
directed to ensure a certain level of distributional equity,105 and is pledged to  
safeguard with especial care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the community, 
and, where necessary, to contribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the orphan, and the 
aged.106 
In addition, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights protects public health through provisions on 
health care, access to services of general economic interest and consumer protection.107 The right to 
health is also protected in Ireland under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The Covenant establishes a right to the “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”108 This has been interpreted to oblige governments to ensure "a variety of facilities, goods, 
services and conditions" necessary to realize the health of the population, including access to health 
care, medical services and essential medicines.109 The right pertains to the provision of adequate and 
affordable access to water and sanitation, food, housing, and good workplace conditions. It also 
includes the right to meaningful participation in health-related decision-making at all levels of 
government.  
In the present discussion the most important element of the right to health is that it places an obligation 
on the government to realise this right progressively. Within reason the government must do all it can 
to ensure that the quality of health enjoyed by the population, as well as its equitable distribution, 
increases in line with general national capacity. This implies that governments will need to maintain an 
ability to intervene in the economy to such a degree as is necessary to realise this progressive 
obligation. In some circumstances it will require that the government’s ability to do so is not simply 
maintained but is substantially increased. This is so especially following an economic crisis, where 
significant social reconstruction is needed, which is not possible without extensive and coordinated 
government action. The right to health is then intrinsically connected to the right to regulate. 
                                                          
102 Sarah Schadendorf, ‘Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Analysis of ICSID and NAFTA Investor-State 
Arbitrations’ Transnational Dispute Management (2013).  
103 Mehmet Toral and Thomas Schultz, ‘The State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment Arbitration? Some Unorthodox 
Considerations’, in Michael Waibel (et al eds.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 
Law International, The Netherlands, 2010), p. 589.  
104 Brigit Toebes, ‘Human Rights and Public Health: Towards a Balanced Relationship’ 19 International Journal of Human Rights 
(2015).  
105 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland), Enacted by the People, 1st July 1937, Directive Principles of Social Policy, 
Article 45 (2)(ii).  
106 Ibid, Article 45 (4)(i).  
107 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 35, 36 and 38.  
108 Article 12.  
109 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health’, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 9.  
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Circumstances that erode the State’s right to regulate will be highly likely to also erode the people’s 
right to health.  
Conversely, any government measures taken for whatever reason that lowers health levels must be 
subject to strict justification, and there is a strong presumption that such measures are contrary to the 
right to health. States are under a general onus not to allow health levels in the population to regress. 
Yet since the onset of the economic crisis in Ireland many studies of Irish health have found that this is 
precisely what has occurred. This regression has accelerated following the bank bail-outs and the 
imposition of traditional structural adjustment measures by Ireland’s creditors, demanded as 
conditions on loans intended to stem the worst effects of the 2008-9 crisis and help lift the country out 
of its subsequent recession.110 The government’s obligation to ensure progressive realisation of the 
right to health within its means and the concomitant presumption of non-retrogression in levels of 
public health provision are highly important in an assessment of the costs and benefits of TTIP.  
Despite an economic boom in the years previous to the crisis and average levels of government health 
expenditure relative to other European States, Ireland’s public health system was underperforming.111 
Poorly developed primary and community health services, and increasing inequity in access to services 
and benefits, were the effects of an inadequately developed and implemented social ‘partnership’ 
during the years of the boom years.112 Therefore, the sub-standard and steadily deteriorating nature of 
Irish public health care, operating under a two-tier system, was widely considered as unfair, unequal 
and inefficient even before the crisis. Particular groups in society were significantly marginalised and in 
relatively poor health such as the Traveller community.113 This situation prompted various debates and 
proposals but induced no concrete government action.  
To address this situation, the most recent government plan to overhaul the organisation of health care 
in Ireland has suggested replacing it with a single-tier system “via a multi-payer model of universal 
health insurance (UHI)”, “based on need, not income”, and consisting of competing private health 
insurers and a State-owned provider.114 This system is modelled on that of the Netherlands, and is 
intended to be implemented gradually, potentially to be fully operational by 2019, although it has run 
into early uncertainty with projected insurance costs appearing to be vastly higher than initial 
government assumptions. 
The crisis that hit in 2008 led to a fall in GDP over the next 3 years of nearly 20%,115 leading to sharp 
increases in public debt, unemployment and outward migration. The decision of the government of the 
day to institute a blanket guarantee for all bank depositors significantly worsened the country’s public 
financial position and ultimately led to the necessity of a bail-out for the country itself. This came in the 
form of a loan from the ‘Troika’ (coordinated by the European Central Bank, European Commission and 
the International Monetary Fund). The loan came with conditions aimed to ensure prompt repayment, 
                                                          
110 Sarah Thomson, Matthew Jowett and Philipa Mladovsky (eds.), ‘Health System Responses to Financial Pressures in Ireland: 
Policy Options in an International Context’, Final Report, World Health Organisation and European Observatory of Health 
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including severe budget cuts to social spending. Ireland’s public health system has suffered significantly 
as a result of these cuts and other austerity measures imposed on the country by its creditors.  
Government spending on health has fallen by 22% since 2008.116 Ireland was second only to Greece in 
terms of the scale and speed of cuts to health budgets in the EU following the crisis. This has deepened 
a theme that was extant well before the crisis. The long-term underfunding of Irish health care has 
always been a well-known problem.117 In 2014 it was reported that there had been an overall reduction 
of € 3.3 billion in health spending since 2008 and that the Irish government planned to cut a further € 
619 million in that year.118  
Ireland now seems to be in a trap where further cuts are only make things worse and showing only 
losses in efficiency and quality of service. In short, there is no ‘fat’ left to trim. In 2014, the country 
stood near the bottom of the Euro Health Consumer Index, at number 22.119 One study concludes that, 
“[o]verall, international standing, health outcomes, accountability, equitable access, underfunding, 
rationing and waiting times are all clear problems in the current Irish system.”120 
At the same time as there has been less money to spend on health, the number of people that need to 
be covered has risen. In contrast to most of Europe, population growth in Ireland has risen despite the 
crisis and recession, going up by an average of 1% since 2008.121 Compounding this, the number of 
people in the over 65 bracket has risen by 3%. Given the growing population and spending cuts required 
by international creditors, one study estimates that the result between 2015 and 2016 will be a 
reduction in health spending per capita of between 16-24% overall, and 32% for the population aged 
over 65.122 As such, population growth is not being matched by the capacity of the public health system 
in Ireland.  
It is then no surprise that there have been significant increases in waiting times and lengthening waiting 
lists for those in need of care. This is in addition to the fact that waiting times have long been a concern 
in Ireland in comparison to other European countries. In 2010 more than 20,000 patients at public 
hospitals were forced to wait for longer than the stipulated 3 months, which was an 11% increase on 
2009.123 This is exacerbated by the two-tier system, whereby many people on lower incomes struggle 
to access the care they need while people with private voluntary health insurance get preferential 
treatment in State hospitals or directly exclusive access to the higher-quality care in private hospitals. 
The inequities in the Irish case are borne out by an EU survey of income and living conditions in Ireland, 
stating that 47% of those living under persistent poverty have a chronic illness compared with 23% in 
the general populace.124  
In this regard it is important to stress that the current government shift to a nominally ‘one-tier’ 
universal health insurance model may in the end result in the same inequities. What will make the 
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difference is close government oversight and regulation of the system, not so much the nature of the 
system itself. It is therefore necessary that the government’s right to regulate is not abridged in this 
area. As is explained in more detail below, there are a number of aspects of TTIP that raise concerns in 
this regard with respect to public health, specifically relating to provisions on services, intellectual 
property and the process of regulatory harmonisation.  
Further complicating the financial squeeze is the fact that health care costs have increased at a faster 
rate than other comparable goods and services in the Irish economy. While general inflation between 
2005 and 2011 was around 10%, the increase in the price of health care was 20%.125 This is an anomaly 
because in most countries the prices of general goods and services increase faster than health care. 
Inflation has been driven mostly by large increases in hospital charges, outpatient fees, doctors’ fees 
and dental fees. Additionally, this has been the highest rate of health cost inflation in the EU, except for 
the Netherlands. As such it may be somewhat worrying that the Netherlands provides the model for 
the future of Ireland. Again, the main way inflation can be brought down is through judicious 
government regulatory action.  
Currently, 61% of the population in Ireland must pay to visit a General Practitioner (GP), who acts as 
the gateway to the health care system.126  They have to pay ‘out-of-the-pocket’ directly to the GP. 
Consultation fees range from €35 – €70. The other 39% are covered by a GP card or a Medical Card, 
which is provided by the State for those below a certain income level. This system has been found to 
be unique in the developed world, where most people who do not hold medical cards still have their 
GP visits subsidised to some extent.127 This results in a situation where those just above the threshold 
level are severely penalised, and will often choose not to go to the GP when they are ill because of their 
inability to pay, as many studies have demonstrated.128 Between January and April 2014 a review to 
check that GP cards were actually only held by those sufficiently poor to obtain one resulted in the 
confiscation of 97,000 cards. This provoked such an outcry due to the very significant and discriminatory 
health impact that the government was forced to stop the review and return some of the cards based 
on medical need.129  
Of importance to the discussion below on intellectual property rights provisions in TTIP, public 
expenditure on drugs and medicines is high in Ireland. In comparison to New Zealand, a similar sized 
country, medicines in Ireland are considerably more costly, and can be up to 24 times more expensive 
for certain products.130 There was a very large increase in the cost of medicines since the 2000s, which 
could be linked to the massive increase in the establishment of a major pharmaceutical industry in 
Ireland before and during that time, consisting mainly of foreign companies. In recent years the prices 
have come down, but only through direct government action. This has occurred through measures to 
introduce a system of reference pricing and generic substitution (or the enabling of cheap copies to be 
sold on the market), which have lowered the factory price of many products. It has also occurred 
through direct negotiations with manufacturers to enable lower prices. These are common measures 
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taken by governments to regulate the pharmaceutical industry in the interests of public health. 
However, as detailed below, they may be challenged by investors under the investment provisions of 
agreements such as TTIP, and may also be undermined through rules on intellectual property. In the 
context of a government proposal to lower prices, a pharmaceutical company will have far less 
motivation to negotiate a decrease in price if it knows that it can eventually sue the government for a 
failure to treat it fairly should that government force the issue.  
The government’s response to the financial pressures on the health system has largely been to restrict 
recruitment, place ceilings on staffing, and intensify redundancy schemes and incentivised early 
retirement. From 2008 to 2011 this resulted in 6,000 job losses in the health sector, and there were 
projected to be another 6,000 lost between 2013 and 2015.131 Major financial savings were also made 
through cuts to pensions and public service pay cuts.  
Health care user-charges have also been increased, thereby shifting some of the cost burden from 
government to the public and placing a particular burden on those with the lowest incomes.132 This is 
a serious issue from the viewpoint of the right to health because it directly and negatively effects 
equitable access to health services. The higher and broader the user charges, the greater restrictions 
to health care access. This has a far greater impact on the poor and already marginalised and is 
therefore a discriminatory measure. Not only access, but equality of access is harmed by user fees and 
is generally understood to result in a regression in the right to health. Furthermore, given the 
framework of financial and population pressures the government is under and the way it has chosen to 
manage them, it is not easy to see how it can implement its ambitious plan for the overhaul of public 
health care in Ireland without at least maintaining, if not increasing user fees.133 Further cuts in pay, 
staffing, pensions and other areas would not seem to be possible. Therefore to meet the growing 
shortfall it is fair to suspect that the health ‘consumer’ will have to bear more and more of the financial 
burden.134  
In terms of issue areas, particular problems have been identified in regards to gender inequities in the 
Irish health care system,135 the mental health of the population136 especially young males,137 the 
                                                          
131 Ibid, p. 20. 
132 Age Action Ireland (et al), ‘Report on the right to health and the right to housing’, Submission to the Office of the High 
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134 Ibid, p. 22.  
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September 2006.  
136 Health Service Executive, ‘The Efficiency and Effectiveness of Long-Stay Residential Care for Adults within the Mental Health 
Services’, Evaluation report prepared under the Value for Money and Policy Review Initiative, 21 December 2008.  
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 54 
 
disabled,138 and the Traveller population already mentioned.139 In addition, there are serious concerns 
about access to health care amongst the migrant population,140 and the wellbeing of older people.141   
The universal health insurance model that is being implemented by the government would seem to be 
moving in the direction of greater competition and more private actors in the ‘health market’. This will 
not necessarily lead to either better or worse health outcomes for the population. It could do either. 
However, there are two points to stress. The degree to which more competition and private provision 
raises health standards will depend highly on the close regulatory oversight that is necessary from 
government to ensure fairness and equity. As a former Irish Minister for Health has stated; “What 
matters most is how resources are used, not how resources are raised from the public”.142 In short it 
will depend on continuing overall government control. This has been mentioned above. The 
government is under an obligation to ensure the right to health equitably, such that cost is not a barrier 
to access to health care. The government may ensure this in whatever way possible, within a degree of 
latitude. Nevertheless, to fulfil its obligation it must have the necessary latitude to act in the first place.  
In addition, while movements in the direction of greater privately funded and operated activity in the 
health sector are in line with trade and investment agreements, movements in the opposite direction 
are not. This is complicated in the Irish case where a substantial amount of private health care takes 
place within the publically-funded hospital infrastructure.143 This is not to say that reversing a trend 
towards the private is impossible, however, there are significant barriers set up to make such a move 
costly in a number of respects. Structurally speaking, trade and investment agreements reduce 
government control over the economy. This is their intent. However, unless very close attention is paid 
to the wording of the agreements and the use of the possible flexibilities in negotiation and in 
implementation, more control can easily be lost than is intended.  
What is clear from this brief appraisal is that extensive work needs to be done on the public health 
system in Ireland. The government is well aware of this and has plans in place. But these plans will not 
make a tangible difference to fundamental inequities in Irish health, and will not contribute to the 
progressive realisation of the right to health, unless they are managed closely by the government in 
response to the will of the people. To exercise this regulatory management effectively the government 
will need sufficient policy space. From the scale of the problem, it would seem to need quite a large 
range of policy space.  
Yet restricting this policy space is likely to be the biggest effect that TTIP will have, far outweighing the 
expected economic benefits. Ireland, far more than most in the EU, has been hit very hard by the 
economic crisis, especially in the area of public health. It has instituted a number of structural 
adjustment measures and deep austerity. Ireland’s fall from the grace of its ‘Celtic Tiger’ days has 
exposed the precarious nature of its development model, based on extreme openness to the global 
economy, export orientation, low corporate taxation, a heavy dependence on foreign investment, and 
                                                          
138 Maureen D’Eath, Jane Sixsmith, Roseanne Cannon and Louise Kelly, ‘The Experience of People with Disabilities in Accessing 
Health Services in Ireland: Do inequalities exist?’, Report to the National Disability Authority, Centre for Health Promotion 
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140 Immigrant Council of Ireland, ‘Submission to the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants on access to 
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143 Amnesty International Ireland, ‘Healthcare Guaranteed? The Right to Health in Ireland’, June 2011, p. 10.  
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a weak social contract. The pitfalls of this model are now amply evident and it will require significant 
changes if public health is to be better secured and the right to health of the Irish people is to be 
realised.   
There is very good reason to believe that making such changes will be more difficult under TTIP. The 
next two chapters explore this assertion in further detail. However, at this point it is clear that necessary 
government spending and regulatory control will be rendered far more difficult if already intensely 
strained budgets are depleted by significant amounts of compensation for US investors under ISDS. And 
they will be far more difficult if government intervention and ‘anti-competitive’ measures with respect 
to the health sector are hampered by rules on trade in services or intellectual property, for example. 
Furthermore, alternative economic arrangements necessary to fully and progressively realise the right 
to health may also be made harder by the institution of a trade and investment regime that is in tension 
with human rights aims and standards.  
 
2.4 – Social Costs and General Impact on Public Health 
 
This chapter was intended to give an overview and general weighting of the main costs and benefits 
from TTIP, as a backdrop or prelude to a more detailed assessment in the next chapters. From the 
overview it may be concluded that for the EU as a whole the economic benefits of TTIP are most likely 
to be either very small or non-existent. On the other hand, the risk of economic cost, primarily in the 
form of possible adverse awards for compensation through the ISDS mechanism, is not insignificant, as 
detailed in the next chapter. In particular, the risk for Ireland of financial loss through the ISDS 
mechanism is very high.  
On the social side of the ledger, the social benefits of TTIP are primarily dependent on a trickle down 
from the economic benefits. As such, because these are likely to be small to non-existent, the indirect 
social benefits may be assumed to be virtually nil. This encompasses any possible benefits for public 
health, either in the EU as a whole or in Ireland specifically. On the other hand the social costs are likely 
to be high, particularly in terms of the loss of regulatory capacity necessary to secure public health. This 
is especially so for Ireland due to the severity of the financial and public health challenges it currently 
faces.   
The general conclusion then is that for the EU, on average, the likely costs of TTIP outweigh the gains. 
Yet for Ireland in particular the prognosis is far worse than the EU average. For Ireland the likely social 
costs and potential economic costs are significantly higher than in other EU Member States.  
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3. INVESTMENT IMPACTS 
  
3.1 – Explaining the Investment Law Regime and ISDS  
 
From the mid-1980s annual global flows of foreign investment began to rise markedly,144  with a 
dramatic increase between 1994 and 2000, from US$256 billion to US$1.4 trillion annually. By 2007, 
flows reached a height of almost US$2 trillion. In 2014, flows stood at US$1.45 trillion, the large 
majority of which both originating from and being invested in developed countries. It is important to 
note that while flows have risen and fallen, overall stocks of FDI have continuously accumulated, rising 
roughly seven-fold since 1995 to a total of US$20.4 trillion by 2013.145  
The international legal framework on foreign investment is constituted essentially by a network of 
thousands of bilaterally negotiated investment treaties (BITs). The first bilateral investment treaty was 
signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, and currently some 3,200 BITs are now in force 
worldwide. The provisions of BITs have been broadly copied into increasingly numerous preferential 
free trade and investment agreements (PTIAs), some bilateral and others multilateral. While the 
conclusion of BITs is on the decline, the number of PTIAs such as the TTIP and TPP being negotiated is 
increasing, marking a trend towards a regionalisation of investment rule-making.146 In 2013 there were 
334 PTIAs in place globally. BITs and investment chapters in PTIAs will be referred to collectively as 
(international) investment agreements. It must be stressed that Ireland is at present almost entirely 
uninvolved in this system as it has no BITs in force and is only subject in this context to the Energy 
Charter Treaty, an international agreement between some 50 States, which protects only investors in 
the energy sector and does not presently include the US. The consequences of investment inclusion 
in the TTIP for Ireland are therefore more far-reaching than for many EU Member States who are 
already far more exposed to investment claims through sometimes extensive BIT networks. Germany, 
for example, is a Party to over 100 BITs, while a number of central and eastern European members of 
the EU already have individual BITs with the US.   
For a number of reasons the current investment law regime is “becoming increasingly controversial 
and politically sensitive.”147 As the real world consequences of the extensive protection issued to 
investors and the power of arbitrators instituted in the ISDS procedure increasingly come to light, a 
deep imbalance is becoming obvious to governments and civil society alike. In the words of one 
commentator:  
Over the coming years, governments and users of investment arbitration will re-evaluate their 
priorities. This shift could have profound implications for the foreign investment regime. The 
                                                          
144 Measurements of FDI can vary according to definition and methodology, as between the IMF, UNCTAD and the OECD for 
instance. The statistics that follow are taken from UNCTAD data. See UNCTAD, FDI Statistics Table, at 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sRF_ActivePath=P,5,27&sRF_Expanded=,P,5,27.   
145 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014 (UN, Geneva, 2014), p. xiii.  
146 Stephen Woolcock, ‘Making Multi-Level Rules Work: Trade and Investment Rules in Regional and Bilateral Agreements’, in 
Philippe de Lombaerde (ed.) Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment (Springer, Dordrecht, 
2007).  
147 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (United Nations, Geneva, 2012), 
p. xx.  
 57 
 
current crisis might turn a minority’s critique into the mainstream, and catalyze change that has 
long been in the offing.148 
While there are multiple differing viewpoints on the severity of this legitimacy crisis and on what to 
do about it, it is clear that the field of international investment law has become a site of serious 
political contestation, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. 
Of particular note, investment agreements are in a sense inherently unbalanced in that they confer 
substantial and powerful rights on foreign investors yet do not bind them to any substantive 
obligations. Investors must observe certain minimal procedural obligations, such as waiting a set 
period of time before suing a government (usually around six months), and are under a general 
expectation to establish and conduct their activities in accordance with the domestic law of the host 
State. However, contravention of the law is not necessarily a bar to having their rights vindicated by 
an international tribunal. In the case of Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador, the oil company 
was awarded US$1.77 billion in damages despite a finding that the company had clearly violated 
Ecuadorian law, because the government’s response was adjudged “disproportionate”. 
 
3.1(a) – Substantive Provisions of International Investment Agreements 
 
Investment agreements essentially contain provisions on most favoured nation treatment (MFN), 
national treatment, full compensation in event of expropriation (direct and indirect), minimum 
standards of treatment, i.e. ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) and ‘full protection and security’, the 
repatriation of profits and other related finances, and the prohibition on performance 
requirements.149  
National treatment mandates that foreign investors must be treated the same as nationals of the host 
State. This provision can cause problems with certain forms of positive discrimination legislation 
aimed at redressing societal imbalances, attending to human rights, protecting domestic industry, and 
correcting the legacies of previously unjust regimes.150 
Investment agreements mandate that expropriation must fulfil three criteria: it must be for a public 
purpose, non-discriminatory and enacted through the due process of law. This includes indirect 
expropriation, in the form of ‘creeping expropriation’151 or ‘regulatory takings’.152 The extent of the 
concept of indirect expropriation is unclear, yet has been read very broadly in some arbitral awards 
to require compensation for negative effects on foreign investors that are a result of non-
discriminatory bona fide government actions in the public interest. Some tribunals have employed a 
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so-called ‘sole effects’ doctrine, whereby in the determination of expropriation the purpose of the 
government action is irrelevant and the economic impact is the essential criteria.153  
As a safety net, minimum standards of treatment are applied, which must be determined in the event 
of a dispute on the merits of each case. The fair and equitable treatment standard that is included 
under this rubric is notoriously vague and subjective. There is seemingly strong agreement among 
arbitrators that it provides a high standard of investor protection,154 despite ongoing controversy. 
Arbitrators have included in this standard an obligation not to violate an investor’s ‘legitimate 
expectations’; again, there is no general agreement on the content of the phrase, how far this concept 
extends, or what type of expectations should be taken as legitimate or not. The enthusiasm of 
arbitrators in over-interpreting and thus effectively creating new substantive rights and protections 
for investors has led to some governments amending their model BITs to nominally limit these 
standards of protection to the understanding found in customary law.155 This has not often had the 
intended result, however.  
Particularly emblematic of the nature of investment arbitration is the recent extension of the fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) standard to include ‘creeping unfair treatment’. The tribunal in El Paso v. 
Argentina decided that: 
in the same way as one can speak of creeping expropriation, there can also be creeping 
violations of the FET standard. … [which] could thus be described as a process extending over 
time and comprising a succession or an accumulation of measures which, taken separately, 
would not breach that standard but, when taken together, do lead to such a result.156   
The State was ultimately ordered to pay US$43 million in damages.  It is important to note that even 
before such sweeping expansion, the fair and equitable treatment standard per se has been described 
by a leading authority as a standard that has “no consolidated or conventional meaning”, the 
normative content of which “is contested, hardly substantiated by State practice, and impossible to 
narrow down by traditional means of interpretive syllogism.”157 The El Paso decision creates a new 
grey area of State liability under the investment regime that will have the same chilling consequences 
on government regulation as the doctrine of ‘creeping expropriation’ from which it was borrowed, 
and will create another new playground for investors’ claims and arbitral interpretation.  It also begs 
the question of whether all concrete provisions and standards in BITs might ultimately be subject to 
such ‘creeping’ interpretation. 
Investment treaty provisions on repatriation of profits and funds typically allow for the unimpeded 
entry and removal of finances from the host State. This also applies to any compensation paid to a 
foreign investor in the event of a positive award as a result of a dispute settlement, and to any debts 
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owed to an affiliate by local interests. Restrictions on host State use of capital controls, and forced 
financial liberalisation generally, can easily precipitate and/or worsen financial crises, as was 
demonstrated in the case of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.  
Restrictions on performance requirements preclude the host State from placing certain demands on 
investors that would have the effect of limiting their economic and profit-making freedom in the 
interests of facilitating host State development. These requirements can take a wide range of forms 
and are usually precluded in US and Canadian investment agreements through use of a positive list 
approach.158  
 
3.1(b) – Procedural Provisions of International Investment Agreements 
 
Almost all BITs contain provisions establishing investor-State dispute settlement. Consequently, 
foreign investors have recourse to take the host State directly to arbitration, generally without 
requiring any previous attempt to resolve the dispute within the domestic legal system. The final 
award of an arbitration tribunal is binding. It can only be contested under exceptional circumstances 
and no fully operative appeal mechanism is provided for. The ISDS procedure is a serious incursion 
into State sovereignty, as well as the general principle of subsidiarity that governs almost all other 
forms of international treaties involving State and non-State actors and is of particular importance 
regarding human rights treaties.159 The significance of the removal of the local remedies rule cannot 
be overstated. It is a customary rule of international law and lies at the core of State sovereignty. The 
rejection of this rule in the modern system of investment arbitration is of profound concern from the 
point of view of democratic determination of national public policy and economic development. Nor 
does it augur well for the long-term stability of the current international investment law regime.160  
Investors can take issue with any kind of host government action taken at any level that is claimed to 
have breached any provision of the investment agreement, or, in many instances, of an underlying 
investor-State contract. This encompasses the full range of government measures, laws or policy 
changes (executive, judicial or legislative). In the event of a dispute, a tribunal is formed of three 
arbitrators – one chosen by the investor, one by the host State, and a third agreed by the first two 
arbitrators or appointed by a supervisory body. One practicing arbitrator notes the remarkable 
submission of states to such broad review:  
When I wake up at night and think about arbitration, it never ceases to amaze me that 
sovereign states have agreed to investment arbitration at all [...] Three private individuals are 
entrusted with the power to review, without any restriction or appeal procedure, all actions 
of the government, all decisions of the courts, and all laws and regulations emanating from 
parliament.161  
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These ad hoc tribunals are not bound by any rule of precedent and are given scant textual direction 
with regard to interpreting the content of investor’s rights. Each tribunal has considerable latitude in 
deciding the extent of any particular provision.162 Furthermore, the formal international legal rules of 
treaty interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are regularly either 
ignored or only very loosely applied by tribunals. This situation has proved particularly problematic 
with regard to disputes over indirect expropriation and the extent of minimum standards of 
treatment. 
The issues of transparency and participation have long been central points of critique. The default 
setting for investor-State disputes is closed hearings, making it very difficult for proceedings of 
ongoing cases to become public, even if one of the parties would greatly desire public knowledge and 
discussion on the subject of the dispute. The rules are limited and highly conditional with regard to 
permitting amicus briefs and allowing standing to interested third parties, and are, in other respects, 
problematic from the perspective of transparency. Participation of non-parties extends only to the 
submission of written briefs by particular actors under particular circumstances. Presence at oral 
hearings has so far been strictly limited to the parties concerned and their direct counsel (with the 
exception of arbitrations under the Central American Free Trade Agreement). Due to a bias towards 
confidentiality, an amicus curiae, where one is permitted, would generally not be allowed knowledge 
of specific arguments by the parties and would have to structure a brief independently and in the dark, 
reducing the likelihood of its effectiveness. 
Many, if not most, arbitrators come from a background in commercial arbitration and arguably are 
heavily influenced by the interests and viewpoint of investors. In the opinion of one of the leading 
commentators in the field, “their concern for the values of the international community is weaker 
than their concern for contractual sanctity and the securing of their next appointment to a tribunal on 
the basis of their display of commercial probity and their loyalty to the values of multinational 
business.”163 Judges in standing courts are stringently vetted for suitability and are subject to strict 
rules regarding qualification, conduct, impartiality and conflict of interest. Such processes and rules 
do not currently apply to arbitrators. Consequently, opportunities are rife for persons simultaneously 
acting as counsel and arbitrator to shape the interpretation of substantive provisions in the interests 
of their clients.  
The literature widely acknowledges a clear tendency of arbitrators to interpret the provisions of 
investment agreements broadly in favour of investors.164 Ultimately the institution and business of 
investment arbitration is entirely dependent on investor perception of its utility, as only investors’ 
claims give it life. The clear substantive preference toward investor protection within the law itself has 
provided fertile ground for this business to grow into a veritable arbitration industry, existing primarily 
for the service of foreign investors. 
A recent report from Corporate Observatory Europe and the Transnational Institute provides evidence 
that the major players in the arbitration industry are highly active in vigorous defence of the 
investment regime as such, and are powerful lobbyists against reform.165 These actors are not just 
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limited to arbitrators themselves, but include a relatively small coterie of global North-based law firms, 
academics and, increasingly, hedge funds and other financiers. The report demonstrates a host of 
fundamental concerns: a revolving door between law firms and government departments tasked with 
investment policy-making, a dominance over academic discourse on investment law and arbitration, 
the existence of specialised departments within law firms dedicated to seeking opportunities for 
litigation and encouraging suits against governments in crisis, and an increasing integration between 
the arbitral system and the speculative financial world.166 Due to its genesis in commercial arbitration, 
the rules on conflict of interest in investor-State arbitration are widely noted as lenient and, 
unsurprisingly, disqualification motions rarely succeed. 
 
3.1(c) – The Backlash against ISDS  
 
The vicissitudes of investment arbitration are undoubtedly the primary reason for a range of measures 
recently taken by States attempting either to exit the system, or to modify it in such a way that arbitral 
excesses are less likely. This observed backlash is motivated by what is seen as an unwarranted 
expansion in the frame of protection offered to investors by tribunals; protection that some States 
feel has gone well beyond the intention of drafters of the underlying treaties. The institution of 
investment arbitration has escaped their control, and they now seek ways to bring it back into line. It 
remains to be seen whether this can be done without starting again from scratch. One influential 
commentator and lawyer who regularly represents States at international arbitration argues that the 
dispute resolution system could well be viewed as systemically ‘broken’.167 Many thus believe that the 
excesses of the system will ultimately bring about its own downfall.  
References in the literature to a legitimacy crisis and backlash are numerous,168 and the consequences 
of an over-expanded investor’s agenda promulgated through capricious interpretation is increasingly 
evident in the recent reactions of host States in the global South. In 2007, Bolivia became the first 
country to notify the ICSID Secretariat of its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. Ecuador followed 
suit in 2009, as did Venezuela in 2012. Elsewhere, South Africa has cancelled BITs with Germany, 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain, and it appears that all of South Africa’s ‘old generation’ BITs are set 
for termination.169 India has formulated a new draft model BIT that dramatically reduces the scope of 
investor protection, the range of actors covered by the definition of ‘investor’, and the leeway for 
arbitral interpretation, as well as removing the most favoured nation clause and instituting the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, investor obligations, and mandatory home State remedies for 
victims of extraterritorial misconduct by their investors.170  
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Significantly, such reactions are not limited to developing countries. Many States in the global North 
have also re-modelled their investment treaty templates to reduce the latitude of tribunals in their 
interpretive capacity. Australia provides a prominent example, where the government recently 
decided to exclude the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism from some of its future 
investment agreements.171 The decision was taken on the basis of a 2010 report by the Australian 
Productivity Commission, which found a range of concerns regarding the institution of investor-State 
arbitration.172 Important additional concerns not yet noted, but dealt with further below, include the 
issue of ‘regulatory chill’, the granting of rights to foreign investment not shared by domestic 
investors, the undermining of the democratic process, inconsistency of decisions, and the costs 
incurred by the parties to the disputes. Australia refused to include ISDS in the  US-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, and is considering opposing its inclusion in the TPP.  
Within Europe, sensitivity to some of the widespread criticism of BITs has been displayed by the 
European Parliament, which has called on the Commission to ensure that the EU Investment Policy 
includes obligations not only on host States but also on investors, noting that “for investment 
agreements to further benefit countries, they should also be based on investor obligations in terms of 
compliance with human rights and anti-corruption standards”, and that agreements “should better 
address the right to protect the public capacity to regulate.” 173 As detailed below, the current 
proposals of the European Commission clearly acknowledge many of the existing problems with the 
investment regime and ISDS and make certain efforts to address most of them in the context of the 
current negotiations. The question is whether the Commission’s proposals are adequate or not. 
 
3.2 – Investment Liberalisation and Social Policy 
 
The intensification of the turn to market principles of economic and social organisation worldwide 
over the last 30 years has constituted the greater part of what is generally referred to as globalisation. 
Together with a general reduction of State intervention in the economy and a decline in public funding 
for social programmes and economic assistance both nationally and internationally, liberalisation has 
led to an increasing dependence of States on foreign investment and trade opportunities to 
underwrite growth and living standards. While such dependence is most pronounced in the 
developing world, it has also become highly prominent in the States of the global North, with Ireland 
being a prime example. Despite a significant influx of public funds from Europe after Ireland joined 
the European Economic Community in 1973, the country has based its development on attractiveness 
to foreign investment and high export volumes. This has led to constant pressure on social and 
environmental protections, which have often been compromised in the name of maintaining and 
increasing incentives for foreign investors. Overall, this approach has brought mixed results at best, 
with the downsides of such dependence cruelly exposed in the wake of 2008 global financial crisis. In 
the response to the crisis in Ireland, social protections have been further eroded, and future 
generations will now be heavily burdened with the fall-out from hugely significant decisions made in 
an attempt to maintain attractiveness for foreign investment and the favour of global capital markets.  
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By any measure—economic, fiscal or social—Ireland’s approach to development and liberalisation 
would not seem to be sustainable. It is a core contention of this report that the further liberalisation 
of TTIP and the added pressure on social protections resulting therefrom is ultimately unsustainable. 
The social fabric of the country will not long support further strain on a model already defined by 
relatively low tax and low spending on public services. A new approach to economic development and 
social welfare will almost inevitably become both necessary and demanded by the electorate, and this 
new approach is likely to conflict with the thrust of TTIP. As such, further liberalisation of trade and 
investment that is to be locked in by international law must be scrutinised extremely closely with a 
view to its social value.  
The trade liberalisation aspects of TTIP will be addressed in the next chapter. With respect to 
investment liberalisation, it may well be argued that TTIP could make little difference as foreign 
investment is already almost completely liberalised on the majority of EU States with US companies 
enjoying virtually total market access as a matter of domestic law. This is certainly the case for Ireland. 
However, TTIP could make a difference in several important respects.  
Firstly, it could mandate full liberalisation of foreign investment as a binding obligation under 
international law. This is significantly different from the present situation of virtually full liberalisation 
as a policy choice of each EU Member State that could be reversed, adjusted or applied to particular 
sectors, in accordance with national and social prerogatives. In Ireland’s case at present this can be 
achieved simply through the national legislature with no consequences under international law. By 
contrast, an investment chapter in TTIP could liberalise foreign investment entry regimes in both the 
EU and US by requiring pre-establishment national treatment. This would grant US investors a right of 
access to EU economies and a right to be treated equally alongside any EU or domestic company in a 
Member State at the point of entry. This has long been common practice in US and Canadian 
investment treaties. Market access and liberalisation norms were also included in CETA, which has led 
some to note that TTIP may be superfluous to a certain extent, as most US investors in the EU would 
be covered already through their subsidiaries in Canada.174  
Secondly, unless it is otherwise specifically ruled out in the text, this right of establishment could be 
enforceable through the ISDS mechanism. These two factors combined have the potential to make it 
impossible to reverse or adjust the access of US investors in certain areas of the economy once opened 
up in this way, thus removing a very significant amount of governmental policy space. Currently it is 
not clear if an investment chapter in TTIP would include a right to establishment, whether it would 
enable carve-outs for particular sectors, or whether it would be enforceable through dispute 
resolution. However, if it is excluded it would be a prominent departure from CETA. Given the present 
de facto openness of the EU to US investment it is difficult to estimate a specific cost on mandatory 
full liberalisation. The cost is a structural one, and a crucial one at that, and is dealt with further in 
chapter 4. CETA is in fact a substantial deviation in EU practice as the Member States have not included 
market access provisions in their BITs previously. Nevertheless, in TTIP, and in line with US and 
Canadian practice, the EU mandate would seem to be fairly straightforward in its demand for pre-
establishment rights.175 From the point of view of Member State policy space it would be undoubtedly 
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beneficial to exclude pre-establishment national treatment, or, even if it is included, to carve these 
rights out from enforcement through ISDS. However, this would set up an internal contradiction 
between the investment chapter and that on trade in services, which will no doubt seek further, if not 
full, liberalisation in this sector. 
Thirdly, it is also common practice for the US and Canada to include prohibitions on performance 
requirements. These are policy tools commonly used by governments to help ensure a net positive 
benefit from foreign investment and are usually imposed on foreign investors at the time of entry and 
establishment in the host economy. They may take forms such as mandatory reinvestment in the host 
country, transfer of technology, and employment of local workers and managers. Performance 
requirements are a crucial aspect of a government’s regulatory capacity and have long been thought 
of as highly important in efforts to ensure that foreign investment has a net positive impact on the 
society and economy of the host State.176 However, these capacities of Member States could be 
severely restricted if not eliminated through investment provisions and ISDS, and are further affected 
by the trade in services chapter addressed below. According to paragraph 23 of the EU’s negotiating 
mandate, “market access commitments may include, when necessary, rules prohibiting performance 
requirements.” 
 
3.3 – ISDS and Public Health  
 
3.3(a) – General Considerations on Public Health and International Investment Law 
 
One may reasonably assume that, compared to chemical manufacturers, elected local and national 
governments would be better placed to judge the health effects of certain chemicals and the levels of 
risk that are acceptable to the population. However, in 2009, Dow Inc., one of the largest chemical 
companies in the world, based its investment claim against the Canadian government on the 
assumption that it knew best. The company claimed that a Quebec ban on pesticides containing a 
chemical named 2,4-D violated clauses on fair and equitable treatment and expropriation under 
NAFTA. Although the government based the ban clearly on the health risk, Dow believed that “there 
was no evidence that 2,4-D posed a health or safety risk to humans”. It also believed that Quebec's 
“stated reliance on an interpretation of the precautionary approach was motivated by political 
considerations, rather than any legitimate scientific concerns.”177 This raises fundamental questions 
of how a precautionary approach should be implemented in the area of public health, how much 
science is needed, how much public sentiment can factor in, what the relationship is between the 
precautionary approach and democratic governance, and who should ultimately decide on its 
legitimacy according to what criteria.  
The Dow case was settled in the end, limiting its utility in answering many of these questions. 
According to the settlement agreement, the company received no compensation and the ban 
remained in place. However, the Quebec government was forced to make a statement that “products 
containing 2,4-D do not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment, provided that 
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the instructions on their label are followed.”178 Despite the fact that Quebec’s ban remained in place, 
this result has fuelled perceptions of regulatory chill as the authorities’ admission could be used 
against any subsequent decisions of other local authorities considering a ban.179 
Trade and investment liberalisation has granted investors a range of new legal tools that can be used 
to influence public and democratic processes in host States to their advantage. The intensification of 
competition due to the same process of liberalisation has structurally reinforced these newly acquired 
powers. Through extensive protection of investor rights, international investment governance runs a 
high risk of undermining fundamental national goals to provide for the highest levels of public health. 
In theory it can be argued that investment protections and public health interests may be reconciled; 
whether this occurs in practice depends heavily on the interpretations given to treaty texts. In the 
context of investment treaties, history has shown that there is only so much States can do in 
formulating investor rights and qualifying language in such a way as to try and ensure a consistent or 
determined outcome.  
Once the matter is set down in an international treaty and placed in front of a series of ad hoc 
investment tribunals there is little that can be done. In their decisions, much will boil down to 
questions of ‘reasonableness’, ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘necessity’. There is arguably some scope for 
allowance of bona fide government regulation. However, there is also ample textual opportunity for 
tribunals to narrow that scope to a minimum or even effectively preclude it in certain circumstances, 
which may or may not be objectively justified. In the end, given the unsettled opinions of arbitrators 
on these matters and the vagueness of terminology in BITs, their determination will essentially be a 
matter for each arbitrator's judgment. Again, the issue boils down to a simple question: is it worth the 
risk? 
In the tobacco plain packaging cases addressed below, much will depend on the tribunal’s weighing 
of competing international legal obligations that States are under to uphold the public interest and 
social rights. Specifically at issue are obligations under the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
and human rights treaties that protect the right to health. However, the track record of investment 
tribunals demonstrates a very clear reluctance to even acknowledge such competing obligations, let 
alone give them due weight. This is especially so when it comes to international human rights law. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health has recently made some strong statements in this 
regard: international investment agreements “allow transnational corporations to reduce States’ 
policy space and have been instrumental in increasing the influence of transnational corporations on 
States’ ability to institute public health policies”; inequities “in access to information can enable 
corporations to influence the content of an international investment agreement in their favour”; and 
“[s]uch agreements perpetuate and exacerbate an asymmetrical relationship between investors and 
States.”180 More specifically, he argues that investment treaties “may affect States’ power to introduce 
health laws in the public interest. States may have to modify their laws to accommodate investors’ 
rights, even though such modifications may increase the risk of violating individuals’ right to health.”181 
Although investment treaties may involve language seeking to limit investor’s rights in the public 
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interest it is nevertheless the case that “investor rights may trump them.”182 The Special Rapporteur 
also notes the following, which is of special relevance to the issue of interpretation: 
The current system of investor-State dispute settlement also suffers from bias and conflicts of 
interest. The dispute settlement is controlled by a small clique of arbitrators and lawyers, and 
the same person may be counsel, arbitrator and adviser to an investor or State at different 
times. Many arbitrators share close links with business communities and may be inclined 
towards protecting investors’ profits. This can affect the independence and neutrality of 
arbitrators, is contrary to the principle of fairness and further compromises the integrity of 
arbitration under international investment agreements.183 
Another UN official, Professor Alfred De Zayas, Independent Expert to the UN Secretary-General on 
the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, has also recently warned of the 
threat to human rights posed by investment treaties and the lack of transparency in negotiations over 
TTIP.184 
We illustrate these concerns by outlining a few of the cases in point below.185 
 
3.3(b) – Plain Packaging for Tobacco Products 
 
Ireland has recently passed legislation on the plain packaging of cigarettes with the President signing 
the legislation into law on March 10th 2015. Ireland was the second country in the world to do so, after 
Australia, and now followed by the UK. This has occurred in reaction to numerous studies indicating 
that substantial benefits for public health will ensue, and amid threatened legal action by a number 
of tobacco firms. Because Ireland is not currently part of the investment treaty network such 
challenges would have to be pursued through the domestic courts. However, TTIP could change this 
situation dramatically.  
The issue of tobacco regulation and plain cigarette packaging is of special relevance here as actions 
challenging government regulation in this area have encompassed both the international trade and 
investment law regimes. Claims have been brought by States on behalf of the tobacco industry before 
the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (see chapter 4), and have also been launched directly by 
tobacco multinational Philip Morris in two investment arbitrations, which are of concern here.  
Following years of open public inquiry and cost benefit calculation, the Australian government 
introduced legislation in 2011 mandating the plain packaging of all tobacco products. Soon after, Philip 
Morris initiated litigation under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, claiming a violation of the FET and 
expropriation clauses, infringements on its intellectual property rights and a diminished value in its 
trademark. The Australian government argues that the litigation is abusive and spurious as the 
legislation is non-discriminatory, clearly in the public interest, and in accord with due legal process.186 
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Philip Morris also blocked Australia’s request for open hearings in the dispute.187 A previous challenge 
to the legislation was brought in the High Court of Australia by Philip Morris and three other foreign 
tobacco multinationals.188 The Court rejected the challenge, noting that the arguments made by the 
foreign investors were “delusive”, “unreal and synthetic”, and fatally defective in logic and 
reasoning.189 The initiation of the international BIT claim aims to effectively override the High Court’s 
decision and seeks an award of “billions of dollars in damages”.190  
Australia also argues that the legislation is aligned with the spirit and obligations inherent in the World 
Health Organisation’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FTCT), under which the 
contracting parties are mandated "to give priority to their right to protect public health.”  It would 
furthermore seem that Philip Morris deliberately restructured its corporate holdings of the Australian 
subsidiary through Hong-Kong deliberately to ensure that it would be able to initiate the dispute under 
the relevant BIT, and is accordingly accused by Australia of an abuse of its rights. Philip Morris also 
carried out its restructuring of its investments long after Australia had publically announced the 
intention of enacting plain packaging legislation and the underlying dispute with Philip Morris had 
begun. The investor claims that the dispute arose only when the plain packaging laws were actually 
passed in November 2011; however, it lodged its ‘notice of claim’, which is the first necessary step in 
the litigation, in June 2011, compromising the claim that there was in fact no dispute at that time. 
Australia holds that the claim is an “abusive manipulation of the system of investment protection”, 
warning that that the longer it takes to resolve the dispute, "the longer every other state that is 
considering a similar plain packaging regulatory measure (including the 177 parties to the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control) will be prevented from enacting such measures."191 This 
has been confirmed by the statements of the New Zealand government and others.  
Notably, with respect to the verification of the regulatory chill argument, Australia itself refers to the 
fact of regulatory chill in one of its submissions to the tribunal. As part of an argument to deal with 
jurisdictional issues separately, the government argues that this would speed up the process and 
therefore be in the public interest, not just of Australians but of people worldwide, as “many countries 
are now awaiting the results of the litigation in order to decide on their own legislative proposals on 
plain packaging.” Australia in fact states that Philip Morris’ litigation has "produced and is producing 
a deep and profound regulatory chill across the globe”.192  
In a closely related case Philip Morris has also sued Uruguay regarding its plain packaging legislation 
enacted in 2008 and 2009. This will be an interesting test, as the relevant BIT between Switzerland 
and Uruguay contains a clause reaffirming the right to regulate, stating that; “The Contracting Parties 
recognise each other’s right not to allow economic activities for reasons of public security and order, 
public health or morality, as well as activities which by law are reserved to their own investors.” 
Although this is not worded the same as an exceptions clause the interpretation by the tribunal will 
give some indication of how such a clause will be applied. The investor does not directly deny a right 
to promote and protect public health, yet it claims that the government “cannot abuse that right and 
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invoke it as a pretext for disregarding the Claimant's legal rights.”193 Philip Morris claims that the 
mandatory graphic warnings are “offensive” and “operate so as to denigrate [the claimants'] 
products”, affecting the goodwill associated with PMI trademarks”, “thereby depriving them of their 
commercial value” and is an abuse of the company’s trademark.194 Reportedly, Uruguay President Jose 
Mujica almost settled the claim early on under pressure from the company, due to the fact the investor 
claims US$2 billion in damages, or 3.6% of its US$55 billion GDP.195 In comparison, Philip Morris 
International’s annual sales total US$66 billion, more than the GDP of 130 developing countries.196 
The WHO has successfully applied to make an intervention in this case, stating that it will “stand 
shoulder to shoulder with all countries who are defending their tobacco control policies to fully 
implement the WHO FCTC.”197  
In both cases, the investor challenges the government’s measures as ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unreasonable’, 
even though these standards will be difficult to prove. With respect to Australia, Philip Morris argues 
that there is insufficient evidence that plain packaging legislation will have the desired effect of 
protecting human health, despite numerous studies and public consultations entered into by the 
government before the adoption of legislation.  
Both cases are currently pending so it remains unclear how plain packaging regulations will fare under 
the investment law regime. There is little doubt that the cases will set a form of precedent that could 
be adopted by subsequent tribunals and possibly even national courts. What is clear for now is the 
regulatory chill factor; even though undecided, the cases are nevertheless having an active effect on 
the regulatory autonomy of governments in an area of great significance to public health. As such, it 
appears reasonable to surmise that Ireland has felt safe enough to go ahead with the regulation as it 
is not bound by international investment treaties in this regard, whereas New Zealand has felt 
constrained due to its obligations to foreign investors. It should be added that in the 1990s Philip 
Morris placed pressure on a Canadian government contemplating plain packaging, threatening 
investment treaty claims and at the very least contributing significantly to the plans being shelved at 
the time. The threat of NAFTA claims “is widely believed to have deterred the government from taking 
legislative action on plain packaging.”198 Canada subsequently inscribed more restrictive language in 
its model BIT. Similar concerns have long surrounded US proposals to legislate, and both British 
American Tobacco and Philip Morris are currently suing the UK in its domestic courts over the 
government’s recent introduction of plain packaging laws, creating a potential liability of billions of 
pounds.199  
In another case involving US legislation mandating payment by cigarette manufacturers into a special 
account of a certain amount per cigarette sold to offset State costs for treating smoking-related 
illnesses, the tribunal held against the investor and affirmed the State’s right to regulate.200 The case 
of Grand River Enterprises was notable in denying that the measures amounted to indirect 
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expropriation, stating that “trade in tobacco products has historically been the subject of close and 
extensive regulation by U.S. states”, and that the investor could not have a legitimate expectation of 
freedom from further measures.201 The tribunal also held that expropriation required “a complete or 
very substantial deprivation of owners' rights in the totality of the investment”,202 and as the 
investment remained profitable there could be no negative finding against the State.   
However, another tribunal in Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, in a case involving 
the taxation of cigarettes for export, has held that “if there is a finding of expropriation, compensation 
is required, even if the taking is for a public purpose, non-discriminatory and in accordance with due 
process of law”.203 This approach would seem to confirm the ‘sole effects’ doctrine that is highly 
restrictive of government regulatory space, and would have been sufficient to find against the US in 
the Grand River Enterprises case.   
These cases serve to highlight the controversy regarding the nature and extent of the standards 
applied, which leads many to advocate the simple exclusion of tobacco control measures from the 
scope of any future BITs and investment chapter that may be included in future trade agreements.204  
An interesting comparator is a case decided by the European Court of Human Rights. The European 
Convention on Human Rights protects the right to property, and as such the Court was asked to find 
a violation of tobacco companies’ intellectual property rights due to an EU Directive requiring the 
printing of the levels of toxins on packages and larger health warnings. In the Tobacco Products 
Judgement the Court noted that the right to property is not absolute and that "[i]ts exercise may be 
restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest ... and 
do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the 
rights guaranteed."205 The Court found that the Directive did not compromise the essence of 
companies' trademarks, but was instead a proportionate restriction on their use in the interests of 
public health. In addition, the European Court of Justice has declined to find in favour of two 
companies that argued that UK and German legislation preventing the marketing of tobacco for oral 
use contravened their rights.206 The Court held that such government measures were clearly aligned 
with EU obligations to pursue a high level of public health and health protection.  
Although there is some overlap between the jurisprudence of the European courts and the decisions 
of investment tribunals it is clear that very divergent approaches are taken. It is unlikely that 
investment tribunals will begin to adopt the same restrictive interpretation of property rights as the 
Courts, which operate in an entirely different contextual milieu, having a forced regard for a much 
broader range of rights and interests. This raises the distinct possibility of a clash between the 
application of investment provisions under TTIP on the one hand, and EU law and European human 
rights law on the other. The implementation of an ISDS mechanism that allows investors to circumvent 
domestic and regional judicial processes will be detrimental to the protection of public health, in the 
contexts of tobacco regulation and more broadly.  
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3.3(c) – Secondary Health Impacts 
 
Many claims brought by investors directly challenge environmental regulations or measures that 
nevertheless have a significant effect on public health. In fact, the vast majority of disputes nominally 
framed as environmental are at heart concerned with the secondary effects of environmental 
degradation on human health. Although most often grouped under the heading of ‘environmental 
cases’ Tecmed vs. Mexico,207 for example, is essentially a public health case. The Tecmed case 
concerned a dispute over the expropriatory effect of the refusal to reissue an operating permit to the 
foreign operator of a hazardous waste processing facility in Mexico. Subsequent to Tecmed’s purchase 
of the relevant landfill, the government enacted more stringent environmental and health legislation 
requiring the relocation of the landfill further away from a neighbouring urban centre. Confronted 
with a refusal to renew its operating permit on health and safety grounds, the foreign investor, 
Tecmed, initiated arbitration claiming expropriation and unfair treatment. The tribunal found in 
favour of Tecmed and directed Mexico to pay US$5.5 million in compensation. The verdict was based 
on the conclusion that, despite denouncing clear code violations, the Ministry of the Environment had 
failed to identify said violations explicitly as public health hazards.208 Perversely, the denial of the 
permit as a response to community concerns regarding health and safety was seen as an improper 
basis for a decision by a governmental body.209 The tribunal ruled that, to avoid the burden of 
compensation, States must provide investors with:  
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment … to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity 
and totally transparently … [such that the investor] may know beforehand any and all rules 
and regulations that will govern its investments.210 
This passage has been seminal in the development of the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’.211 This 
is, nevertheless, an impossible standard for any State to manage, developing or developed.212 It 
effectively means that the BIT would act like a contractual stabilisation or economic equilibrium 
clause, freezing legislation at the investor’s point of entry and requiring all subsequent legislation to 
be equally, or more, protective of the investment. Any subsequent regulation, including necessarily 
progressive human rights measures, that reduced investor protection, would simply not apply to that 
investment. This could potentially stall human rights realisation and public interest legislation at the 
time of entry of foreign investment. 
In relation to the Tecmed dispute, it is important to note that a State may be violating its competing 
obligation under human rights law to safeguard public health if it fails to “regulate the activities of 
individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent them from violating the right to health of others,” 
or “to enact or enforce laws to prevent the pollution of water, air and soil by extractive and 
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manufacturing industries.”213 The potential conflicts between human rights norms and international 
investment protection are thus manifest, but ISDS tribunals are clearly mandated to adhere to the 
latter rather than the former.  
Of particular relevance to the Irish context, where licenses for fracking are causing deep public 
concern, US oil and gas company Lone Pine is now suing Canada over its environmental and health 
policies with respect to fracking operations in Quebec.214 Amid serious issues of possible water 
pollution and human health consequences, the Quebec National Assembly placed a moratorium on 
the fracking of shale gas until the uncertain environmental and health impacts could be assessed. The 
measure also revokes existing permits pertaining to oil and gas within a specified region close to a 
major river. Lone Pine claims that the government “acted too hastily” in its actions, questions the 
validity of the environmental impact assessments relied upon, and characterises the decision-making 
process as irrational and politicised.215 This occurs in the broader global context of controversy over 
the effects of fracking that have led to public authorities placing similar moratoriums on the practice 
in various parts of the world. In this context, the Lone Pine dispute has the hallmarks of another case 
of regulatory chill. 
Another example of the exposure of States to arbitration come from a dispute over gold mining in El 
Salvador, where the multinational Pacific Rim has brought a claim under the US-El Salvador BIT. The 
El-Salvador government had concerns over an environmental impact assessment submitted by the 
company, which it suspected did not attend properly to possibilities of cyanide, mercury and arsenic 
poisoning of the groundwater. Local wells had also allegedly dried up due to Pacific Rim’s activities. 
The company applied for an exploitation concession and was left waiting by the government while it 
considered the situation amid huge public controversy. Pacific Rim alleges violations of national 
treatment, expropriation and minimum treatment standards, and has raised its damages claim to 
US$301 million, which amounts to 2% of El Salvador’s GDP.216  
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3.3(d) – Health Insurance 
 
The Slovak Republic has faced three claims in recent years from foreign investors impacted by the 
government’s decision to amend its policy on health insurance.217 In 2007, Slovakia enacted a law 
obliging insurers to operate on a not-for-profit basis and to re-invest surplus revenues, rather than 
distribute them as dividends to shareholders. This reversed an earlier policy adopted at the behest of 
the World Bank as part of a ‘reform’ of the public health system in the context of a national debt crisis, 
seeking to encourage foreign investment in the relevant sector and permitting operations for profit. 
One claimant sought over US$1 billion in damages. While the Slovakian Constitutional Court 
overturned the law in 2011, one investment tribunal made it clear that it would have found the 
government fully liable under the terms of the relevant BIT either way, as the very concept of an 
investment should imply a right to “enjoy the possibility of a return on the investment, if it proves 
profitable.”218 Even under this temporary ban that was ‘corrected’ by the domestic courts, the tribunal 
found a violation of the FET standard had taken place in the interim, and awarded compensation. 
Slovakia repeatedly asserted its right to regulate on fundamental matters of health care reform, but 
the tribunal was of the opinion that while the investment law regime is not “hostile” to any particular 
policies on the provision of health care, it does control “the manner in which policies may be changed 
and implemented”.219 
The Slovakian cases do nothing to dispel deep concerns that investment treaties act to effectively ‘lock 
in’ market oriented policies favourable to foreign investors and their profit margins at the expense of 
localised democratic control and public accountability. At least it is clear that these treaties will often 
make the reversal of these policies prohibitively expensive, especially for small countries undergoing 
prolonged external debt difficulties, not unlike the situation of Ireland. Because the reversal law was 
struck down by the Constitutional Court, and was therefore only temporary, the tribunal did not have 
to decide on the claim of the investors for compensation for decades of future lost profits. If the 
Constitutional Court had not decided in this way then Slovakia may have been forced to strike the law 
down in any case for purely monetary reasons, given its poor public financial situation.  
A Commission established by the Canadian government in 2004 to enquire into the extension of non-
profit public health insurance, to cover extra treatments such as prescription medicine and dental 
care, warned that this may not be feasible due to damage claims under investment treaties.220 
Reportedly, in 2006 the threat of investment claims factored into the eventual decision of the Czech 
government not to re-establish a number of hospitals as non-profit organisations.221 In short, 
extensive privatisations may become effectively irreversible due to the possible effects of investment 
treaties.  
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3.4 – Assessing the Case For Investor Protection and ISDS in TTIP 
 
It is essential to address the fundamental question of whether the inclusion of ISDS and investment 
protection generally within the TTIP is warranted in the first place. This basic question is not taken up 
directly by the European Commission and was not included in the call for public comment in the course 
of its March 2014 consultation on ISDS. This has significantly narrowed the terms of the debate and 
an attempt must be made to open it back up. As things stand, it is our view that ISDS should not be 
included in TTIP. For it to be enacted, there would need to be an expectation that an overall public 
benefit would be delivered that would outweigh the evident costs of granting of such powerful rights 
to corporations. “Otherwise, the Commission would be proceeding with a major expansion of 
investor-state arbitration – extending its coverage of international FDI flows by about 300% of its 
current coverage based on existing treaties – without a careful review of the significant risks to public 
funds and regulatory capacity; to the principle of a level playing field for European and extra-European 
companies; and to established structures of public accountability, regulatory flexibility, and judicial 
independence.”222 
The same reasoning underlies the unanimous vote of the European Parliament (with the exception of 
those MEPs who rejected ISDS outright) in May 2013 that future EU investment agreements should 
include ISDS only “[i]n the cases where it is justifiable”.223 The question of whether ISDS is justified is 
still a very live issue in the European Parliament. In June 2015, a report containing a series of new 
recommendations on TTIP negotiations from the Parliament to the Commission was tabled, which still 
includes a mandate to continue negotiating an investment chapter with a reformed ISDS system.224 A 
plenary vote was planned for 10 June 2015 on the adoption of these recommendations, but was 
abandoned due to strong and persistent calls for the exclusion of ISDS in total and widespread concern 
over ‘weak language’225 in the recommendations and the appropriate way forward in the 
negotiations.226 Notably, 6 of the European Parliament’s 14 committees (those on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, Legal Affairs, Employment, Environment, Petitions and Constitutional Affair) have 
all taken positions calling for the rejection of ISDS due to various concerns including regulatory chill.227  
In October 2014 the ministers of 14 EU Member States, including the UK, sent a letter to Commissioner 
Malmström stating their support for an investment chapter in TTIP.228 Germany, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands were notably absent. Given that 14 Member States chose not to voice a favour for ISDS, 
the EU could be effectively split down the middle on the issue in terms of numbers, but may be pushed 
to lean towards the qualification or exclusion of ISDS in terms of political and economic weight. The 
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small and medium sized businesses that are the foundation of the German economy, for example, are 
highly sceptical if not opposed.  
The case for ISDS generally rests on one or both of two distinct grounds. The first is a claim that it 
depoliticises disputes and overcomes deficient domestic legal systems, thereby giving aggrieved 
foreign investors a fair hearing and contributing to the development of an international rule of law.229 
The second is a claim that it is necessary to give meaning to international legal protections afforded 
to foreign investors in treaties that would otherwise be empty words and therefore provide no 
encouragement for investors to invest in a host State, hopefully spurring its economic development.230 
The first claim is thus based on on a particular conception of justice, and the second on the promise 
of economic benefit. Both claims are quite shaky to say the least, even in the context of investment 
between developed and developing countries, and arguably collapse entirely when applied to the 
context of an EU-US agreement.  
There is a third claim, which is particular to the context of TTIP. Those making this third claim 
acknowledge that there are problems with both the extent of the rights granted to foreign investors 
and the system of dispute resolution, but argue that the problems can be fixed, and that the 
negotiations over TTIP provide a prime and crucial opportunity to do so. As such, it is held that 
systemic reforms may be catalysed through their enactment in TTIP, which may be of significant 
benefit to the investment law system itself, and its survival and evolution. This last claim is ultimately 
based on the value of the international investment protection system in itself, and therefore is 
dependent on an evaluation of the first two claims. Yet the third claim also rests on the notion of a 
gamble. It is therefore important to assess what level of cost is going to be incurred for the chance of 
an improved investment system that may still fail to serve its alleged purposes, in order to properly 
appreciate the size of the gamble. Integral to a clear picture is an assessment of the proposed reforms 
against the likelihood of their success.  
 
3.4(a) – The First Claim: Legal Certainty for Investors 
 
With regard to the first claim, resting on an idea of justice for foreign investors, it must first be noted 
that ISDS was nominally instituted in reaction to a perceived lack of predictability, independence and 
quality in the domestic courts of specifically developing countries. The system was allegedly designed 
to manage political and judicial risk for global North-based investors in the global South. Such 
perceptions suggested racialised and neo-colonial undercurrents; until now Northern capital-
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exporting States have not denigrated their own domestic courts in the same manner. The ECT and 
NAFTA cannot be properly understood as an exception to this rule as these agreements envelop 
developing countries and remain primarily of benefit to Northern investors. Setting aside the 
questionable validity of the cultural superiority and imperialism underlying the initial creation of the 
ISDS mechanism, it is evident that by design the investment law regime is not applicable to economic 
relations between global North States. This fact is reflected in the Australian position, whereby the 
country rejected ISDS in its bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the US based on “the fact that both 
countries have robust, developed legal systems for resolving disputes between foreign investors and 
government”.231 Therefore, there was no need to risk the obvious costs of the investment arbitration 
regime by altering the status quo ante. Evidently the Australian government also deemed the possible 
economic benefits of ISDS in terms of increased US investment to be of such limited likelihood or 
minimal value as to also fail as a justification for the risk of its inclusion.  
In a related vein, it is sometimes claimed that, in comparison to domestic judges, international 
investment arbitrators are somehow more efficient in resolving investment disputes as they possess 
some form of special expertise in gauging the meaning and application of the vague terms of 
investment agreements. This notion is highly debateable, arguably ridiculous, given that such 
supposed special expertise has failed to resolve numerous and deep conflicts between these 
arbitrators over very basic questions of interpretation, especially regarding the extent of the FET and 
indirect expropriations standards, the operation of MFN and umbrella clauses, the admission of mass 
claims and the definition of protected investments, among other fundamental legal points. There is 
little reason to believe that domestic judges would do worse, and because of the interpretative and 
professional strictures they work under, there is very good reason to believe they would do far better. 
In addition, as this report seeks to emphasise, there are competing legal obligations at hand in many 
disputes than the simplified and vague investor protections established by investment agreements, 
which are routinely ignored by many investment tribunals. Where these broader legal questions relate 
to the wider socio-economic setting of the investment concerned, it is likely that domestic judges will 
be better placed to make appropriate decisions, and will have far more holistic expertise. Domestic 
courts are in important respects more knowledgeable and logically located to provide an appropriate 
balance, accounting for the compromises struck nationally and locally between public and private 
interests. They have greater awareness of domestic rules and mores, including the ability and 
requirement to gauge disputes against the underlying constitutional framework.  
The US and the EU both maintain very high levels of protection for foreign investors, non-existent if 
not very low barriers to establishment, and deep commitment to private property rights and 
commercial freedoms as central to the rule of law. Yet some still argue that international legal 
protections and enforcement through ISDS is nevertheless necessary to reassure foreign investors and 
thereby increase investment flows. Primarily on the basis of two investment claims brought against 
the US government for alleged denial of justice in its domestic courts, the EU Commission has argued 
that ISDS is needed to adequately protect EU investors. However, the cases relied upon by the 
Commission are extreme outliers. In one case, Mondev, the investment tribunal itself stated that there 
had been no judicial impropriety involved in the domestic litigation, and in any case found that it could 
not find for the investor as its rights in international law had not been violated. In the other case, 
Loewen, while the conduct of the domestic jury trial was indeed compromised, the US immediately 
initiated significant reform of the local courts in Mississippi.232 The Loewen case is in fact notorious for 
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the faulty reasoning of the investment tribunal itself and for its own possible misconduct. One of the 
arbitrators has admitted that prior to his appointment he met with US officials who warned him that, 
“if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA”; to which he replied, “Well, if you want to put pressure on 
me, then that does it.”233 If anything, these cases themselves, rather than supporting the Commission’s 
arguments about the need to protect EU investors from an incompetent US court system actually add 
weight to the ongoing and far more relevant critique of bias, and ideological and political influence, 
within investor-State arbitration itself. 
It must also be remembered that whatever the possible benefits for EU investors in the US, the flipside 
of the mechanism is increased protection for US investors in EU Member States. Some argue that this 
formal bi-directionality could favour US investors,234 who, when considered by nationality, bring 
considerably more arbitration claims than those of any other State. UNCTAD data shows that of a total 
568 ISDS cases, US investors have initiated 22%, or 127 cases, followed by Dutch investors (61 cases), 
the UK (43), Germany (39), Canada (32), France (31), and Italy (26).235 These statistics reflect the higher 
volumes of US foreign investment relative to other States, with some believing that they also reflect 
the heightened litigiousness of US investors. Tietje and Beatens, on the other hand, point out that “in 
aggregate, investors from EU Member States have brought more claims in the past 30 years than 
investors from the United States”,236 although a sizeable percentage of these EU cases are intra-EU 
and therefore not relevant to the present comparison.  
The only direct comparison currently possible is through the nine existing US BITs with (peripheral) EU 
member States. There have been no cases from EU investors against the US under these BITs, while 
US investors have initiated litigation in nine instances (4 cases against Poland, 3 against Romania, 1 
against the Czech Republic and 1 against Estonia, representing 7% of total claims filed by US 
investors).237 These BITs only cover 1% of the existing stock of US FDI in the EU. If US investors are this 
actively litigous in regard to 1% of their investments, there would seem to be very good reason to 
expect a very significant number of claims arising from an ISDS mechanism covering the entire EU. 
According to Gus Van Harten, “[a]pproximately 54% of the total compensation awarded (about $5.1 
billion) in the 38 known investment treaty awards of over $10 million up to June 2, 2014 was awarded 
to U.S. companies. ... The U.S. share of total compensation in these cases rises to about 59% after 
accounting for apparent forum-shopping.”238   
The main point here is that grouping the diverse EU Member States and ‘EU investors’ together as 
singular comparators is artificial and consistently veils important details. The most crucial 
consequence is an analytic avoidance of the fact that the costs and benefits of various aspects of TTIP 
will be unevenly distributed across the 28 States. The costs of State liability through ISDS to core 
Member States of the EU, such as the Netherlands, Germany, France and others, will be offset to a 
greater degree as their investors are more likely to utilise its protections. This is not to say that the 
                                                          
Jason Yackee, ‘Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection’, Paper No. 3 in the CEPS-CTR Project on “TTIP in the Balance” and 
CEPS Special Report No. 102, March 2015, pp. 11-13.   
233 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Note: European Policy Space in International Investment Law’ 27 ICSID Review 2 (2012).  
234 Lauge Poulsen, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Jason Yackee, ‘Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection’, Paper No. 3 in the CEPS-
CTR Project on “TTIP in the Balance’’ and CEPS Special Report No. 102 / March 2015, pp. 17-18.  
235 UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’, IIA Issues Note No. 1, April 2014, p. 8.  
236 Christian Tietje and Freya Baetens, ‘The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership’, Study prepared for the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, 24 June 2014, p. 26.  
237 UNCTAD, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Information Note on the United States and the European Union’, IIA Issue 
Note No. 2, June 2014, pp. 1-2.   
238 Gus Van Harten, ‘Comments on the European Commission’s Approach to Investor-State Arbitration in TTIP and CETA’, 
Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 59, Volume 10, Issue 13, 2014, p. 3. 
 77 
 
costs will be balanced off overall for these States. We think that unlikely. However, ISDS will be of 
significantly lesser value to the peripheral Member States, whose liability is likely to be far greater and 
whose investors will not benefit to the same degree, as clearly indicated by the operation of the 
existing BITs between the US and peripheral EU Member States. This highlights an important aspect 
of the significantly divergent cost/benefit ratio from TTIP across the Member States of the EU, from 
the core to the periphery.  
Turning to the issue of de-politicisation, it should be noted at the outset that ISDS may in fact escalate 
disputes and increase politicisation. The case of Yukos is instructive. In this case, a domestic political 
dispute in Russia between President Putin and one of his main rivals, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, spread to 
encompass a commercial dispute over Khodorkovsky’s giant oil company, Yukos, leading to charges of 
government mistreatment and expropriation. The case was internationalised by foreign shareholders 
of the company through a series of conjoined investment claims under the Energy Charter Treaty, 
whereby the tribunal found Russia in violation and awarded damages of US$50 billion. As part of an 
effort to enforce the award, a holding company acting for the shareholders has persuaded France, 
Belgium and Austria to freeze certain Russian bank accounts.239 The Russian Foreign Ministry has 
warned Belgium's ambassador that Moscow would retaliate by placing controls on Belgian accounts 
and property in Russia if the accounts of the Russian companies and diplomatic missions in Belgium 
were not released.240 The Russian government has said it will take all sovereign and legal action 
possible as it has no intention of paying the award, and it also acknowledges that this is only the 
beginning of an escalating series of international disputes as the shareholders have plans to ‘roll out’ 
the tribunal’s award also in UK and US jurisdictions. As a result, a domestic political dispute has been 
internationalised through the investment regime to now engulf up to six countries.  
However, it is worth considering that some issues perhaps should be politicised. The existence of 
sensitive and controversial political elements in a legal dispute should not be cast as inherently 
illegitimate. One may think of instances where licences may be revoked on the basis of new scientific 
evidence that is strong enough to persuade local communities and public authorities yet highly 
contested by foreign investors, especially where regulatory approaches differ significantly from one 
country to another. In such a situation the best result may not be achieved by an ‘impartial’ 
international tribunal instituted for the benefit of the foreign investor with exactly such cases in mind, 
a tribunal that is furthermore unfamiliar with local and national realities and subtleties. The most 
suitable decision-makers, those best placed to find a balance that will receive the greatest acceptance 
from the full spectrum of stakeholders, is most likely to be located in the domestic legal system.  
Yet, in the absence of a strong rule on exhaustion of local remedies these systems will have no chance 
to resolve disputes. Given the depth and extent of controversy over investment tribunals and their 
own bias, the appeal to such tribunals as paragons of virtue, balance and impartiality in comparison 
to domestic courts seems untenable. Even if there were a potential argument to support the role of 
an international site of appeal on technical points of international treaty law, investment arbitration 
is nigh on impossible to justify as a first and final remedy. Baetens states that “one type of risk that is 
certainly present in several EU member states relates to the possibility of not being granted a fair trial 
before a domestic court.”241 In support she refers to the World Economic Forum’s 2014-2015 country 
rankings of ‘judicial independence’, pointing out that according to this survey while some EU Member 
States are near the top, others such as Slovakia and Bulgaria are far down the list, ranked 130 and 126 
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respectively out of 140. Again leaving aside the undertones of political and cultural hegemony that 
feed into the framing of such indicators, one might add that the Czech Republic is ranked 106, Croatia 
100, Romania 84, Lithuania 71, Latvia 58, and Poland 54. She argues that this provides a rationale for 
inclusion of ISDS in the EU-US agreement to ensure protection for US investors from suspect EU courts. 
However, what is not mentioned is that the US already has BITs in place with every one of these ‘low 
ranked’ EU Member States. This fact negates the argument. For any remaining EU Member States that 
the US may regard as lacking in ‘judicial independence’ it would be far more sensible, easier and logical 
for the US simply to negotiate BITs with these countries, than to push through controversial 
negotiations with the entire EU. With reference to the US government’s own official Investment 
Climate Statements, Poulsen et al also find that “[e]ven in what would typically be considered the 
most ‘risky’ investment destinations in Eastern Europe, the US government considers foreign 
investments there generally safe from expropriation and post-establishment discrimination, and 
advertises it as such to potential American investors.”242 
In the context of the EU-US trade and investment relations as a whole, the idea of ISDS reducing 
politicisation and instabilities is ultimately misleading. Even Tietje and Baetens, in a study arguing in 
favour of ISDS under TTIP potential beneficial from a Dutch perspective, manage to go from: arguing 
for ISDS as a depoliticising tool; to demonstrating that in the present case there is no politicisation to 
de-politicise; to arguing that there may be politicisation but ISDS will make no difference; to stating 
that ISDS is in fact likely to increase politicisation; to ultimately ending on the fact that ISDS can be, 
and has been, used to force public authorities into settlements that are unjustified, and that 
furthermore this could be worse than if the case had been pursued through the domestic courts 
because the public backlash may be greater.243  
Perhaps this is simply indicative of the debate, that it is ultimately confused and difficult to distil any 
accuracy or coherence. In sum, however, the arguments that investment arbitration reduces the 
exposure of investors to politicised processes and provides increased legal certainty as compared with 
domestic judicial systems appear ungrounded at best, deliberately disingenuous at worst.  
 
3.4(b) – The Second Claim: Economic Benefit through Increased Investment Flows 
 
Regarding the second claim that the security afforded by investment protections leads to increased 
investment and economic benefits, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that despite a long and 
extensive search and many dedicated studies there is no clear evidence to support this.  Although 
Tietje and Baetens argue strongly for the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP, it is very difficult to understand 
where they see the benefits, as they themselves acknowledge the failure of this second claim, 
concluding that “it is difficult to predict what effect, if any, the TTIP will have on Dutch-US FDI flows. 
It is equally difficult to predict whether ISDS provisions in the TTIP will have a discernable [sic effect 
on FDI flows. … We can only safely say that investment is important for both the US and Dutch 
economies, but neither economic costs nor benefits can be statistically linked to the TTIP given the 
paucity of statistics in this field.”244 
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There is not so much a paucity of statistics however, as a simple paucity of any evidence positively 
linking ISDS and investment protection to increased levels of foreign investment. Despite a number of 
dedicated studies the oft-assumed but purely theoretical link between increased protection in treaties 
and increased investment flows has proved impossible to reliably establish in fact. For example, all 
that can be concluded from a relatively recent collection of such studies,245 is that for every one study 
that finds a correlation there is another finding no correlation and yet another that is inconclusive.246 
This means that increased protection from TTIP may simply elevate the fortunes of foreign investors 
already established, giving them new powers to challenge government action and extract 
compensation, representing an increased cost that is certain with no discernible economic benefit in 
terms of increased investment or job creation.  
One of the most recent studies, by Peinhardt and Allee, is also one of the most respected as it has 
corrected many of the statistical and methodological faults of previous studies.247 It is also of particular 
value with respect to potential economic benefits to the EU from TTIP, as it concentrates only on US 
investment flows. It concludes that very few US investment agreements have had any impact on actual 
patterns of US investment. Where there has been a positive statistical correlation found, it has been 
quite weak, and the increase in investment marginal. But most importantly, the study found that no 
investment agreement between the US and another developed country, such as Israel, Singapore, 
Canada or Australia, has had any impact on incoming US investment.  
This only stands to reason, as it is clear that the vast majority of global investment has been flowing 
within the global North without any need for host States there to ‘signal’ their receptiveness or 
degrade their domestic courts in order to attract it. Investment has followed, and continues to follow, 
a completely different logic. It clearly and primarily seeks markets, export opportunities, educated and 
affordable labour, general political and economic stability, and natural resources, among other 
practical benefits leading directly to profit-making opportunities; not investment treaty protections. 
When States possess these qualities, whether in the global North or South, foreign investment will 
come, regardless of the presence or absence of special protection under investment agreements.  
Based on the studies undertaken on the effects of investment protections in BITs and PTIAs on 
investment flows, the best that can be said for the EU as a whole is that the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP 
will on balance have no effect at all in terms of economic benefit. The most positive spin that could 
ultimately be put on this situation is that ISDS may have a very marginal overall effect, particularly in 
countries that may be presently viewed by US investors as risky but are not yet covered by a BIT with 
the US. Ireland does not fall into this category, as it is quite evidently viewed as a highly desirable 
destination for US investment already, despite the absence of protection under the international 
investment regime. For Ireland, therefore, it is safe to say that, on the evidence, ISDS in TTIP will bring 
no economic benefit at all.  
It must also be noted that the underlying assumption in all of this, that more FDI is always better, at 
least economically speaking, is itself highly questionable. In fact, those States that are now 
economically powerful only became so because of protectionist measures that systematically 
excluded and discriminated against foreign investment. This fact is somewhat taboo in discussions on 
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the liberalisation of the investment regime; it is nonetheless wellestablished and accepted among 
economists. A position assuming that foreign investment is essential to development, economic 
growth and human wellbeing, and is always a good thing, whereby more is always better and less is 
always bad, is therefore not a tenable position. This is a thoroughly discredited viewpoint in economic 
thinking. 
This claim of increased investment must also be weighed against the high likelihood of significantly 
increased costs in the form of awards for damages that States which take the risk of entering the 
investment regime will inevitably have to pay. There is a particularly high probability that these costs 
will outweigh any marginal economic benefits (which are the best that can be expected) in the case 
of the EU as a whole and Ireland in particular. In our view then, the costs will significantly outweigh 
any benefits. This issue is dealt with further below in the section on Revenue and Budgetary 
Implications.   
 
3.4(c) – The Third Claim: Saving the Investment Law Regime 
 
When the arguments for the inclusion of ISDS are examined more closely, the many problems of the 
system as it presently exists in BITs and other investment agreements are only reinforced. As Tietje 
and Baetens themselves note, “the ISDS system as it currently exists suffers from serious drawbacks 
that must be overcome.”248 Those advocating for the inclusion of ISDS are often well aware of its many 
pitfalls, but believe that it can be fixed, and that furthermore we should take any opportunity possible 
to attempt to do so. From their point of view, the TTIP is a prime opportunity to experiment.249  
Baetens, for example, states that “[a]n investment chapter in TTIP offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to reform and improve the system of investment law. If the EU and the US seize this 
opportunity, it would set an important precedent in treaty-drafting”.250 According to Quick, similarly, 
“TTIP provides for a unique opportunity to introduce procedural and substantive reforms for Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The EU and the US can define a modern investment chapter 
protecting foreign direct investment against unjustifiable interferences by the host state whilst 
ensuring the sovereign right of the state to regulate. … Such an agreement would function as a catalyst 
to overcome the fragmented network of bilateral investment agreements. Not to include ISDS in TTIP 
would demonstrate that the two economic champions of the world are unable to lead by example.”251 
And in the words of Commissioner Malmstrom, “Eventually, what will be proposed in the TTIP context 
will set the standard for the further development of investment protection provisions and investment 
arbitration in EU investment negotiations. TTIP provides a unique opportunity for reforming and 
improving the system.”252  
That is, investment in TTIP may be bad for the EU and its Member States, and for its people, but it is 
justified because it is good for the investment law regime as a whole, and its exclusion would 
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otherwise make the ‘champions’ look bad. This evinces an extraordinary and vested interest in this 
regime and in its survival. However, there is a valid question mark over whether the deficiencies of 
the regime can be overcome in a coherent manner, or whether it would not be better simply to allow 
the system to lapse, and re-design it from scratch. Many believe that it is necessary to re-imagine the 
purpose of foreign investment and investment protection beyond the frame of profit and investment 
incentivisation, by taking a large step back and properly incorporating social responsibility, public 
interest, sustainable development and human rights from the outset. Such a fundamental change will 
not come about overnight, but that is no reason to keep going in the same direction when the warning 
signs are getting more regular, when the minimal attempts to ameliorate its negative consequences 
do not work, and when the conclusion of further agreements make it ever more difficult to begin 
again.  
In any event, there is widespread acknowledgment of the problems with ISDS, even among 
commercial actors,253 but there remains profound confusion over how to effect change and what 
exactly effective reform would look like. In short there is no consensus on the details. As the process 
of the EU consultation on ISDS verifies, there is a very large grey area when it comes to which reforms 
can produce the desired result, or even whether the adoption of all of those currently identified would 
be sufficient. There is little question that any EU-US treaty that does not eliminate or radically overhaul 
the ISDS system will be counter-productive to the social and economic public interest.  
Whether ISDS is redeemable, even after twenty years of NAFTA and a distinct evolution in the 
standards and procedures of the international investment regime, is still very far from clear. It still 
amounts to a bet, and therefore a risk in itself. It is also unsure which reforms will be politically viable 
and implementable given internal divisions in the EU and the external pressure from the US. As such, 
an approach that views TTIP as an opportunity for reform without any clear idea of what that should 
be or how it would work, is fundamentally flawed. Quick, Baetens and others, including the EU 
Commission, effectively ask us to trust that their particular mix of reform proposals will solve all of the 
manifold problems of ISDS. Or, alternatively, that we need to at least try them out and see. They are 
asking us to let them experiment with this new legal system on a massive scale, not with an individual 
BIT, but with a regional agreement covering a substantial portion of the world’s capital. This is hugely 
irresponsible, especially given the very patchy track record of reform proposals to date and the depth 
of the problems with ISDS. The question is whether we should be taking such an experimental 
approach to the State’s right to regulate in the public interest? Australia’s answer in the context of its 
own Free Trade Agreement with the US was a clear no, and it excluded ISDS from that agreement.  
Given that the investment arbitration regime has really only fully crystallised in the last 20 years, it is 
clear that changes occur in the regime relatively rapidly. Therefore, it should be considered that a 
compromise struck now, relative to the set of reform proposals currently in fashion, is likely to look 
insufficient or inadequate in the not too distant future. The clear trajectory of the regime is towards 
accelerated reform. Subsequent reforms will almost certainly overtake those incorporated into TTIP, 
as even the marginal evolution of EU agreements from rudimentary EU BITs to CETA, and now to the 
more complex proposals for TTIP, amply demonstrate.  
Furthermore, a viewpoint that settles for the level of reform on the table at present ignores the far 
more radical and socially progressive proposals that are underway in the global South; from the 
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repudiation by Latin American countries of ICSID and their cancellation of existing BITs and moves to 
establish a new regional investment arbitration institution from scratch, to the incorporation of 
investor obligations and other deeper reforms in the model treaty of the South African Development 
Community,254 and the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement in the latest Indian template.255 
More radical texts have even been adopted involving global North States such as the 2015 China-
Australia FTA,256 the investment chapter of which only provides for national treatment and most-
favoured nation treatment, eschewing the indeterminate FET and indirect expropriation standards. 
Further undermining the case for ‘saving’ the investment law regime through TTIP, there is ever 
growing disenchantment in the global South with the Northern line on investment protection, as the 
link between investment treaties and increased investment continues to escape empirical validation. 
As such, it is becoming increasingly less likely that global South States will uncritically adopt Northern 
standards, which means that whatever happens in TTIP is of decreasing relevance to the rest of the 
world. The power of the EU and the US to dictate the direction of the investment regime is waning 
with their simultaneous economic decline, relative to the rising powers such as the BRICS countries. It 
would indeed be somewhat ironic if the EU and the US, the traditional leaders of restrictive investment 
agreements finally bound themselves to the standards they have long pushed on others just as the 
rest of the world either rejected the investment regime or decided to radically alter it.  
These considerations are linked to the ‘confidence case’ for TTIP, which may be the largest actual 
motivation for the negotiations. This ‘confidence case’ holds that TTIP is necessary to boost general 
levels of confidence and optimism in both the US and EU economies, particularly with respect to the 
expectations of global capital markets. It is believed that this would then have consequently positive 
effects on their recovery from the global financial crisis and enable a basic exit from recession and 
stagnation for the EU, and a return to strong growth for the US. This is largely an argument around 
the sentiments and psychology of capital markets and investors that may be impossible to either verify 
or categorically disprove. In large part, however, the EU’s relentless austerity drive since 2008 has 
been aimed at reassuring markets and investors by demonstrating a commitment to improve 
economic fundamentals, yet this has not had the intended effect on market sentiment, as the austerity 
policies continue to stifle economic activity.  
In fact, a lack of investor confidence in the EU in general would seem to be linked far more closely to 
internal issues of economic and social management and the relations between Member States than 
to a concern for a lack of investor protections or any perceived failure to align externally with 
international trade or investment standards. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that the decisions 
of potential foreign investors are in fact dominated by preoccupations such as macro-economic 
stability, infrastructure, resources, potential supply chains, an educated population, and prospective 
markets or exporting opportunities. In short, it is more likely to be increased internal stability and 
internally-led growth that brings foreign investment, rather than foreign investment bringing stability 
and growth. In addition, investor’s decisions are not likely to be highly influenced by the existence or 
otherwise of investment agreements, especially as between two developed regions. Foreign 
investment has long flowed strongly between developed countries without the aid of commitment 
devices such as investment agreements. 
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Furthermore, the lack of evidence of a net economic benefit or a correlation between the conclusion 
of investment agreements and any increase in actual foreign investment suggests that this 
‘confidence’ argument rests on a particularly shaky empirical premise. The ‘confidence’ argument 
then boils down to a tenuous hope that does very little to offset the far more concrete and direct 
negative effects arising from TTIP. These considerations, however, highlight the fact that, relative to 
each other, the benefits and costs of TTIP have a markedly qualitative difference; the benefits are 
more ephemeral and indistinct, while the costs are more concrete, immediate and direct. Under these 
circumstances TTIP represents quite a high risk.  
 
3.5 – The Major Cost of Investor Protection and ISDS: Freedom to Regulate 
 
As mentioned above, one of the clearest manifestations of regulatory chill is the decision taken by 
New Zealand’s government—despite a clear mandate from the public which overwhelmingly favours 
plain packaging legislation—not to take any action before the resolution of ongoing investment claims 
by Philip Morris against Uruguay and Australia. Uruguay itself reportedly considered watering down 
its tobacco control regulations as an initial response to the claims.257 In the case of Ethyl v. Canada, 
the investor’s claim under NAFTA played a prominent part in the final decision of the government to 
abandon the environmental measures at issue and to settle with the US company.258 Again involving 
Canada and a US investor, the case of SD Myers also resulted in a settlement and the revocation of a 
ban on hazardous waste exports.259 Other cases often pointed to include the reversal of a policy to 
ban open-pit mining in Indonesia where the Minister for the Environment cited the threat of 
international arbitration by foreign mining companies,260 and a similar reversal by the Costa Rican 
environmental agency of a decision to withhold a permit for an open-pit mine only two months after 
the foreign investor initiated an arbitration claim.261  
There is ongoing debate over the extent and seriousness of the chilling effect of the investment treaty 
and arbitration regime. Broadly put, there are discernible divisions between a certain legalistic 
approach that tends to downplay or deny such an effect,262 an approach informed by political science 
that highlights the seriousness of the effect,263 and perhaps a middle path holding that the issue 
certainly exists and should be treated with care, caution and deeper analysis.264 One of the central 
points of contention is the difficulty of obtaining ‘proof’ of regulatory chill and evaluating its 
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occurrence empirically. However, it may be the case that due to the nature of the phenomenon it is 
simply not amenable to empirical analysis.  
We may distinguish two forms of regulatory chill. The first occurs when public authorities factor in the 
possibility of investment arbitration even before an action is taken, or before any legislation or other 
measure is drafted or formulated. In this case the chilling effect will be almost invisible and ‘proof’ of 
the counterfactual case—that is, what would have happened in the absence of the possibility of 
arbitration—will be virtually impossible to substantiate. Nevertheless, as the number of arbitration 
claims continues to grow and the investment regime becomes more prominent in the minds of 
decision-makers, as will surely be the case if ISDS is included in a successfully agreed TTIP, this form of 
regulatory chill will logically become increasingly prevalent and serious. Furthermore, in this form 
there is an obvious danger of decision-makers greatly overestimating the extent of investor 
protections, to be on the ‘safe side’, and thereby refusing to adopt policy positions and measures that 
may even be technically allowed by some tribunals. The uncertainty inherent in the protections and 
procedures of the investment regime and the reasoning of any given tribunal, will result in an often 
unnecessary encroachment on the space for progressive public policy. Even those downplaying the 
chilling effect admit that this first form of ‘anticipatory’ chill, or “the overall phenomenon whereby 
the regulatory process is hampered by all areas impacted by foreign investors”, is “a very serious 
concern”, even if it is not one that they engage with.265  
The second form of chill is far more visible, occurring where an investor has expressed opposition to 
a measure, or already taken a claim, prompting or at least influencing a subsequent change in public 
policy. The examples provided above mostly adhere to this second form. Here again, despite an 
increased visibility, there remain issues with the empirical approach, mainly centred on the difficulty 
of separating and weighting the fact or the threat of an investment claim from the other numerous 
considerations that will influence a government decision to back down from a previous position in 
favour of a foreign investor. While it will be evident when the claim or threat plays a part in a given 
policy reversal or adjustment, it will often be impossible to say with certainty how significant a part 
that is. Heavily complicating the delineation of levels of influence and their legitimacy is the simple 
fact that the basic purpose of separate enforceable protections for foreign investors is precisely to 
chill or disallow certain State actions, and the line between these actions and the ‘bona fide’ exercise 
of State powers in the public interest is perhaps impossible to precisely define ahead of time. In any 
event, the confusion over regulatory chill is evident in Tietje and Baetens’ final words on the matter, 
where, after arguing that it is no particular problem, they nevertheless state that “the potential for 
actual, threatened, or perceived investment arbitrations to chill legitimate public policy-making is a 
major concern for TTIP and many other international investment agreements. And rightly so.”266 
Echoing the EU Commission, Tietje and Baetens ultimately argue that the adjustments made to the 
definitions of investment protection standards, additional exception clauses and procedural 
safeguards in the CETA text and proposed for TTIP could “help protect against any possible regulatory 
chill while also ensuring that investors can raise legitimate claims.”267 If ISDS is included in TTIP then 
these steps could help to mitigate unjust outcomes, but there is clearly no guarantee that they will be 
sufficient, as the heavily qualified language of the proponents of ISDS demonstrates.  
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And yet the creation of the risk in the first place is unwarranted. Legitimate claims can be raised and 
vindicated through the domestic courts in the US and the EU. There is no objective need for the 
institution of a new supra-national legal structure and claims mechanism with all the uncertainties 
entailed. Proponents such as Tietje and Baetens see the obvious dangers in ISDS and the resulting 
necessity of “risk mitigation”, while neither they nor the EU Commission can point to any compelling 
reason for taking the gamble in the first place. This is especially true in the case of Ireland. They can 
only seek to assuage some of the prevalent fears by claiming, in most uncertain terms, that the full list 
of mitigation devices “are all viable options to make an investment chapter and ISDS, if included in the 
TTIP, work more efficiently, act more transparently, and better balance investor rights with the policy 
concerns and priorities of states.”268 That full list is a long one and it is highly doubtful that all of the 
mitigation devices would survive the negotiations with the US, which opposes some outright and 
displays reluctance to adopt others. Within the EU itself, many of these measures are also opposed by 
powerful stakeholders. Even if they were all to be instituted in the final text, transparency and respect 
for public policies and democratically determined priorities of States can not be ensured. This is the 
bottom line, and must be balanced against a status quo situation where no such threats from 
investment arbitration exists.   
 
3.6 – Assessing the EU Position and TTIP’s Provisions in Relation to Public Health Policy 
 
Nevertheless, the European Commission is operating under a mandate to “negotiate investment 
liberalisation and protection provisions … on the basis of the highest levels of liberalisation and highest 
standards of protection that both Parties have negotiated to date”, including “an effective and state-
of-the-art investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism”.269 The question is whether it can satisfy 
this mandate and still maintain the State’s freedom to regulate in the public interest and to intervene 
in the economy to the extent required by popular democratic mandates and the obligations to 
progressively realise social and economic rights. Given widespread consciousness of the flawed nature 
of the investment law regime as it stands, the answer will depend heavily on the amount of faith that 
should be placed in the various adjustments proposed. In assessing this, a precautionary approach is 
essential.  
In the following we will address the proposed solutions from the European Commission in its 
consultation document.270 It is our position that the existing EU proposals are insufficient to guarantee 
an overall benefit. There is far too much uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the proposals to 
satisfy the requirements of an overall precautionary approach, and unless or until that situation 
changes the risks must be taken as outweighing the benefits. As such, ISDS should be definitively 
excluded from TTIP, and in this case it would be of little sense to include any substantive provisions 
on investment. Many if not most of the reform proposals are essentially bets that the system will 
thereby be improved and that the regulatory space and other responsibilities of States will be 
accorded due weight. Such bets are upon ground which is far too unsteady to proceed with 
international treaty rules as far-reaching as TTIP’s investment chapter.  
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In its introduction to the consultation, the European Commission allegedly seeks to reaffirm the right 
of States to regulate, as a balance to the protections offered for foreign investors. However, while 
these protections are enumerated in substantive clauses, there is no visible proposal to give the 
State’s right to regulate comparable prominence or enforceability. Reference such a right in a 
preamble or as a ‘general’, ‘underlying’, or ‘guiding’ principle will never be treated by arbitrators or 
adjudicators on par with the substantive investor protections set out in the body of the text. If the 
Commission is sincere in its stated commitment to sovereign regulatory space, it would be essential 
to incorporate the State’s right to regulate at an equal or higher level to the protections afforded to 
investors.  
For instance, the right to regulate was stated clearly in the Havana Charter of 1948: 
[W]ithout prejudice to existing international agreements to which Members are parties, a 
Member has the right: 
(i) to take any appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that foreign investment is not used 
as a basis for interference in its internal affairs or national policies; 
(ii) to determine whether and, to what extent and upon what terms it will allow future foreign 
investment; 
(iii) to prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as to the ownership of existing 
and future investments; 
(iv) to prescribe and give  effect to other reasonable requirements with respect to existing and 
future investments.271 
This right was placed above the following articles on investors’ rights, which were made expressly 
subject to it:  
Members therefore undertake: 
(a) subject to the provisions of paragraph 1(c) and to any agreements entered into under 
paragraph 1(d), 
(i) to provide reasonable opportunities for investments acceptable to them and 
adequate security for existing and future investments, and 
(ii) to give due regard to the desirability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign 
investments.272 
A more recent formulation is found in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.273 
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The Commission states that the protections enumerated in investment agreements are “fundamental 
principles of treatment [that] are reflected in the rights that democratic governments grant to their 
own citizens and companies … but they are not always guaranteed for foreigners or foreign 
companies. … The overall purpose of international investment agreements is to ensure that the 
country hosting an investment treats foreign investors in accordance with these fundamental 
principles.”274 This would suggest that a supra-national regime should be understood only as a safety 
net for those cases where the protections in domestic law are not applied to foreign investors for a 
particular reason. This is consistent only with a rule for the exhaustion of domestic remedies before 
appeal could be made to the supra-national level, as is the case with all other comparable regimes of 
international law. The Commission’s statement also implies that the protections offered should not 
go beyond those established in domestic legal codes, and that the central purpose of an investment 
regime should be only to ensure that foreign investors receive the same treatment as domestic 
investors under such codes. Again, this is consistent only with a domestic exhaustion rule, as any case 
of a dispute that is decided without reference to, and prior application of, domestic law would make 
no sense. The other logical conclusion is that if the goal is simply to ensure equal treatment to foreign 
and national actor alike then all that would be required of any supra-national legal regime is the 
application of a single standard; the national treatment principle. These issues will be returned to in 
the ensuing discussion.  
Some investors have arguably abused the protections offered in earlier generations of treaties by 
structuring investments through ‘shell’ or ‘mailbox’ companies that are registered in third States but 
have no significant commercial operations or presence in those States. For example, a Russian investor 
in the EU may be able to avail of the protections in a prospective EU-US investment agreement by 
routing the investment through a shell company in the US. Potentially this could apply to an investor 
from any country in the world. In a notable recent case, Khan Resources and others v. Mongolia from 
2012, a claim regarding a Canadian controlled investment in Mongolia operating through a mailbox 
company in the Netherlands was allowed under the Energy Charter Treaty (to which Canada is not a 
Party).275 The claimants did not dispute the nature of the shell company, acknowledging that it was 
incorporated in the Netherlands solely for the advantageous purposes of protection under the ECT. 
The tribunal allowed the claim to proceed despite the fact that the ECT contains a ‘denial of benefits’ 
clause stating that each Party to the agreement “reserves the right” to deny the relevant investment 
protections to companies with “no substantial business activities” in their state of incorporation.276 
Controversially, this clause has been interpreted by tribunals to require the advance notice of the host 
State of a denial of benefits at the time at which the investment was made, which would require the 
host State to exhaustively investigate the exact corporate structure of every investment made by a 
foreign company before it entered the country. The tribunal in this case also ignored the fact that the 
Dutch shell company had been created and inserted into the Canadian parents’ corporate structure 
after the decision to invest in Mongolia had been made and an exploration license had been acquired.   
Following recent established practice in the modern BITs of many countries, including the US and 
Canada, and the provisions of CETA, the Commission seeks to curtail this abuse through requiring that 
the investing company must be owned or controlled by nationals of the State in which it is registered, 
and must also engage in “substantial business activities” in that State.  This is not contained in a 
separate denial of benefits clause but is incorporated directly into the definition of ‘investor’ at the 
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outset, making it a useful step in limiting the unnecessary liability of States. However, this is the only 
substantial proposed change to previous (pre-CETA) practice regarding the definitions of ‘investor’ 
and ‘investment’.  
One major issue that is therefore left fundamentally unaddressed, and that should be cause for 
concern particularly in the Irish case, is that of sovereign bonds. In regard to Argentina and Greece, 
claims have been brought by investors in sovereign bonds who have refused to participate in the debt 
workouts of these countries and take ‘haircuts’ that would significantly reduce the value of their 
investments in the interests of the public welfare of the people of these countries undergoing extreme 
economic and social strain.277 Given that sovereign bonds and other similar debt instruments are not 
excluded from the definition of investment, these deeply distasteful claims seeking to milk a country 
dry when it has nothing left to give, even to its own people, may continue to arise. They may be 
ameliorated to some degree by measures taken regarding prudential regulations, discussed below, 
however they could easily be excluded outright by an appropriate amendment to the scope of the 
agreement.  
The Commission also seems satisfied with a continuation of the requirement that investments be 
made “in accordance with the applicable law” of the host State in order to avail of   standing and the 
rights and protections conferred in the agreement. However, this practice does not clarify whether an 
investment must only be established in a lawful manner or whether the investment must comport 
with the law for the full duration of its existence. As such, despite the assurance of the Commission 
that this wording has “worked well and has allowed ISDS tribunals to refuse to grant investment 
protection to investors who have not respected the law of the host state when making the 
investment”,278 commentators have pointed to numerous occasions where this has not been the case. 
Van Harten identifies nine cases where the issue was decided on by a tribunal and finds that six cases 
do not support the statement of the Commission.279 Others point out that this is a very weak phrase 
to establish what should be significant duties on investors for them to reap the benefits and 
protections of the agreement.280 The clause should at least state clearly that the investor may not 
contravene the local law, nor be complicit in its violation, for the full duration of the investment. In 
addition it should lay down basic duties such as ensuring respect for anti-corruption and international 
human rights standards, and again avoiding complicity in human rights abuse by others, including the 
host State. Additionally, it should be made explicit that the tribunal is not simply allowed to refuse 
protection under such circumstances according to its discretion but is in fact obliged to do so.  
 
3.6(a) – Non-Discriminatory Treatment 
 
The national treatment and most-favoured nation standards ensure that a foreign investor cannot be 
discriminated against in relation to local investors and investors form other countries. These non-
discrimination obligations most often apply only after the investment has been established in the host 
State thereby protecting the investor only in the post-establishment phase. Alternatively, they may 
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apply at the point of entry into the host market, at the pre-establishment phase, acting to open the 
market to foreign investment on the same terms as local investors. Pre-establishment obligations have 
been a consistent part of US, Canadian and Japanese treaties, however, it is important to note that 
they have not been common in the treaties of EU Member States, aside from the recent CETA text, 
and therefore represent a significant departure in the investment treaty practice of the EU as a whole.  
When understood to apply only to the post-establishment phase the national treatment standard may 
be regarded as the core of investment agreements, and from the point of view of the right to regulate 
it is relatively unproblematic. Significant concerns persist that this standard does not actually institute 
a level playing field between foreign and domestic investors. The ISDS mechanism and favourable 
arbitrators provide evident advantages for foreign investors alone. Furthermore, the standard is 
usually phrased as requiring treatment ‘no less favourable’ than that accorded to local investors, 
maintaining silence on treatment that actually discriminates against domestic investors, leaving the 
possibility wide open for the creation of a playing field that is in fact more favourable to foreign 
investors. Many argue that the national treatment standard should be reframed so as to expressly 
demand the equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors, and to clearly prevent discrimination 
in either direction. All other things being equal however, under a post-establishment national 
treatment standard the State will be able to impose certain conditions on foreign investment at the 
point of entry, and as long as subsequent regulation respects the terms of these conditions and does 
not discriminate on the basis of the nationality of investors it will not attract liability. Furthermore, 
the EU acknowledges that “in certain rare cases and in some very specific sectors, discrimination 
against already established investors may need to be envisaged”,281 allowing for a level of 
discrimination in the interests of the host State, albeit quite a low level.  
On the other hand, this highlights the danger of setting pre-establishment or market access provisions 
into an agreement. These provisions will significantly restrict the control governments have over 
national economies and their ability to set the terms of operation for foreign investment in those 
economies. For countries like Ireland and the Netherlands, with such high levels of US investment 
relative to the economy as a whole, these restrictions will be of far greater significance. This ties in 
with the issue of performance requirements. As noted above, the ability of governments to set these 
requirements at the point of entry of an investment is an important tool enabling a certain level of 
control over foreign investment in the host economy and helping to ensure that there is a net benefit 
from that investment in terms of the transfer of technology, local employment and integration with 
local service and goods providers. The practice of the US is to demand pre-establishment rights for its 
investors and disallow performance requirements in its investment agreements. Although the 
Commission’s consultation document does not directly address these issues they are of great 
importance and should be a central consideration. It is a widely held opinion that for the benefit of 
host State economic development pre-establishment rights should be excluded, or if included in the 
agreement then definitely excluded from strict enforcement through the ISDS mechanism,282 and that 
there should be no ban on performance requirements.  
Of particular relevance to public health, the EU has also proposed the use of general exceptions in 
TTIP that will be modelled on those employed regularly in the trade context. These exceptions are 
intended to “allow differences in treatment between investors and investments where necessary to 
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achieve public policy objectives”, 283such as the protection of public health and the environment and 
would apply equally to investment provisions in the agreement.  
However, such general exception clauses utilise highly restrictive language and have been typically 
interpreted very narrowly in the trade context, allowing only small windows through which authorities 
must fit their public policies on health and the environment. Compared to a clearly established right 
of States to regulate in the public interest, the approach of exceptions and carve-outs is by nature an 
extremely limited method of attempting to preserve regulatory flexibility. Indeed it is so limited that 
this approach is all but an admission that such flexibility will not be preserved. Public regulatory space 
is framed from the outset as an exception to the central and primary objective of investment 
protection, not as an equal, and far from a pre-eminent or pre-existing principle, right or objective. 
According to this conceptualisation any government regulation that restricts the rights of foreign 
investors is assumed to be disallowed, and it is then up to the government to meet a high burden of 
proof that its action clears all of the hurdles set out to qualify as an exception. Investment tribunals 
typically take strict and restrictive approaches to any carve-outs or exceptions to the general rules of 
investment agreements.284  
An alternative conceptualisation would be to flip the burden of proof such that the investor would 
have to prove that a government action was not in fact for a valid public purpose and was motivated 
by questionable aims, or otherwise that it disproportionately compromised the investor’s interests. In 
addition, exceptions typically apply only to sections of the treaty, meaning that significant parts may 
be excepted from the exception, therefore giving arbitrators space to expand those protections lying 
outside the scope of exceptions to still find violations against investors and award compensation. In 
CETA, for example, the general exception is not applicable to the provisions on indirect expropriation 
and FET, the most controversial and broad provisions where protection for the right to regulate is 
most needed. This fact bears emphasising, as it undermines the value of a general exceptions clause 
almost entirely. Finally, exceptions often only apply to particular areas of the adjudication process, 
meaning that creative counsel and compliant arbitrators can often reason around the exceptions and 
base claims and awards on those areas that are not covered.  
In more concrete terms, the model for the exceptions, Article XX of GATT, requires that government 
measures be proven as strictly “necessary” for the protection of public health and the environment. 
The carve-out fails if necessity cannot be demonstrated. To determine necessity arbitral tribunals will 
have to engage in an analysis of proportionality. They will be charged with a highly subjective task of 
weighing and balancing the interests of investors against their perception of the validity, legitimacy 
and importance of the public measures taken. They will decide on whether the measures are 
appropriate to achieve the public welfare aims stated, and whether alternative measures that are less 
damaging to investors would be more appropriate. In short, they will engage directly in second 
guessing these often delicate decisions subject to the complex democratic processes of nation States, 
and they will do so according to far more restrictive criteria. They will therefore take on an express 
role of administrative oversight that is normally reserved to the domestic judiciary applying broader 
and more complex standards, which is also balanced by its equal footing with the executive and the 
legislative bodies. Arbitral tribunals are subject to no such balancing. To be clear, investment tribunals 
have long engaged in this role, however, instituting this particular form of general exception, despite 
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its arguably positive intentions, will have the effect of illegitimately solidifying the station of tribunals 
to justifiably engage in this role.  
One can immediately see that it may be very difficult, in the absence of any further textual grounds, 
for a government to prove that plain packaging for cigarettes is in fact necessary to achieve the aim of 
protecting public health. The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted ‘necessary’ in this context to be 
almost equivalent to ‘indispensable’.285 It is uncontroversial to say that the measure helps, and may 
even make a significant contribution to public health, but taking into account the reasoning of 
arbitrators in determining proportionality as described above, it is on balance more than likely that 
plain packaging would fail the necessity test. These considerations are of particular concern when 
paired with differences between the US and EU approaches to regulation. Put simply, the requirement 
of necessity would seem to leave very little room for the EU’s precautionary approach, as the scientific 
link between a government action and its express purpose would have to be drawn with high clarity. 
If the clarity is not demonstrable for whatever reason, the link would be presumed not to exist. This is 
in fact basically incompatible with the precautionary approach, where the presumption may often be 
the other way around, where it is highly desirable and democratically mandated to take ‘common 
sense’ measures that may nevertheless fail to meet high standards of scientific proof. This may often 
be the case not because the measures or the presumed causality is wrong, but because in a sense it is 
too obvious, and for this reason has not been the subject of extensive scientific inquiry.  
The previous context of the EU’s proposed exceptions model is the trade regime, which is an entirely 
different situation, involving disputes directly between States. The operation of WTO dispute 
resolution panels in this regard is far less problematic, as they are balancing the right to regulate of 
one State against the other sovereign interests of another State, necessitating a more nuanced and 
considered approach. This is because the result of their deliberations will equally apply to the State 
bringing the case, such that a broad reading of the exception could benefit the complaining State at a 
future date. The trade context also involves a fully judicialised Appellate Body that can correct and 
harmonise the decisions of the panels. In investment arbitration the situation is not comparable. The 
investor has no future interest in the exception being interpreted expansively or with nuance. This is 
understood well by ad hoc tribunals whose decisions are not currently subject to any proper appellate 
review.  
There have been no instances as yet of an investment tribunal interpreting such a general exception 
clause. However, in a number of cases against Argentina, arising out of the country’s severe economic 
crisis at the turn of the century, tribunals were called to decide on a defence of ‘necessity’ claimed by 
Argentina. The State claimed that under international law many of the measures it took that were 
damaging to foreign investors were nevertheless justified and excused Argentina from liability under 
the relevant BITs due to the fact that they were necessary to avert economic and social catastrophe. 
The vast majority of tribunals hearing this defence rejected it on a narrow interpretation of the term 
‘necessary’, finding in its proportionality analysis that other measures less damaging to investors could 
have been taken by the State and that it remained liable under the investment regime.286 Even 
tribunals that did accept it only did so partially. The extremity of the circumstances that Argentina 
suffered, where average income fell by 60%, unemployment was over 20%, and those living in poverty 
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accounted for 40%,287 demonstrates the extraordinarily high reluctance of arbitral tribunals to excuse 
the actions of States by reference to ‘necessity’ where foreign investors incur damage. The measures 
taken by Argentina were arguably required by the government’s human rights obligations towards its 
own people, as argued by Argentina itself in the arbitration. However, it is widely acknowledged that 
neither these alternative social obligations nor the severity of the social impact to the Argentinean 
people were properly accounted for by most tribunals. 
In addition, in terms of protecting government regulatory space the general exception has not 
operated particularly well even in the trade context. It is not expected to operate any better in the 
investment context, and will may provide even less protection for the right than currently exists.288 
The provisions of GATT Article XX have been read very narrowly by WTO adjudicative bodies, which 
have set high thresholds for the success of a government measure to pass as a legitimate exception. 
According to one focussed study on the matter, “Article XX has served as a last resort stopgap 
measure, not as a proactive environmental or health policy instrument. … [S]uccess with using the 
Article in the GATT has not been high.”289 This would not seem to be a well suited tool to the 
investment context, and expectations regarding its efficacy are not likely to be met.  
In fact, some commentators are of the opinion that an exception clause that included the concept of 
a measure being ‘necessary’ for public health may further restrict what government regulatory space 
exists under the standards of FET and indirect expropriation.290 This could cause a number of 
difficulties especially in the application of the precautionary principle, which would lose its meaning if 
restricted to a standard of necessity. If such exceptions clauses are to be used the EU should apply 
them clearly to the entire agreement without reservation, as well as to the complete dispute 
resolution process. There should also be a move beyond the strict language of necessity. Other 
commonly utilised phrases in comparable clauses require a lower level of causality, referring to the 
exception of measures ‘relating to’, or ‘designed and applied for the purposes of’ protecting public 
health and the environment. These alternative formulations should be applied, providing greater 
leeway for the, nevertheless still exceptional, exercise of the State’s right to regulate. As is clear 
however, only a limited exercise of that right could be expected even with the inclusion of broader 
language and blanket coverage. 
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3.6(b) – Fair and Equitable Treatment 
 
States such as the US, Canada and Mexico have sought to limit expansive readings of the FET standard 
by including conditional language in their BITs and in NAFTA containing the standard to its 
understanding in customary international law. However, the content of custom is almost equally open 
to interpretation, and as the Commission notes “this has also resulted in a wide range of differing 
arbitral tribunal decisions on what is or is not covered by customary international law, and has not 
brought the desired greater clarity to the definition of the standard.”291 Such efforts by States to curb 
the excesses of arbitrators have not worked, with tribunals responding for instance, that “in fact, the 
Treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment and its connection with the required stability and 
predictability of the business environment, founded on solemn and contractual commitments, is not 
different from the international law minimum standard and its evolution under customary law.”292 
Such tribunals have thereby identified the treaty standard with custom and all but wiped out any 
difference, paving the way for the application of the old standard in the usual expansionary manner. 
The LG&E tribunal has stated for instance that FET requires “consistent and transparent behavior, free 
of ambiguity that involves the obligation to grant and maintain a stable and predictable legal 
framework necessary to fulfill the justified expectations of the foreign investor”,293 which would entail 
a very severe restriction on the State’s right to regulate where such regulation negatively affects 
investors once they are established. With respect, some tribunals have displayed more reason. In 
Glamis Gold v. United States the tribunal set the customary standard far closer to the traditional 
standard set in 1926 in the famous Neer decision;  
an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of justice, manifest 
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a 
manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall below accepted international standards.294 
Given the extreme confusion the Commission has proposed some other alterations to the FET 
standard instead. The first is the employment of a closed list approach, where only the types of actions 
listed will be considered grounds for a breach of the provision. However, this list is still extensive and 
includes nearly all of the traditional grounds for appealing to the FET provision for protection, such as 
a denial of justice, a breach of due process, manifest arbitrariness (without any further qualification), 
targeted discrimination, and abusive treatment. These are all worded in an open way providing no 
real protection for the right to regulate. In particular, there would seem to be little difference in scope 
between the old demand for ‘fair and equitable treatment’ as a whole and the scope of a prohibition 
on ‘abusive treatment’, especially as it is to include such low levels of abuse as ‘duress’ and 
‘harassment’. These would seem to amount to two sides of the same coin ultimately representing 
virtually the same standard. This list still allows a large degree of interpretive freedom on further terms 
such as ‘disregard of the principle of effective transparency’. The closed list would then seem to make 
no difference to an arbitrator’s scope for interpretation. Another problem is that from the CETA text 
it is not even clear if the list is in fact closed. The text reads that “a Party breaches the obligation of 
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fair and equitable treatment referenced in paragraph 1 where a measure or series of measures 
constitutes” one of the prohibited measures listed. It is actually quite possible that a tribunal might 
state that if the real intention of the Parties was to ensure a closed list they would have stated that a 
breach can occur ‘only where a measure or series of measures constitutes’ a measure on the list.  
In fact, as was pointed out by a number of submissions in the consultation, the Commission’s so-called 
clarification of the FET standard may have the immediate effect of producing another set of major 
expansionary interpretive doctrines when applied by arbitrators. It would at least seem to go further 
than the restrictions placed on FET in the NAFTA context, by removing the caveat on customary law, 
which at least had the potential to restrict arbitrators, and re-implementing essentially the old 
standard through the vaguely worded closed list. The Commission’s proposals also do nothing to 
address the issue of ‘creeping’ unfair and inequitable treatment, as set out above. All in all it is highly 
unlikely that the changes made to the FET standard will have any effect on the interpretive powers of 
tribunals. This is of central importance due to the fact that this singular standard has caused the 
majority of problems in the investment regime, being abused and interpreted by far the most broadly 
in favour of investors and also being the standard most difficult for States to restrict and redefine in 
their evident dissatisfaction. This amounts to a strong argument for the simple exclusion of the 
standard altogether.  
 
3.6(c) – Expropriation 
 
Interpretations of indirect expropriation have perhaps been the second most serious source of 
concern regarding restrictions on the State’s right to regulate in the public interest. The Commission 
apparently seeks to overcome this concern and “avoid claims against legitimate public policy 
measures” by reference to the CETA text on expropriation.295 The relevant clause states that, 
except in the rare circumstance where the impact of the measure or series of measures is so 
severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. 
While this text is a step in the right direction it does not secure the right to regulate in the designated 
areas. In the same manner as the general exceptions discussed above, the text instead solidifies the 
role of tribunals in second guessing the democratically formulated position of public authorities 
regarding a balance between public goals and costs incurred by foreign investors. Tribunals will again 
engage in inherently subjective proportionality analysis, requiring evaluations of whether or not the 
measures at issue are substantially and sufficiently related to the given public purpose, whether or 
not they are justified according to their own cost-benefit analysis, and whether alternatives that are 
more desirable from the investor’s standpoint should have been adopted instead. The standard of 
review here, of ‘appearing manifestly excessive’, and the qualification involved in a reference to ‘rare 
circumstances’, admittedly sets a relatively high threshold. However, the track record of tribunals in 
skirting around restrictive wording does not instil too much confidence in the ultimate effectiveness 
of these conditions. For starters, only the appearance of manifest excess is required, which may 
preclude an in depth analysis of whether a measure was in fact excessive.  
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To take the example of cigarette plain packaging again, foreign investors in the UK have threatened 
claims on the basis that the relevant legislation could cost them £ 11 billion due to the lost value of 
their trademarks and intellectual property.296  It is not beyond the realms of possibility that a tribunal 
may decide that this level of ‘damage’ appears manifestly excessive in relation to the stated aim of 
protecting public health. From the wording of the clause above it is not clear how deeply the tribunal 
would have to investigate this appearance. Such a straightforward case of legislating in the public 
interest, backed by public demand and the requirements of international law under the FCTC, could 
therefore conceivably qualify as a ‘rare’ set of circumstances requiring a vast pay-out from the public 
purse. This makes one wonder how many other seemingly straightforward cases may in the future run 
afoul of investor protections, no matter how restrictively worded on the surface, which highlights the 
fact that where investment treaties are concerned there remains a significant amount of unknown 
unknowns.  
It must also be noted that in the same way as the exceptions clause, with its threshold of necessity, 
does not relate to the FET, neither does the clause at hand here, with its somewhat higher threshold 
of manifest excess. Ultimately, non-discriminatory government measures taken in the public interest 
that damage investors may still attract compensatory awards through the virtually unchanged FET 
standard, even if they do not fall foul of these ‘protective’ thresholds elsewhere.  
In addition, the inclusion of the above clause as formulated may even be seen as a step backward with 
respect to the balanced interpretations of some tribunals, which are admittedly in the minority 
however. For example, in Saluka v. Czech Republic, the tribunal held that “[i]t is now established in 
international law that States are not liable to pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the 
normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide 
regulations that are aimed at the general welfare.”297 This clear and unqualified statement of 
international law is ruptured by the formulation of indirect expropriation in CETA, which formally 
introduces the notion that at least some, albeit manifestly excessive and rare, bona fide regulations in 
the public interest must be compensated. Far from a mechanism for its protection, this is a definite 
erosion of the State’s right to regulate.  
In further contrast to the stated intention regarding FET and indirect expropriation, to restrict the 
expansive interpretations of tribunals, the Commission’s position on the most-favoured nation (MFN) 
clause runs a high risk of negating these efforts. The MFN clause provides for treatment equal to that 
of the most well treated foreign investors in a given host State. This provision has been used to 
‘import’ higher standards of protection from other treaties, both in terms of the substantive rights 
investors enjoy and in terms of access to the ISDS system. The Commission’s proposals, in line with 
the CETA text, will prevent the importation of access to the ISDS mechanism, but will not prevent the 
importation of higher standards from other treaties. There is nothing to stop arbitrators applying the 
wording of FET and expropriation from other treaties that do not include the qualifications above, if 
it is argued by a US investor that it is entitled to such equal treatment under the MFN provision. This 
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oversight could render all of the above efforts useless.298 The MFN provision should therefore either 
be excluded or, if maintained, explicitly restricted to ensuring equal treatment in terms of domestic 
regulation rather than international protection, expressly disallowing the importation of both 
procedural and substantive standards from other treaties.  
 
3.6(d) – The Right to Regulate 
 
Responding to the fact that investment agreements have not traditionally engaged with the 
relationship between investment protections and the State’s right to regulate in the public interest, 
and that only some tribunals have taken the public purpose of disputed measures into account while 
others have outright refused to consider this aspect, the Commission affirms the right as “a basic 
underlying principle”, believing that “arbitral tribunals will have to take this principle into account 
when assessing any dispute settlement case.”299 It is nevertheless obvious that tribunals will naturally 
see a very large difference between firstly applying the substantive law of the treaty and adjudicating 
an alleged violation of the primary rights conferred on investors therein, and secondly, ‘taking this 
principle into account’. As pointed out by Hindelang, “such language would not put additional 
emphasis on public interests or may not create an inherent assumption that a regulatory measure 
taking in the public interest would be in compliance with the investment agreement.”300 Indeed, 
legally speaking it would seem to be incoherent and possibly internally contradictory to nominate, and 
essentially downgrade, a right as a principle. As mentioned above, it is not possible to see the right to 
regulate being given equal weight compared to investor’s rights as long as it is not the subject of an 
equally substantive clause in the main body of the text.301  
The Commission also points to efforts to attempt to protect the right to regulate by complicating the 
definitions of expropriation and FET, which are of dubious worth as addressed above. The Commission 
also speaks of adopting “all the necessary safeguards and exceptions”, including the horizontal 
exceptions intended to cover public health that are also dealt with above, and additional carve-outs 
in the areas of the audio-visual sector, subsidies and State aid, competition matters and prudential 
regulation.302 Yet again, the adequate functioning of these carve-outs remains highly uncertain due to 
open language and the known tendencies of arbitrators.  
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The prudential carve-out, which, as mentioned above, may help to combat the abuse of investor 
protections in the case of sovereign debt workouts and economic crises, contains heavy qualifications. 
Most notably, the measures taken by the State must not be “more burdensome than necessary to 
achieve their aim.” This phrase creates a wealth of leeway for arbitrators to decide on what is 
‘necessary’ and what is overly ‘burdensome’. In the context of sovereign debt workouts they would 
place far greater restrictions on the ability of States to get their economies back together after crisis. 
As indicated by a series of Argentinean cases related to the country’s economic crisis in 1999-2001, 
arbitral tribunals almost invariably interpret the word ‘necessary’ very strictly where the State 
measures in question affect foreign investors.303  
Similarly, the space for the exercise of the right to regulate through leeway for particular ‘safeguard 
measures’ would also seem extremely narrow. Measures are allowed only in “exceptional 
circumstances of serious difficulties” and only when “strictly necessary.” Where ‘necessary’ is 
expected to be interpreted narrowly, adding the word ‘strictly’ would seem to virtually eliminate the 
relevance of the exception. These limited tools are far too meagre and cannot be said to adequately 
protect the State’s right to regulate. In fact they are themselves made necessary exactly because the 
right is not protected, through its clear and unambiguous establishment with its own substantive 
clause, at least equal to and alongside the rights conferred on foreign investors in the operative body 
of the agreement.  
Of importance is the fact that the CETA text may even be interpreted as to actively encourage 
regulatory chill. CETA Article x-36(3) gives direction to tribunals when calculating damages incurred by 
investors. In this context tribunals are told to take “any repeal or modification” of the measure or 
measures complained of into account when calculating ultimate damages. This could act as an 
incentive for States, either before or in the course of litigation, to in fact change or withdraw the 
measure in the hope of ultimately paying less to the injured investor. This text is highly undesirable as 
it “institutionalizes the pressure for a state to change its decisions in favour of foreign investors.”304  
The Commission also relies on the creation of a Committee of the State Parties, which could attempt 
to correct any undesired interpretations by tribunals, providing “greater clarity and precision … in 
order to protect the right to regulate” through the issuance of pronouncements adopting official 
interpretations that would be binding on the tribunals.305 However, while such a mechanism has been 
a part for NAFTA for 20 years it has been used to issue an interpretive statement on a substantive 
standard in the treaty only once. Furthermore, this statement was of questionable effectiveness,306 
which is the reason why the US and Canada have gone to lengths to change the wording of their 
treaties in an attempt to gain more effective control. Outside of NAFTA the mechanism has never been 
used at all in relation to investment agreements, despite the fact that it exists as a matter of 
international treaty law. That is, any States Party to an international agreement can issue a binding 
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collective statement on the interpretation of that treaty. There is no need for an express clause on 
such a mechanism in the treaty itself. Yet the fact is that this mechanism is almost never used, and is 
widely regarded as unmanageable and ineffective.  
It is argued by many that the Commission and others place too much faith in the effectiveness of 
textual modifications in constraining the very clear tendency for arbitral tribunals to expand the extent 
of investor protections, and to create new scope and areas for ‘progressive’ interpretation.307 The 
issue addressed above concerning the new field of ‘creeping’ fair and equitable treatment is a classic 
example. It would seem to be in the nature of these arbitrators, especially given the fact that they are 
not in any real sense accountable, to take the text of agreements in directions that follow the 
preferences of investors, even where they are applying relatively clear textual language that would 
require restraint.308 To many who have studied the field of investment treaty arbitration the 
Commission’s statement, that “the decisions of arbitral tribunals are only as good as the provisions 
that they have to interpret and apply”, seems exceptionally naïve.309 It would instead seem that more 
often than not, regardless of the wording of the provisions applied the decisions of arbitral tribunals 
are likely to be equally unpredictable, with the exception that they are more likely to favour investors 
than to disfavour them. One prevalent example is the fact that despite the wording in almost every 
investment agreement requiring tribunals to take cognisance of all law “applicable” to a dispute, and 
despite the clear wording of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requiring the same, and 
despite the fact that numerous respondent States and amicus interventions have pointed out the 
human rights issues directly involved in many disputes, no investment tribunal has yet engaged with 
international human rights law, let alone sought to apply it.  
As such, the quality of arbitral decisions is perhaps less dependent on the texts interpreted than on 
the nature of the arbitrators, the process of their appointment and the manner in which they and their 
decisions are supervised and corrected where necessary. As noted by Van Harten in his submission to 
the consultation; “The lack of institutionalized independence and procedural fairness in investor-state 
arbitration means that all outcomes of investor-state arbitration lack integrity regardless of the 
underlying text on substantive provisions.”310 For these reasons, many have long demanded deep 
changes to the ISDS procedure. The Commission itself is aware that there are many problems with 
ISDS and proposes a number of further adjustments to the procedural aspects of an investment 
chapter in TTIP. However, the Commission would seem to deliberately avoid some very simple and 
effective solutions to these problems, such as instituting a requirement to exhaust domestic remedies 
(and replacing arbitrators with judges, and allowing all ‘stakeholders’ or ‘parties’ to a dispute—
including local communities and affected individuals whose rights or interest are affected—to enjoy 
equal standing and access to the adjudicative process), in favour of more cosmetic but ultimately 
ineffective adjustments.  
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3.6(e) – Transparency 
 
Perhaps the classic example of the Commission’s overall cosmetic tendency in this regard is its focus 
on transparency. This is widely regarded as the most positive change proposed by the Commission, 
yet it is also by far the easiest to make in the prevailing environment. The lack of transparency is indeed 
a deep flaw in the ISDS procedure, however this has been perhaps the central issue for a long time 
and there is clear consensus that this aspect must and will be remedied, despite some States still 
opposing reforms. Given that arbitral tribunals have enormous influence, dealing with important 
issues of public administration and making final decisions on core sovereign powers, the basic 
requirement that their deliberations and the documents involved be on the public record as an 
essential step to help ensure accountability, independence and fairness, should be seen as 
incontestable. As the Commission states; “Transparency is essential to ensure the legitimacy and 
accountability of the system.”311 
A great many model BITs, including those of the US and Canada, now require qualified transparency 
in arbitrations to a similar level as that proposed by the EU. The EU proposes adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, in line with CETA, which is in no way 
controversial, and there would be little likelihood that the US would oppose this. It is low hanging fruit 
for the Commission, and for this reason, though admirable, does not glean the Commission any great 
credibility.    
Nevertheless, the Commission’s approach would still protect “confidential information and business 
secrets” from the public record.312 While it is in some respects understandable that certain documents 
will inevitably be protected, it nevertheless leaves significant leeway for arbitrators to decide in the 
dark what exactly constitutes legitimately confidential information and justifiable secrets. These 
questions should undergo proper judicial review. In addition, the Commission’s position formalises 
the possibility for civil society and interested individuals to file submissions to the tribunal in an effort 
to make their views and arguments known. However, affected parties to a dispute other than the 
State and the investor will not have standing in front of the tribunal and will be able to participate only 
through a submission. Furthermore, the ability to file a submission is not automatic, but is subject to 
the discretion of the tribunal after “consultation with the disputing parties”.313 This leaves open the 
probability that affected communities and individuals will have no say where it is undesirable to both 
the State and the investor. With respect to disputes that touch closely on human rights issues, this can 
pose serious problems, as traditionally both parties, corporations and States, are averse to 
acknowledgement of their human rights obligations and responsibilities. Therefore, a forum is created 
that tends to structurally exclude the framing of human rights issues and the application of human 
rights law.  
Tribunals will still have significant latitude in refusing a submission on the grounds that the party may 
be deemed not have a “significant interest” in the proceedings or may not seem to “assist the arbitral 
tribunal in the determination of a [relevant] factual or legal issue”.314 The tribunal will then exercise 
crucial powers in deciding what counts as a significant interest and what are the relevant factual or 
legal issues. Notably, the tribunal in von Pezold and Border Timbers v. Zimbabwe has been roundly 
criticised for excluding a submission that sought to present arguments based on indigenous peoples’ 
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rights under international law on these grounds, despite the fact that the dispute directly concerned 
title to territory on which an indigenous community lived and to which it also claimed ownership.315 
The tribunal stated that the human rights norms referred to by the petitioners were “unrelated to the 
matters before” the arbitrators. The only support for this assertion was that neither the State nor the 
investor directly referred to human rights, which ironically is a further requirement of a successful 
submission, i.e., that it bring “a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that 
of the disputing parties.”316 In this light the UNCITRAL Rules should be significantly adapted and 
clarified to allow meaningful and appropriate participation by affected parties, and the tribunal should 
be required to publically release its reasoning in writing.  
In addition, the UNCITRAL Rules provide a great deal of leeway to the tribunal to adapt any of the rules 
to the circumstances of particular cases. Article 3(b) provides that: 
The arbitral tribunal shall have the power, besides its discretionary authority under certain 
provisions of these Rules, to adapt the requirements of any specific provision of these Rules 
to the particular circumstances of the case, after consultation with the disputing parties, if 
such adaptation is necessary to conduct the arbitration in a practical manner and is consistent 
with the transparency objective of these Rules. 
This provision may be seen to be inherently prone to significant abuse.  
In sum, the Commission’s stance would still leave important decisions regarding the release of 
documents, the participation of affected persons and the openness of proceedings to ad hoc and 
largely unaccountable arbitrators, who will enjoy significant discretion and will remain subject to the 
temptation of deferring overly much to foreign investors. This is because only investors can bring 
claims thereby constituting the fundamental reason for the existence of an ISDS institution which 
ensures arbitrators’ increasing employment and remuneration. For this reason, as Van Harten puts it, 
arbitrators are still susceptible to viewing foreign investors as their “customers”.317  
 
3.6(f) – Multiple Claims and Relation to Domestic Courts 
 
The EU’s approach in this section is extremely weak. On the possibility of investors bringing multiple 
claims in front of various international forums, the Commission states only that it intends to instruct 
tribunals to “take into account” any parallel proceedings “pursuant to another international 
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agreement”.318 This would clearly be insufficient to attain the Commission’s stated aim “to avoid any 
risk that the investor is over-compensated … by excluding the possibility for parallel claims.”319 The 
Commission’s approach would avoid the possibility of parallel claims simultaneously under TTIP and 
in domestic courts by imposing a ‘fork in the road’ clause that requires the investor to choose either 
domestic or international litigation. However, this would only preclude simultaneous claims of the 
same type. An investor would still be able to pursue a claim for monetary compensation through ISDS 
and at the same time take a claim for non-monetary compensation, such as declaratory relief, in the 
domestic courts.  
There is nothing further in the proposals to give any substance to the Commission’s statement that 
“[a]s a matter of principle, the EU’s approach favours domestic courts” and that it “aims to provide 
incentives for investors to pursue claims in domestic courts”,320 which remain empty sentiments. An 
obvious way to give meaning to these statements would be to at least require the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies before an investor is allowed to take make a claim under the ISDS procedure, 
however this logical mechanism is very conspicuous by its complete absence. This requirement could 
easily be nuanced, as it is in the case of human rights treaties, by allowing for direct access to ISDS 
where it can be demonstrated that the domestic courts would be unable or clearly unlikely to provide 
an adequate remedy according to specified criteria.  
 
3.6(g) – Arbitrators 
 
To continue an evident pattern, the Commission also does little to allay its own apparent concern that 
“arbitrators on ISDS tribunals do not always act in an independent and impartial manner” and indeed 
may display “potential bias or conflicts of interest” due to a practice of acting both as arbitrator and 
as counsel.321 In line with CETA the Commission proposes the creation of a roster of arbitrators that 
would be vetted by the State Parties, however these arbitrators would only be employed as 
chairpersons of the tribunals in question, and only in the event that the original arbitrators appointed 
freely by the parties to the dispute cannot decide on a chairperson themselves. As such, these 
arbitrators will only be involved in some tribunals and even where they are involved, vetted arbitrators 
will only constitute one third of the decision-making body. This change in relation to the status quo in 
ISDS is insignificant.  
Of only slightly greater significance is a proposal to ensure that arbitrators adhere to a certain code of 
conduct, relying on the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration. Yet this instrument has been drafted by arbitrators themselves and is an 
exercise in self-regulation, which has evidently been totally insufficient to safeguard against the 
practices that apparently cause the Commission so much concern. There is little content in this 
instrument that would make any major difference to the ISDS system. Most notably there is no clear 
ban on an individual simultaneously operating as an arbitrator and counsel. The IBA Guidelines also 
state that the Secretary-General of ICSID will decide on challenges to arbitrators, which would appear 
highly incongruous as this individual is not accountable to either US or EU authorities.    
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For the Commission to give meaning to its implied desire to remove the possibility of bias or conflicts 
of interest, and to ensure independence and impartiality in ISDS it would have to make clear proposals 
to effectively ‘judicialise’ the system, that is to make the procedure far more like a public court than a 
commercial tribunal. This would then reflect the primarily public law nature of most disputes, rather 
than basing resolution on secondary commercial characteristics. This would mean an end to ad-hoc 
appointments of adjudicators, the establishment of secure tenure and the setting of stable and 
predictable levels of remuneration, clear prohibitions on dual roles of adjudicators, independent and 
credible decisions on conflicts of interests in accord with a substantive and independently drafted 
code, and perhaps even a standing appellate body. While the Commission’s initial proposals made no 
significant moves in these directions, subsequent developments addressed below may indicate that, 
following the strongly negative response to its approach in the public consultation, it is now more 
disposed to envision such judicialisation.  
 
3.6(h) – Appellate Mechanism 
 
An appellate mechanism that could serve to ensure a better level of correction and consistency in the 
plethora of divergent and largely unsupervised awards to date has long been a prominent suggestion 
in the literature. It is now enjoying a certain renaissance given the moves of some States to include an 
intention to at least discuss the establishment of an appellate body in the text of some investment 
agreements. One such is CETA, which states that the Parties commit to “consult on … whether, and if 
so, under what conditions, an appellate mechanism could be created under the Agreement to review, 
on points of law, awards rendered by a tribunal”. The agreement contains a number of specific issues 
that would structure the consultations, but that is all. The Commission’s consultation document 
effectively goes not further in elaborating the substance of the proposed mechanism, stating only that 
“in TTIP the EU intends to go further and create a bilateral appellate mechanism immediately through 
the agreement.”322 As such there is little that can be said by way of assessment given that there is little 
of substance to assess.  
A properly functioning appellate body, operating as a permanent and judicial body not as yet another 
‘glorified’ arbitral tribunal, would be a very welcome addition to the ISDS system, and there are some 
indications that concrete steps in this direction may be taken by the EU. The negotiating mandate 
refers to a “Transatlantic Investment Tribunal” that “shall be a permanent, independent, impartial 
organisation” and “shall exclusively be composed of impartial professional judges”.323 However, it 
must be remembered that while this might make a certain level of difference in some outcomes, it 
would not correct the initial illegitimacy and assorted other failures of the first-instance arbitral 
tribunals that would continue to operate as normal. Decisions of the system as a whole would 
therefore continue to be tainted by these deficiencies, no matter how many ‘corrections’ an appellate 
mechanism made. 
Ultimately, the Commission does not address the deeper and persistent problems of ISDS. There is no 
convincing evidence of any alleged inadequacy in the domestic courts of the US of the EU. Yet there 
is no substantial engagement with the preliminary question of why these domestic courts do not then 
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suffice, beyond simplistic statements: “Domestic remedies would be preferable, but TTIP provisions 
cannot be invoked directly in front of a national court … it is possible that investors will not be given 
effective access to justice … [and] ISDS is therefore necessary”.324 As such there is no suggestion of a 
simple rule, in line with all other comparable regimes of international law, to require the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. In fact it is hard to see how the stated preference for domestic remedies is 
reflected anywhere in the Commission’s proposals. This is despite the evident fact that the 
“aberrations of international investment law must be cut back to its initial idea: providing a safety net 
in case the primary means available in a host state fail to prevent or remedy abuse of sovereign power. 
Put differently, international investment law and ISDS can only regain legitimacy when they do not 
aim at replacing national administrative and judicial safeguards but back them up in case of failure.”325  
Nor does the Commission make any effective proposals to address the evident structural imbalances; 
in the process of ISDS whereby only investors can bring claims; or in the weight of investor rights with 
no responsibilities and State responsibilities with no rights; or the lack of procedural fairness, given 
the lack of standing for affected communities and individuals; or the lack of safeguards for the 
independence of arbitrators and the fairness of proceedings. Ultimately, the ISDS procedure would 
remain fundamentally illegitimate and lacking in integrity. If it is left in place, or worse, greatly 
expanded through TTIP, it will continue to discolour the relations between States and foreign investors 
who deal with each other continuously in its shadow.   
 
3.7 – Revenue and Budgetary Implications 
 
The expenses related to ISDS, through the costs of arbitrations for both parties, investors and States, 
and the additional costs of adverse awards for States, can be very considerable. According to the 
OECD, the cost of litigation expenses for both parties to the dispute has so far averaged at around 
US$8 million per claim, and has at times been as much as US$30 million.326 Costs may vary greatly 
however. In the Abaclat case, which is as yet still pending, the Italian claimants have expended USD$27 
million already in legal costs just to clear the first jurisdictional hurdle.327 Argentina has already spent 
USD$12 million on its defence. The remainder of the case will no doubt be even more expensive. One 
study has found that overall costs have also been climbing quickly, far beyond any standard measure 
of inflation, reflecting the growth of the investment arbitration ‘industry’. Comparing claims before 
and after 2006 the costs of lawyers and expert witnesses have risen on average by 32%, and the costs 
of tribunals by 56%.328    
In addition, in many, if not most instances, even if the State is vindicated it may still have to contribute 
to the costs of the tribunal and cover its own legal expenses in the defence of the claim. In one case, 
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Plama v. Bulgaria, for instance, the State had to spend over US$6 million in its defence, a cost that 
was not recouped even though the claim was dismissed.329 When claims succeed the awards of 
damages vary greatly, however it is fair to say that the majority are in the hundreds of millions (US$). 
Although much larger pay-outs are becoming more numerous. In 2014 the largest award ever 
rendered, US$50 billion, was made against Russia in the Yukos case. In 2012 Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation v. Ecuador resulted in damages of US$1.77 billion (US$2.3 billion with the required 
interest),330 and 2013 saw two awards of almost USD$1 billion go against Libya, one of which 
amounted to US$900 million in lost future profits relating to a failed tourist venture.331 These costs 
represent a large drain on public budgets, even those of developed countries, and furthermore only 
very few tribunals have ordered investors who have brought failed or frivolous claims to cover the 
litigation costs of respondent States.332 To say the least, these facts have “put into doubt the oft-
quoted notion that arbitration represents a speedy and low-cost method of dispute resolution.”333  
There are complex issues regarding how the financial burden of the costs of arbitrations and the 
payment of awards will be distributed between the EU and its Member States. The approach of the 
Commission has been clarified in a draft regulation where positions are taken on some of these 
issues.334 The central principle of the draft regulation is that financial responsibility will be allocated 
according to the actor that is responsible for the measure that caused the damage to a given investor, 
or in other words, that “financial responsibility for any costs should follow the origin of the treatment 
of which the investor complained.”335 Where the actor is an EU institution then the EU will be liable. 
Where the actor is a Member State acting under its own volition the State will be financially 
responsible, and where the Member State is acting as directed by EU law then the EU will be liable. 
This would seem to result in a fairly logical and reasonable financial division. Member States would 
have to pay awards and costs in circumstances where it is solely their responsibility, and where 
responsibility lies with the Union or its laws the financial burden will be shared between the States.  
The suggested rules are complicated regarding which entity will act as the respondent in any given 
dispute, the EU or a Member State, due not least to the fact that disputes may entail either mixed 
competences, or multiple measures that are attributable to both parties, or legal issues of importance 
to either party even though the other is directly responsible for the measure under dispute. However, 
what is clear is that even if the EU acts as respondent on behalf of a Member State, the State will 
ultimately incur the expense of the dispute. A final point may be small but telling. Despite the fact 
that, as the Commission states, “[i]t is by definition not possible to give precise information on the 
likely costs associated with investor-state dispute settlement”, it also refers to the “potential for 
significant demands (even temporary) on the Union budget and on Union resources were the Union 
to act as respondent in all cases”.336 This would indicate that the Commission is preparing for a 
significant amount of cases and therefore a significant amount of eventual costs.  
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As noted above, these costs are likely to rise in proportion to the amount of US investment in the 
State. This means that Ireland and the Netherlands will be the most likely to accrue the largest costs. 
Also as mentioned, this burden will weigh far heavier on Ireland not only due to its lesser income, but 
also due to its straightened financial circumstances, relative to the Netherlands and the vast majority 
of other EU Member States. Especially in relation to Ireland, costs will also depend on the degree to 
which investment has been treated liberally to date, in the sense of benefiting from advanced 
implementation of internally generated neo-liberal policies and externally imposed structural 
adjustment measures. This significantly raises the likelihood of restrictions, greater regulation and 
legislative changes in the future, probably in reaction to popular demands and the emergence of 
democratic mandates, which could prove very costly under ISDS.  
Some believe the answer to deterring frivolous claims and unwarranted expenses arising for Member 
States and the EU through ISDS is to establish a clear ‘loser pays’ rule, whereby the unsuccessful party 
pays for the full costs of the arbitration, including the expanses of the ‘winner’.337 Although this is not 
a widely applied principle in arbitrations some tribunals have charged the losing party with covering 
the expenses of the winner, either in whole or in part.338 This may have the effect of shifting 
government costs to unsuccessful investors and deterring ‘frivolous’ claims in the first place, or 
discouraging investor’s tactics to pressure governments into settlements by launching or threating 
litigation. Moreover, some also argue that the costs of domestic litigation could prove higher than 
international arbitration, due to a perhaps increased use of State subsidised national courts and the 
lengthening of the process due to the availability of multiple forums for appeal.339 They conclude that 
ISDS with a loser pays rule, and other mechanisms to filter and deter frivolous claims, is the most cost 
effective route in purely financial terms.  
However, it is far from clear that the use of domestic courts will in fact be more expensive. While the 
overheads for these forums are borne exclusively by the State it is a cost that is independent of 
investment claims and will be incurred in any event. The only additional cost will relate to the time 
spent specifically by domestic forums on investment cases, and this additional cost may be more than 
offset in terms of the additional benefits already mentioned at length of deciding such cases in a 
domestic environment. Additionally, the vast majority of costs related to investment claims are legal 
representation and witness costs, or ‘party costs’, which will have to be incurred by the parties in any 
case, and may even be expected to be lower in a domestic rather than an international setting. The 
institutional cost, which is the main saving at issue, amounts to less than 10% of total costs in most 
disputes.340  
Savings would therefore depend on the relative difference between party costs comparing between 
international arbitration and domestic courts. Strong reasons exist to believe that, on average, party 
costs will be less in the domestic context. In investment arbitration, costs will be heightened due to 
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ever more frequent arbitrator challenges, lengthy processes of appointing third arbitrators when the 
first two cannot agree, and the time taken to argue and decide on the vague standards established in 
treaties, among other circumstances particular to the forum. These issues will often not pertain in the 
domestic courts, and here the rule of precedent and well-established codes of administrative, 
corporate and contract law may serve to simplify disputes and render judgements more speedy and 
precise. To illustrate, Japan Tobacco International took a case through Australia’s domestic courts 
challenging the government’s plain cigarette packaging legislation, which took less than a year until 
the final judgement of Australia’s High Court. Yet an identical claim from Philip Morris challenging the 
same legislation through investment arbitration under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT has to date taken 
4 years, 3 years just to get to a hearing on preliminary objections, and remains far from a resolution.  
The availability of multiple appeals levels may theoretically lengthen the process in the domestic 
context, however as the Australian case indicates, this will not always occur in reality. This argument 
loses more force when it is considered that the lack of an appeals mechanism in ISDS has been one of 
its most widely accepted failures, meaning that the consequences for certainty and justice in slightly 
longer disputes will often outweigh any additional financial costs. This will spill over into increased 
social acceptance of awards when rendered and less likelihood of further unforeseen financial costs 
down the line. Moreover, the finality of arbitration awards is sometimes over emphasised, as the 
Yukos case illustrates. These awards may undergo lengthy challenges in multiple national courts or, in 
the ICSID system at least, be subject to annulment proceedings.  
With respect to the ‘loser pays’ rule it must again be remembered that, as in so many instances, such 
a consistent rule cuts both ways. It will also act to saddle governments with the costs of investors in 
those cases where their claim is vindicated. As noted by Poulsen et al, “whether a ‘loser pays’ rule will 
result in a net benefit or cost to the EU over the status quo of each side pays its own costs will depend 
on assumptions about the distribution of losers and winners and the likely magnitude of the costs on 
each side.”341 These considerations are hard to predict. Of the 274 concluded cases the State has won 
outright only 43% of the time, while the investor has won in 31% of cases and the dispute has been 
settled in 26%.342 This indicates that a loser pays rule may not make any significant difference from 
the State’s point of view.  
A telling point is the fact that the rule does nothing to dissuade the most important claims from the 
viewpoint of States; those brought by very wealthy investors for very large amounts of compensation. 
As one commentator states, “one should not give in to the world of illusions by assuming that such a 
rule would seriously deter financially robust claimants from resorting to arbitration if it would serve 
strategic interests.”343 For such investors the prospect of a vast win or a forced settlement far 
outweighs the (relatively) insignificant cost of the arbitration if the gamble is lost. On the flipside, this 
creates a huge amount of pressure on the State to settle unless it is almost certain of vindication, 
which, given the uncertainty of the system as a whole, will not be very often. The loser pays rule will 
then do very little to prevent regulatory chill in this way.  
This highlights the fact that the structural anomalies of the system increasingly favour the investor the 
higher the amount of compensation sought, to a large extent irrespective of the wealth of the 
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claimant. The sheer uncertainty of the investment regime adds to this structural favouritism. Due to 
this uncertainty, coupled with a fair presumption that on balance tribunals are more likely than not to 
interpret treaty texts in favour of investors (even where textual clarifications and explanatory annexes 
are included), they have a strong incentive to bring ‘long-shot’ claims. Even if they lose a few and have 
to pay the full costs as a result, they may eventually win a large claim thereby wiping out their losses 
and setting the State’s finances back significantly.  
For example, in Occidental v. Ecuador the tribunal, under the FET standard, somewhat unexpectedly 
expanded the common understanding of contract-based rights to terminate a commercial 
relationship. In most domestic legal systems a party can terminate a contract at will, with no 
qualification, when the opposite party has breached the contract. There is no requirement to do so in 
any particular way or with any due respect for the opposite party. However, the tribunal did read in a 
‘new’ condition that, even though Occidental breached the relevant contract that Ecuador 
subsequently terminated, Ecuador’s termination of the contract was done in a manner that was not 
‘proportionate’, thereby violating the FET standard. The tribunal ultimately ended up awarding 
Occidental the second largest amount of compensation of any case to date, USD$ 1.7 billion.  
The only way that the State could recoup this loss, and we must be clear that ISDS only represents a 
potential loss for the State monetarily speaking, is through attracting an equal or greater amount of 
foreign investment than it would have without ISDS. As we argue above, the likelihood of this added 
financial inflow actually materialising is very low, even more so for peripheral States already heavily 
dependent on foreign investment such as Ireland.  
Ireland simply does not have a great deal of spare income to compensate for the costs of the 
investment regime. This is a point on which it differs dramatically from the core EU States. Because of 
the higher proportion of (US) foreign investment in the country and the perhaps greater need to re-
regulate there is a high probability that Ireland will incur greater proportional costs in terms of claims 
and settlements. It remains to be seen whether the EU adopts some internal measures to alleviate 
these greater costs, but for now such balancing schemes would be purely speculative and unlikely. 
Nothing like this is mentioned in the Commission’s draft regulation on financial responsibility for ISDS.  
 
3.8 – An Investment Court? 
 
To date there have been two major responses to the results of the Commission’s consultation and the 
ensuing debate, one from the Commission itself and one from an academic charged with drafting an 
investment chapter for TTIP by the German government. Commissioner Malmstrom has released a 
concept paper on the future direction for negotiations on investment which aims to enhance the right 
to regulate and move from “the current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court.”344 And at 
the behest of Sigmar Gabriel, the German Vice Chancellor, Professor Markus Krajewski has 
contributed a draft investment chapter that also outlines a proposal for a similar investment court, in 
this case called a US-EU Permanent Investment Tribunal.345  
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Krajewski’s draft is a notable advance in many ways. Although it does not include the right to regulate 
as an operative clause of the text it does use the phrase “the provisions of this Agreement preserve 
the right to regulate”, which may be understood as stronger phrasing than the Commission’s previous 
approach of only “recognizing” the right. Also in the preamble it is stated that the agreement “does 
not provide a higher level of protection to foreign investors than provided by each Contracting Party 
to its own domestic investors and investments”, which would help to foreclose the possibility that the 
text could be used to ground a higher level of protection for foreign investors. Yet one of its major 
innovations of the draft is to suggest that the substantive standards provided are limited to most-
favoured nation treatment and national treatment. As the text notes:  
If the aim is to ensure that foreign companies are granted the same protection as domestic 
companies, it is sufficient for the treaty to define only NT [national treatment] as a standard 
of protection. Standards of protection like fair and equitable treatment and protection against 
expropriation are then no longer necessary, since they will have a function if - and only if - the 
foreign investor is to be granted better or additional protection. For this reason, it makes 
sense to dispense with the protection standards of fair and equitable treatment and indirect 
expropriation in a treaty with the U.S. or other countries with a legal system comparable to 
the German rule of law and only to include non-discrimination standards.346 
This approach has already actually been taken in the 2015 China-Australia FTA. This agreement also 
limits the substantive investment protections of the treaty to MFN and national treatment, and 
provides only for a ‘work program’ that sets out the intention of the Parties to discuss further, after 3 
years, the possible inclusion of other standards of protection.  
Given that this approach may not be politically feasible in negotiations with the US, Krajewski’s draft 
also provides more restrictive language for the FET provision, which is also limited to a closed list 
following the practice in CETA. For instance, a measure will only be manifestly arbitrary if it “is not 
based on a rational reason”, and there is express direction to tribunals mandating that they must “give 
appropriate regard to the right to regulate of a Contracting Party and leave a margin of appreciation 
to the respective Contracting Party.”347 It is made clear that non-discriminatory measures in the public 
interest per se, and without qualification, do not amount to indirect expropriation. The general 
exception clause applies expressly to the whole agreement, correcting the problems of the 
Commission’s approach that excluded FET and expropriation from its scope. However, the draft still 
retains the qualifier ‘necessary’ from GATT Article XX. This is something that could be changed to 
better protect the State’s right to regulate, by for example replacing ‘necessary’ with ‘related to’ or a 
less strict standard.  
Notably, Article 16 of the draft proposes the institution of a ‘Permanent International Investment 
Tribunal’, which would eliminate the traditional ad-hoc tribunals made up of party-appointed 
arbitrators. The Tribunal would only be responsible for this specific treaty and would be staffed by 
independent and impartial judges, with knowledge of international law and domestic public law, and 
possessing “the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest 
judicial office”.348 Adjudicators would be expressly forbidden from service if they had ever served as 
legal counsel to either of the disputing parties in a previous case. And perhaps most notably, the 
Tribunal could only accept jurisdiction if the claimant had exhausted all reasonably available domestic 
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remedies. However again, if this is not feasible the draft makes provision for a ‘fork in the road’ clause. 
Finally, the draft proposes the institution of an Appellate Review Panel that is similarly staffed and has 
comprehensive review powers with respect to issues of law, and may also address issues regarding 
new facts.  
Krajewski’s draft takes some large steps towards a better balance between public interests and 
investor protection. The draft has various ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions, but if the stronger options are 
consistently chosen then a resulting agreement restricted to MFN and national treatment standards, 
with an permanent tribunal staffed with tenured judges and a requirement for domestic exhaustion, 
would have a fighting chance of adequately protecting the democratic mandates of governments to 
regulate in the interests of their people. However, this strong version may not survive negotiations, in 
fact it is yet to make it to the negotiating table, therefore little more in the way of commentary at this 
point is warranted. Yet it must be stated that all versions of the draft, weak or strong, will still 
introduce a risk that does not presently exist in the EU. On balance it remains most likely that there is 
nothing substantial to gain from that risk.  
In its recent concept note the Commission would also seem to be solidifying its approach to 
establishing an appellate mechanism, which would be based on the WTO Appellate Body. However, 
as Commissioner Malmstrom notes, there are deep and complex questions regarding how this 
appellate mechanism would actually work.349 For example, would it operate only for the EU and the 
US under TTIP or would it apply across treaties? If the former route is taken separate appellate 
mechanisms for every treaty would entail some very cumbersome arrangements, increasing 
uncertainty and confusion in the system, and will most likely be cost ineffective. This is a difficulty that 
Krajewski’s draft would also encounter. Yet the Commissioner’s proposal would seem to envisage the 
latter possibility: “[I]t should be considered to start working on an appellate mechanism with tenured 
judges, applying to multiple agreements and between different partners, for example on the basis of 
an opt-in system.” This institutional plan would furthermore seem to be extended down from the 
appellate level to encompass all initial disputes related to investment agreements: “[T]he EU should 
pursue the creation of one permanent court. This court would apply to multiple agreements and 
between different trading partners”.350 Apparently, “[w]ork has already begun on how to start this 
process.” 
Similar to Krajewski’s draft, this would seem to be a welcome development along the lines of 
judicialising the entire ISDS system, and the Commission’ apparent responsiveness to the outpour of 
negative submissions in the consultation should be acknowledged. However, in the absence of a single 
multilateral treaty, a number of problems will arise.  For instance, a new set of complications will be 
produced in this quest for more ‘consistency’ across different treaties. The process will seek to 
harmonise the standards of different treaties and diverse decisions across a range of mostly bilateral 
investment agreements. Although there are evident similarities in these agreements, they will all be 
substantially different, representing the specific compromises made between the State Parties to each 
agreement. A ‘harmonising’ interpretation given at an appellate level, or at the level of a permanent 
court, could fail to respect these specific compromises. This process would also seem to be contrary 
to the rules on treaty interpretation under international law.  Put simply, there will be a lessened 
likelihood that each State’s intention at the time of drafting the treaty will be reflected in the 
outcomes of disputes. This has serious consequences for democratic control and accountability. As a 
result, there is a significant danger that this process of harmonisation could lead to a large shift in 
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power from States to a permanent or an appellate court. The conceptualisation and establishment of 
these bodies should be approached with great care and precision.  As one prominent commentator 
notes, “each investment instrument reflects a specific balance between public and private interests 
established in the negotiations between states. By importing standards from one investment 
instrument into another one at the discretion of an appeals facility, this facility would turn into a 
powerful self-styled and unchecked lawmaker.”351  
The bottom line is that while these new developments are indeed positive, far more discussion is need 
to flesh out the details and to guard against incompatibility with the general rules of international law 
and the possibility of inordinate power transfers to these new institutions. The pressures of a 
negotiating context are far from ideal in this situation and must not be allowed to rush or constrain 
such an important process.  
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4. TRADE IMPACTS 
  
The most significant trade impacts on public health are most likely to occur in the areas of intellectual 
property, regulatory harmonisation or non-tariff barriers to trade, and services. These areas will be 
addressed in sequence below. However, the recent challenges to Australia’s tobacco plain packaging 
legislation under the trade regime are highly illustrative in a number of respects and have attracted 
substantial attention from the media, and so will be the subject of the first part of this chapter. These 
challenges have been brought in tandem with the claims made by Philip Morris under the investment 
regime against the same legislation. This highlights the manner in which the trade and investment 
regimes can act to reinforce each other for the benefit of multinational corporations to the detriment 
of State’s capacities to protect and promote the wellbeing of their citizens.  
In contrast to the investment regime, where multinational corporations and foreign investors are 
empowered to directly initiate claims and sue States, the trade regime is populated only by States as 
actors. This focus on States, particularly in the dispute resolution context, can allay popular concerns 
due to a public perception that because only States are formally involved the public interest will be 
better protected. This may be true to some degree yet it can obscure the fact that the trade regime is 
increasingly designed for the benefit of the same corporations and investors that are the more visible 
actors in the investment regime. Generally speaking, disputes increasingly arise under the trade regime 
for the same reasons as under the investment regime, because some State measures may harm the 
interests of foreign investors. Claims for relief are then brought under the trade regime by other States 
essentially for the benefit, if not at the direct behest, of these investors. Attention to the cross-regime 
challenges to Australia’s legislation designed to protect and promote public health serves to dispel 
some of these misperceptions and demonstrates clearly that adequate protection of the public interest, 
in the final analysis, will require equal attention to both aspects of TTIP.   
 
4.1 – WTO Tobacco Plain Packaging Cases  
 
The core of Philip Morris’ claims against Australia and Uruguay under the investment regime is an 
allegedly unjustified infringement of the corporation’s intellectual property rights. These rights are 
protected by investment agreements as part of the definition of investment. They are also protected 
under the multilateral trade agreements of the WTO, specifically through the agreement on Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and to some extent under the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). In fact Philip Morris’ 
original claim against Australia under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT specifically referenced the standards 
of intellectual property protection in the WTO and sought to have those standards applied equally by 
the tribunal charged with deciding the case under investment law.352 This displayed a definite 
opportunism, seeking to import standards from a multilateral regime where corporations and 
individuals have no standing in dispute settlement into a bilateral treaty allowing corporations to bring 
suit directly against States. It also demonstrates how the different rules in the investment and trade 
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regimes are becoming somewhat confused, a process exacerbated by the inclusion of investment 
chapters in traditional trade agreements such as TTIP. However, under the general law of international 
treaties a tribunal constituted under a BIT has no competence or jurisdiction to apply the law of another 
treaty and would be bound to refuse to do so. Perhaps due to a realisation of this fact Philip Morris 
subsequently made an amended claim in which the references to application of WTO law have been 
deleted. Nevertheless, the investment tribunals seized with disputes over Australia’s and Uruguay’s 
plain packaging legislation may turn to an appreciation of those WTO standards and their jurisprudence 
in interpreting the relevant clauses of the BIT under which Philip Morris eventually limited its litigation.  
In the course of 2012-2013 five countries initiated proceedings against Australia in the WTO over its 
plain packaging legislation; Ukraine, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Cuba and Indonesia.353 All 
countries are major tobacco exporters, and it would seem that the Dominican Republic, Honduras and 
Cuba have initiated their disputes on behalf of their local cigar manufacturing industries. Yet with 
respect to the Ukraine and Indonesia it is an open question whether the legal actions brought by the 
countries to the WTO are founded on actual national interests or those of foreign investors, in the form 
of major multinational tobacco companies operating within these countries with considerable influence 
over their governments.  A previous and successful challenge to tax regulation of tobacco imports into 
Thailand was brought by the Philippines in 2011 at the behest of Philip Morris,354 which has extensive 
operations in the Philippines that are the pride of the government’s drive to attract foreign investment. 
As a recent World Health Organisation Report states, this case 
reflects the way foreign direct investment and preferential trade arrangements through free 
trade agreements may create a staging point for international litigation. More specifically, 
foreign direct investment of this type can create an incentive for a Government to bring an 
international claim on behalf of a tobacco company where such an incentive may not previously 
have existed.355 
It is indicative that the Ukraine has subsequently suspended its dispute with Australia amid controversy 
over the original motivations for the challenge.356 Ukraine was the first country to take WTO action over 
Australia’s legislation, opening the door to later challenges. According to the Ukrainian Prime Minister, 
Arseniy Yatseniuk, the country initiated the dispute at the request of the American Chamber of 
Commerce, presumably on behalf of tobacco multinationals headquartered in the US but operating 
through subsidiaries in the Ukraine.357 The Ukraine has one of the world’s highest smoking rates and 
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produces some of the world’s cheapest cigarettes through the operations of multinational tobacco 
companies headquartered mostly in the US and the UK. Production far outstrips demand in the Ukraine 
and large quantities of cigarettes are smuggled into Europe and further afield. Within the country it is 
widely accepted that, at least until recently, the tobacco industry has been highly integrated into 
government decision-making and has often ‘called the shots’ on national decisions affecting tobacco 
products.358 A former senior corporate affairs officer at British American Tobacco was later appointed 
deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and a longstanding and prominent lobbyist for the tobacco 
companies was also made deputy Minister for the Economy. 
The four WTO challenges that remain are important test cases to assess the level of protection in 
existing trade agreements for measures taken by States to regulate in the interests of public health. 
The purpose of TTIP is to provide for greater liberalisation of trade beyond the level established in these 
agreements,359 which may entail an increased threat to the State’s right to regulate. It is therefore 
essential to have an idea of the state of play and the plain packaging cases are highly illuminating in this 
respect. On the basis of this knowledge we can better ensure that the present level of protection for 
the State’s right to regulate in trade agreements is not eroded in the TTIP, and that in fact it is 
strengthened where appropriate.  
The general position in the academic literature is that Australia’s plain packaging legislation would not 
be disallowed by the current provisions of the trade regime, and that the State’s right to regulate may 
be adequately protected, at least in relation to these particularly clear circumstances.360 The prognosis 
is not so positive in regard to the Philip Morris claims under the investment regime,361 so it is instructive 
to appreciate the differing flexibilities in trade provisions.  
Australia’s legislation requires the packaging of all tobacco products to be standardised in “drab dark 
brown” packets. No logos are allowed and graphic health warnings must cover 75% of the front of the 
packet and 90% of the back. The brand names and other manufacturer information must only appear 
in a specific font, colour and size.362 Irish legislation on plain packaging is very much the same, therefore 
an assessment of how such legislation may fare under the trade regime is highly pertinent.  
Before proceeding it is necessary to make two points. The first is that, as with the current investment 
regime, the State’s right to regulate is not expressly provided for in the trade regime. Like the 
investment regime, the trade regime constitutes primarily obligations on States in the interests of trade 
liberalisation but does not balance these with express positive rights. Therefore the State will be 
immediately on the defensive in these disputes and will be tasked with proving that its measure meets 
the numerous requirements of certain exceptions to the primary obligations imposed by the regime.  
Secondly, it is important to note at the outset that one of the critical factors in an assessment of the 
likely success of these claims is the large amount of evidence amassed scientifically establishing two 
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very strong connections; one between smoking and serious illness363 and the other between cigarette 
advertising and levels of tobacco consumption. The WTO’s dispute resolution bodies will undergo a 
process of quasi-administrative review of Australia’s legislative measure, effectively second guessing 
the elected and accountable government, which as noted above is in itself cause for serious concern. 
In doing so they will adopt a proportionality analysis that will weigh the harm done to tobacco 
companies against the seriousness of the public health issue and the degree to which the measure 
contributes to its resolution. In this process the strength of the scientific evidence will be a strong factor 
in Australia’s defence of its right to regulate against the systemic strictures of the trade regime. This is 
fortunate, however it highlights the well noted structural tension between the approach of WTO 
dispute resolution bodies and the EU’s highly valued precautionary approach to regulation, whereby 
certain regulations that may not meet such a high evidentiary threshold will be disallowed under WTO 
rules regardless of their desirability or the democratically expressed wishes of EU citizens.364  This issue 
is central and will be returned to below.  
As alluded to above, the WTO claims challenge this legislation on three main grounds, under the 
provisions of TRIPS, GATT 1994, and the TBT. 
 
4.1(a) – Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
 
The TRIPS challenge is perhaps the most serious.  Article 20 of TRIPS states the following: 
The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by special 
requirements, such as use with another trademark, use in a special form or use in a manner 
detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those 
of other undertakings.365 
It will be argued that the packaging restrictions described above are special requirements rising to the 
level of ‘encumbrances’ that reduce the ability of consumers to tell one brand from another. Although 
Australia’s legislation clearly interferes with the use of trademarks it is not so clear whether it is an 
encumbrance within the context of this article. Manufacturers may still use 25% of the front of the 
package to distinguish their brand from others, leading to a reasonable conclusion that brands will 
remain easily distinguishable; that the words ‘Marlboro’, ‘Camel’ and ‘Benson and Hedges’ for example 
will remain clearly different from each other. However, even if a detrimental encumbrance is conceded 
it will still be allowed where it can be shown to be justified. Here Articles 7 and 8 come into play, 
together with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.  
Articles 7 and 8 refer to the objectives and the purpose of the TRIPS agreement, which  must be taken 
into account in a decision on whether measures restricting the use of a trademark are justified or not. 
Article 7 states that intellectual property rights are protected and enforced by the agreement such that 
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they “contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology … in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.” That is, intellectual property rights should serve an innovative purpose and contribute to 
social wellbeing. They are not absolute, and must be understood as inherently subject to qualification 
in order to balance their effects against other competing rights and obligations. It is not clear that the 
trademarks on cigarette packages are particularly innovative, or that they transfer any technology or 
increase social welfare. In fact it is because of significant evidence that they are damaging to social 
welfare that plain packaging legislation is being brought in. However, it is clear that the human right to 
health and the corresponding obligations of States to protect and fulfil this right are entirely legitimate 
considerations against which the use of trademarks must be balanced.  
Article 8 is in some ways more direct. Accordingly, States are enabled to “adopt measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socioeconomic and technological development”. This provides a clear basis for the Australian 
legislation. However, in a final caveat, the Article states that these measures must be “consistent with 
the provisions” of the TRIPS agreement. This article would not then operate as an exceptions clause, 
and does not wholly justify measures that would go against the meaning of Article 20. Yet the meaning 
of Article 20 is as yet unsettled and only an unjustifiable measure will be inconsistent with the 
agreement.  
Also aiding in an interpretation of whether the measure is justified is the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health announced by the WTO’s Ministerial Conference, its highest authoritative body. This 
Declaration was developed in response to the difficulties developing countries have with providing 
access to necessary medicines for those who cannot afford the prices maintained by pharmaceutical 
companies with the aid of overly strict intellectual property provisions. However, it has force beyond 
this singular issue. The Declaration requires that the TRIPS agreement should as a general rule be 
interpreted in an accommodating manner where public health regulations are concerned. Accordingly, 
all WTO Member States have agreed that 
the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect 
public health . .. [T]he Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access 
to medicines for all.... In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose 
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.366 
This statement does not substantively alter the provisions of the TRIPS agreement but it does have a 
significant effect on the interpretation of the justifiability of measures that restrict the use of 
trademarks and intellectual property in the interests of public health. It counts as an authoritative 
pronouncement of the agreed understanding of the manner of interpretation of the agreement under 
customary international law,367 and therefore any WTO dispute panel is obliged to take heed of it when 
applying Article 20 above. This is in accordance with the WTO rules on the operation of its dispute 
settlement system,368 and with customary international law on the interpretation of treaties, which 
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states that a panel must account for “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.”369 The EU has stated that 
in the case of disputes … Members can avail themselves of the comfort provided by this 
Declaration. … [T]he Declaration is part of the context of the TRIPS Agreement, which, according 
to the rules of treaty interpretation, has to be taken into account when interpreting the 
Agreement.370 
Other considerations in the interpretation of Article 20 include the nature of trademarks and the line 
drawn between their registration and their use in the treaty. As pointed out by Olmedo,371 among 
others, the right that companies and individuals can have over a trademarks in TRIPS is a negative right, 
in that it only entitles the owner to prevent anyone else from using that trademark.372 It does not 
provide the owner with a positive right to use the trademark in any particular way. Neither does a right 
to use the trademark exist in any comparable treaties such as the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property.373 According to experts on trademarks, “when granted the trademark 
registration the owner has a ‘negative’ right entitling him to prevent all third parties not having the 
owner's consent from using in the course of trade identical, or similar, signs for goods or services which 
are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered”.374 Trademark owners 
may have an interest in using their mark, but they do not have a right to use it. This is admittedly a 
technical distinction. However, it means that Article 20 effectively protects an interest of tobacco 
companies in using their trademarks, which in turn means that it would be easier for a well-recognised 
right of States to regulate in protection of public health to displace or qualify that interest.  
Furthermore, Article 15.4 of TRIPS states that “[t]he nature of the goods or services to which a 
trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to the registration of the mark”. This could 
be said to establish a right to register a trademark regardless of the product it is intended to distinguish. 
However, again, it does not establish a right to use the trademark. Evidently, plain packaging legislation 
does not affect the registration of trademarks, and therefore would not contravene this rule. The 
measures taken by Australia do not cancel or revoke any trademarks and do not create any barriers to 
their registration, only their use. In addition, they do not affect the rights associated with trademarks 
because they do not prevent the owners from stopping others from using and thereby benefiting from 
those trademarks.  
To summarise, it would seem that the flexibilities included in the TRIPS agreement, and the clear 
intention of the State Parties to allow themselves a significant degree of latitude in respect of measures 
taken to protect public health in particular, would be sufficient to exempt plain packaging from the 
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range of measures prohibited by the agreement. As the submission from Canada to the WTO panel 
dealing with these issues states; 
The complainants argue for an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that would create new 
rights for trademark owners, establish new obligations for Members, and erode Members' ability 
to regulate in the interest of public health – a right that was carefully and purposefully preserved. 
The interpretations of the TRIPS provisions in issue must not only be faithful to the text but also 
to the objectives and principles expressed in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8.1, as well as the interpretive 
direction in paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration on Public Health.375 
 
4.1(b) – The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1994 
 
This measure may nevertheless amount to a violation of the Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. This 
agreement, however, includes the original general exception clause discussed above, Article XX GATT, 
which has been imported into some investment agreements and is now one of the options considered 
by the EU Commission for the prospective investment chapter of TTIP. As such, plain packaging 
legislation may be acceptable if it passes the tests of the exception clause. In relevant part, the clause 
states the following: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... 
It is evident that the relevant measure falls clearly within the subject matter of section (b), however the 
crucial question is whether it would pass the test of necessity. As discussed above it is not an easy 
question to answer. As also noted above, the WTO Appellate Body has interpreted the term ‘necessary’ 
in Article XX GATT as synonymous with ‘indispensable’.376 This is quite a high threshold. Nevertheless, 
there are reasons to believe that in the case of plain packaging legislation that threshold can be met in 
the trade context.  
In determining necessity a WTO panel must take close note of the degree to which the measure 
contributes to the aim of protecting public health by reducing the incidence of smoking. The significant 
scientific evidence mentioned above linking plain packaging with a decrease in the incidence of smoking 
will play a very large role. It is not possible here to properly review this evidence. However, in the 
opinion of the WHO as well as numerous health organisations and official bodies, and the governments 
of Australia, Uruguay, Ireland and the UK, the existing evidence is more than sufficient to conclude that 
plain packaging will have a direct and significantly positive effect on lowering the incidence of smoking 
and ameliorating its health impact on the populations of these countries. The authors therefore adopt 
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the widely held viewpoint in the legal literature,377 that WTO panels are most likely to agree that plain 
packaging “appears sufficiently related to its purpose that it could be considered likely to fulfil the 
effectiveness requirement” for the purposes of a determination of necessity,378 and is therefore 
justifiable on health grounds.379  
The ‘proof’ of this positive effect is, as they say, in the pudding. According to surveys and reports,380 
since the introduction of the measure Australia has recorded the fastest decline in smoking rates in 20 
years, falling 15% between 2010 and 2013 according to a National Drug Strategy Household Survey.381 
Younger people, the central target of the measure, are delaying taking up smoking and the average 
number of cigarettes smoked has dropped.   
Even if it is accepted as necessary the measure must still pass more tests. Its restrictiveness on trade 
must be proven to be justified in the light of the importance of the measure and with respect to 
alternative measures that could have been taken. The importance of plain packaging in reducing 
smoking is, as mentioned, widely accepted, and is indeed reflected in the language of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, which states that State Parties must  
within a period of three years … adopt and implement … effective measures to ensure that: (a) 
tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco product by  any means that 
are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about its 
characteristics, health  effects, hazards or emissions, including any  term, descriptor, trademark, 
figurative or any other sign that directly or indirectly creates the false impression that a particular 
tobacco product is less harmful than other  tobacco products.382 
Accordingly, Australia will undoubtedly point to its alternative obligations under international law to 
demonstrate that the measures are justified as against their restrictions on trade and that no lesser 
measures would suffice. In this respect Australia could also point to its human rights obligations. As 
mentioned above, the human right to health is protected by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). In respect to the latter treaty the Committee charged with monitoring States 
adherence to its provisions has expressed concern for the fact that “women are often targets in tobacco 
advertising campaigns” and urging States to “ratify and implement the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and put in place legislation aimed at banning smoking in 
                                                          
377 Tania Voon, ‘Flexibilities in WTO Law to Support Tobacco Control Regulation’ 39 American Journal of Law and Medicine 
(2013); Mark Davison and Patrick Emerton, ‘Rights, Privileges, Legitimate Interests, and Justifiabilty: Article 20 of TRIPS and 
Plain Packaging of Tobacco’ 29 American University International law Review (2014); Javier Garcia Olmedo, ‘The Use of Tobacco 
Trademarks versus Public Health: A New Trend in Investor-State Arbitration’ 15 International Arbitration Law Review (2012); 
Tsai-yu Lin, ‘The Status of FCTC in the Interpretation of Compensable Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Adopt “Stricter” 
Tobacco Control Measures under BITs’ 9 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 1 (2014).  For a contrary 
viewpoint see, Memorandum from Lalive to Philip Morris International Management SA, ‘Why Plain Packaging is in Violation 
of WTO Members' International Obligations under TRIPS and the Paris Convention’, 23 July 2009,  
378 Benn McGrady, ‘TRIPs and Trademarks: The Case of Tobacco’ 3 World Trade Review (2004), p.10. 
379 Carlos Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007), p.179. 
380 See, Melanie Wakefield et al, ‘Australian Adult Smokers’ Responses to Plain Packaging with Larger Graphic Health Warnings 
1 year after Implementation: Results from a National Cross-sectional Tracking Survey’, 24 Tobacco Control (2014), concluding; 
“The specific objectives of plain packaging were achieved and generally sustained among adult smokers up to 12 months after 
implementation.” See also, Jamie Smyth, ‘Australia Smoking Rates Tumble after Plain Packaging Shift’, Financial Times, 17 July 
2014.  
381 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘National Drug Strategy Household Survey: Detailed Report 2013,  
Drug Statistics Series No. 28, AIHW, Canberra, 2014.  
382 FCTC, Article 11.  
 119 
 
public spaces and restricting tobacco advertising.”383 Human rights and tobacco control can in this 
respect be seen a mutually supportive endeavours. The former requires the latter. Government’s 
obligations regarding the right to health require them to regulate private parties if their activities 
threaten public health. This necessitates the development of laws and policies that adhere to the 
minimum international requirements of public health protection, which are contained in the FCTC.   
That there are no less demanding measures that could be taken is also evident from this discussion. 
The measures themselves are required by international law. There is as such no room for manoeuvre. 
In any event, even if we remain within the legal boundaries of the WTO agreements, the WTO Appellate 
Body has stated that 
certain complex public health ... problems may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy 
comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures. In the short-term, it may prove difficult to 
isolate the contribution to public health . . . objectives of one specific measure from those 
attributable to the other measures that are part of the same comprehensive policy. Moreover, 
the results obtained … can only be evaluated with the benefit of time.384 
This statement would provide significant leeway in the present case with respect to a State’s decision 
on which measures are appropriate to address a given health problem.  
Finally, the measure must not constitute “arbitrary or unjusitifiable discrimination” or a “disguised 
restriction on international trade”. To begin with, plain packaging applies to all tobacco products sold 
in Australia, whether they are sourced or manufactured locally or internationally. The measure in clearly 
non-discriminatory. Even if some form of discrimination could be made out, the discussion above 
demonstrates that the measure is assuredly not arbitrary, and is on balance clearly justified. As to the 
final hurdle, it is unlikely in the extreme that taking all this into account a WTO panel will see plain 
packaging as an underhanded measure the ultimate purpose of which is actually to restrict trade.  
Plain packaging is therefore most likely to meet the requirements of the exception in GATT Article XX.  
To illustrate why this conclusion differs in the trade context as compared to the prospects of plain 
packaging under investment arbitration it is important to consider that WTO panels are bound to 
adhere to past decisions. This is not the case for ad hoc investment tribunals, which are not required 
to follow previous interpretations. WTO panels must therefore apply previous precedent where the 
necessity criteria are concerned. As argued above, due to the vast difference in the structure and the 
actors in relation to the settlement of trade disputes, the jurisprudence of the WTO is far more likely 
to be balanced and to better accommodate the right of States to regulate in the public interest. The 
level of respect accorded to the States right to regulate within the trade regime, although in important 
aspects still subject to concern and criticism for not being high enough, is therefore more predictable, 
and is on the whole higher than the level of respect accorded in aggregate by investment tribunals.385  
With respect to a dispute involving measures taken to protect public health in relation to the use of 
asbestos, the Appellate Body of the WTO stated that “the preservation of human life and health through 
the elimination, or reduction, of ... well-known, and life threatening, health risks is both vital and 
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important in the highest degree.”386 With respect to plain packaging this understanding will add 
substantially to the likelihood of it passing the tests of necessity, smoking being an issue that affects far 
more people than asbestos. All other WTO panels are unlikely to diverge from this understanding. This 
approach, to treat the reduction and elimination of health risks as “vital and important in the highest 
degree”, may also be taken by investment tribunals, however there is no security in this regard 
whatsoever. Tribunals may equally be likely to take an approach that accords a lesser degree of 
importance for public health relative to the rights of investors. Indeed many would agree that they are 
more than likely to do so. This is why it is recommended above that especially in the case of investment 
any application of exception clauses should expressly direct adjudicators to apply a lesser standard than 
that of necessity.  
 
4.1(c) – The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade also prohibits certain technical regulations that may be 
relevant to the issue of public health.  These regulations include those affecting  
product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the 
applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they 
apply to a product, process or production method.387 
On the face of it plain packaging would therefore come within the scope of the TBT. As such, under 
Article 2.1 States will be required to ensure that with respect to these regulations “products imported 
from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.” These 
requirements echo the basic rules of the trade regime relating to national treatment and most-favoured 
nation treatment, which generally prohibit States from discriminating between local and foreign 
products and services and between one foreign product or service and another from a different State. 
With respect to plain packaging it is very difficult to see what type of discrimination there could be 
within this understanding. As noted, the measure requires all tobacco products, whether local or 
foreign and without distinction on the grounds of foreign origin, to be treated the same.  
Nevertheless, and for the purposes of illustrating the degree to which the right to regulate is protected, 
even if some form of discrimination is conceded the measure may still be allowed. Similar to TRIPS and 
in contrast to GATT and GATS, the TBT agreement does not contain a general exceptions clause. 
However, the preamble of the agreement does ‘recognise’ that  
no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary … for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, … subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are 
otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
The preamble therefore incorporates the same language as in the exceptions clauses of GATT and GATS, 
but without the express force of those clauses. Nevertheless the WTO Appellate Body has stated that 
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the purpose and nature of the measures under question must be taken into account, and that their 
‘necessity’ must be assessed in the event of a possibly discriminatory effect, more or less the same 
manner as applies to the exceptions clauses.388 Thus, Member States “have a right to use technical 
regulations in pursuit of legitimate objectives, provided that they do so in an even-handed manner and 
in a manner that is otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the TBT Agreement”, specifically in 
“recognition of Member’s right to regulate”.389 
As such, despite the absence of an express exceptions clause, legitimate regulatory infringements of 
the rules set out in the TBT would nevertheless be allowed, provided that they meet the tests set out 
in the exceptions clause. As addressed above, this would mean that plain packaging is likely to be 
allowed even if it is shown that it discriminates in some form relevant to Article 2.1 of the TBT.  
Some of the States disputing Australia’s regulations also argue that they violate Article 2.2 of the TBT, 
which states; 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a 
view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this 
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective ... Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: . . . protection of human health 
or safety . . . . In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available 
scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products. 
In this case it is precisely the consequences of the end use of the product that is the reason for the 
regulation. Additionally, this article has a built-in exclusion in the form of the expressly legitimate 
objective of protecting human health. The test is again ‘necessity’, which has been dealt with, and the 
required element in the form of copious scientific and technical information would seem to be satisfied.  
This discussion allows us to make a general but important point about the difference between dispute 
resolution in the trade regime as compared to the investment regime. While, like investment 
agreements, trade treaties do not at present expressly provide for the State’s right to regulate as an 
enforceable provision, it is clear that they are complex instruments and do to some extent allow 
regulation for legitimate purposes through express carve-outs and exceptions and through inclusion of 
reference to the State’s legitimate objectives in taking measures that may also conflict with trade 
obligations. The interpretation of the space for States to regulate is open to criticism as being too 
narrow from some perspectives, as is discussed further below. However, the nature of adjudication in 
the trade regime changes this completely.390 The fact that it is more clearly understood, from the 
jurisprudence of the WTO, where the boundaries of regulatory space are, allows a more fair assessment 
of the extent to which States may currently regulate, and provides greater clarity for States when 
formulating their regulatory responses to social problems. Future regulations will have to be assessed 
in accord with the same interpretations and the same standards as set out above. There is at least 
consistency in the WTO regime. This stands in stark contrast to the current state of the investment 
regime, where the interpretations of each ad hoc tribunal are largely unknown and where, according 
to many, an accurate prediction of those interpretations is primarily based not on the law but on a 
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knowledge of the predilections of individual arbitrators.391 Effectively, at the moment, nothing like an 
equally accurate, albeit objectively rough, assessment can be made of the extent of regulatory space 
allowed by the investment regime. If ISDS is included in TTIP this goes to emphasise the great 
importance of reforming the dispute settlement process in keeping with the operation of legitimate 
courts. The comparative fogginess of the investment regime has an important consequence that is not 
often voiced as it should be; namely that there are a huge amount of consequences and problems that 
cannot yet be seen but certainly can be sensed, or unknown unknowns, in respect of investment, most 
likely far more than relate to trade. 
In conclusion, it would seem from the foregoing analysis that plain packaging of tobacco products in 
the case of Australia, and as such in the case of Ireland, are more likely to be allowed by the trade 
regime than not. Most tend to agree that a reasonable application and interpretation of the standards 
of WTO law would not bar this measure. This by no means is a certainty and in fact it is only the most 
likely outcome by a marginal degree. The language clearly exists for a restrictive interpretation that 
would bar the measure.  
The analysis above gives rise to serious concern. Australia has a particularly strong case for allowing 
plain packaging legislation, a case that on the whole will not be representative. It is not difficult to 
imagine alternative measures that State’s would wish to employ to protect and promote public health 
that would not fare so well under the trade regime, but which would nevertheless be equally legitimate 
and perhaps even more beneficial given that smoking is now in significant decline. One may think of 
plain packaging for chocolate products or soft drinks for example. Anti-smoking is in a sense in fashion, 
and the Australian measures benefit from a large backlog of scientific evidence that has attracted a 
great deal of funding and a long track record of progressive and aggressive regulation, not to mention 
an international Framework Convention. It is difficult to think of a health issue that reaches this level of 
validation from both scientists and the international community, and adequate funding is not always 
available to discover the evidence relating to important health issues that are not so fashionable.  
In addition, plain packaging benefits greatly from being non-discriminatory. States will often need to 
regulate in a discriminatory manner in order to adequately defend the public interest. These measures 
will be far harder to defend against trade rules.  
It would therefore be prudent to consider ways of creating greater flexibility in the trade regime to 
better accommodate public health measures that are not prima facie ‘meritorious’ to this degree but 
are nonetheless highly important.  
All of the Member States of the WTO have recognised the need for greater flexibility and have 
formalised this acknowledgement in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. This is a 
significant step in the right direction, taken by consensus. Consideration should be given to taking the 
next obvious steps. The Declaration should be broadened to apply to the entire trade regime beginning 
with its extension to all of the WTO agreements and texts. The most effective way of doing this would 
be to incorporate the principles of the Declaration directly into the general exceptions clauses and make 
provision for their application to all agreements as a safeguard. The Declaration should also be applied 
to all other free trade agreements, existing and planned. The EU and the US could consider 
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incorporating the principles of the Declaration into a self-standing clause that would apply to the whole 
of TTIP, both the trade section and any prospective investment section.  
Failing this, further flexibility for the right to regulate would be achieved by amending the language of 
the exceptions clauses to lower the standard of necessity currently required for measures in the public 
interest to qualify as legitimately restrictive of trade. This follows the reasoning outlined above in 
relation to exceptions clauses in the investment context. The assessment of the plain packaging case 
illustrates that the highest barrier to overcome is the requirement of necessity, and that even in such a 
clear-cut case as this, from the viewpoint of public health and human rights at least, there is still no 
certainty that it will be overcome. This does not auger well for the future ability of States to regulate in 
the public interest and protect human rights, especially where, for whatever reason, desirable and 
publically demanded measures may not be taken due to this high standard and perhaps also due to a 
lack of available ‘proof’ of the contribution of the measure to the public aim. Consideration should 
therefore be given to the removal of the phrase ‘necessary for’ in exceptions clauses, and its 
replacement by a phrase such as ‘related to’ or ‘reasonably understood as required for’.  
From the perspective of the EU in particular, it would be sensible to seek a general exception clause 
that specifically excludes measures related to tobacco control in alignment with the FCTC from the 
scope of the whole agreement.  
 
4.2 – Intellectual Property Rights 
 
On intellectual property rights, the EU’s negotiating mandate states that: 
The Agreement will reflect the high value placed by both Parties on intellectual property … The 
negotiations shall aim to provide for enhanced protection … in a manner that complements and 
builds upon the TRIPS.392 
The references to enhancement and an approach that ‘builds upon’ TRIPS clearly evinces an intent to 
expand the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) under TTIP, which will be of major benefit to 
the pharmaceutical industry in both the US and the EU. This industry is viewed as highly important to 
the economy on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet the push for so-called ‘TRIPS-plus’ provisions in TTIP is 
highly controversial.393 An expansion of IPR protection will also have effects on the price and availability 
of medicines, the quality of health care and food and health security, among other social effects of 
major concern to the public and civil society.394 The IPR aspect of TTIP is also of particular importance 
to Ireland as the pharmaceutical sector accounts for a large part of the Irish economy and is dominated 
by foreign and US corporations. Ireland is one of the major hosts for the pharmaceutical industry in 
Europe, with around 120 pharmaceutical multinationals operating in the country including 9 out of 10 
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of the largest in the world. The industry employs more than 24,500 people and is the largest net 
exporter of pharmaceuticals in the EU, accounting for more than 50% of all Irish exports.395 The 
importance of the industry to Ireland can hardly be exaggerated and the corresponding pressure on 
the Irish government to accommodate the industry must be significant. The same would no doubt hold 
true for the European Commission due to the fact that the industry employs around 700,000 people 
Europe-wide.396  
Issues of public health and IPRs have traditionally been approached from the perspective of developing 
countries, particularly with regard to the ability of poor people in these countries to access life-saving 
medicines.397 IPRs allow pharmaceutical companies, mostly from developed countries, to prevent 
copies of their drugs and medicines, otherwise known as ‘generics’, from being produced within certain 
timeframes. This creates a de facto monopoly held by these corporations over a particular medicine 
that may be vital to human health. Due to this monopoly power such companies often set high prices 
to take advantage of the situation, to the clear detriment of public access and broadly beneficial health 
outcomes, which become concentrated in the wealthy tier of society. This polarises society and 
exacerbates inequality in living standards and access to healthcare, with all of the consequent negative 
effects on social cohesion, democracy, human rights, crime levels and political stability. While this has 
traditionally been seen as a developing country problem, the effects of recession and ever more 
progressive cuts to social welfare, social services and benefits schemes in the developed world have 
resulted in a declining ability for average people in the North to afford appropriate health care and the 
products this often depends on.398 As such, adaptations to the TRIPS system of rules in 2001 and 2005, 
which were initially made primarily with developing countries in mind, are now becoming increasingly 
important to ordinary people in the EU and the US.399  
The TRIPS system itself is strongly viewed in the literature as deficient,400 representing an unfair balance 
between the interests of pharmaceutical and other corporations and the value of public health,401 and 
deeply at odds with the realisation and protection of human rights.402 Access to medicines is irrevocably 
linked to the right to health. The United Nations Human Rights Council has stated that 
medicine is one of the fundamental elements in achieving progressively the full realization of the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health … [and it is] the responsibility of States to ensure access to all, without discrimination, of 
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medicines, in particular essential medicines, that are affordable, safe, effective and of good 
quality.403 
The Council called on States “to take steps … to ensure … that the application of international 
agreements is supportive of public health policies that promote broad access to safe, effective and 
affordable medicines”.404 
This statement has direct application to TTIP, in that the agreement should not jeopardise access to 
affordable medicines by increasing the current levels of IPR protections without clearly adequate 
safeguards, which would result in a deterioration of the right to health for the populations of the US 
and the EU. In addition, government negotiators should attend to measures they could take to in fact 
increase access to medicines by remedying the deficiencies of the TRIPS agreement where possible and 
strengthening existing flexibilities related to that agreement, as a matter both of straightforward 
responsibility to their people and of international human rights law. The European Parliament has 
echoed these sentiments by calling on the European Council 
to support the idea that the mechanism created by the WTO Decision and the Protocol to the 
TRIPS Agreement represents just a part of the solution to the problem of access to medicines 
and public health and that other measures to improve health care and infrastructure are equally 
indispensable.405 
While States in the North have had the finances and the will to shield their populations from the worst 
effects of the TRIPS system, through government subsidies, benefits schemes and properly funded 
public health care systems, TRIPS and IPR has not caused any major public concern. However, in the 
current economic and political environment the TRIPS system is becoming increasingly problematic in 
the developed world. There have been impressive advances in medical technology, however the 
exorbitant prices of many available medicines and treatments are now out of reach for the vast majority 
of middle-class people in developed countries. For example, the imbalance of the IPR regime is primarily 
responsible for the fact that in 2014 a new drug called sofosbuvir (Sovaldi), which treats hepatitis C, 
costed US$ 84,000 for a 12 week course or UD$ 1,000 per pill. Yet “there are 170 million people living 
with hepatitis C worldwide, and around 350,000 deaths every year.”406 In the first 3 months of 2014 the 
company made sales of US$ 2.27 billion.407 Such high prices and profits are not justified by production 
costs. Furthermore, arguments from pharmaceutical companies that such high costs are necessary for 
them to recoup the expenses of research and development are undermined by the fact that often a 
large percentage of the expenses for research and development are indirectly subsidised by 
governments or otherwise funded by direct contribution from public budgets.408 Nobel laureate in 
economics, Joseph Stiglitz, and many other economists argue that patent monopolies are economically 
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inefficient and stifle innovation, in contradiction to the central principle that justifies the present IPR 
regime.409  
Public budgets in the peripheral Member States of the EU, including Spain, Portugal and Greece, but 
also Ireland, are now under significant strain and are increasingly unable to support the burden of 
expensive new medicines. One study has found that public expenditure on pharmaceuticals increased 
on average by 76% over the EU as a whole between 2000 and 2009.410 This situation is exacerbated by 
the ageing population and the global recession. Another study performed by the European Commission 
into the pharmaceutical sector in 2009 noted that “public budgets, including those dedicated to cover 
health expenditure, are under significant constraints. Competition, in particular competition provided 
by generic medicines, is essential to keep public budgets under control and to maintain widespread 
access to medicines to the benefit of consumers/patients.”411 The study found that companies routinely 
abused the intellectual property rights system as it stands by delaying the entry of generic medicines 
on the market by significant periods, costing the public billions of euros. It concluded that there was an 
unjust balance between guarantees for affordable health products in the EU and incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies, in favour of the latter.  
In this context, given that the baseline operation of the WTO TRIPS agreement is beginning to cause 
serious concern as it is, the efforts of the EU and the US to strengthen IPRs and to extend them in new 
directions, further impinging on public health outcomes in the absence of adequate mitigation devices, 
evidently worsens the situation and raises the stakes for public health dangerously. In addition, such a 
result in the final version of TTIP would be contrary to international human rights law.  
The European Parliament has on numerous occasions passed resolutions demanding that the 
Commission not include provisions in trade agreements going further than the level of IPR protection 
in TRIPS. In 2007 a resolution was adopted within the context of EU trade agreements with developing 
countries urging the European Council to observe the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and 
“restrict the Commission's mandate so as to prevent it from negotiating pharmaceutical-related TRIPS-
plus provisions affecting public health and access to medicines, such as data exclusivity, patent 
extensions and limitation of grounds of compulsory licences”.412 In relation to the EU-ASEAN trade 
agreement the Parliament referred back to these statements and pointed out that 
nothing in the agreement should create legal or practical obstacles to the maximum use of 
flexibilities set out in the Declaration amending the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS agreement) and access to medicines and calls on the 
Commission negotiators to take full account of the points set out in its above mentioned 
resolution of 12 July 2007 on this topic.413 
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The Parliament has repeated these statements within resolutions on the EU-India free trade 
agreement414 and the new trade policy for Europe under the Europe 2020 strategy.415 It has 
furthermore rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement negotiated between the EU, the US, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Switzerland, 
partially on the basis that the TRIPS-plus provisions in the agreement constituted “possible 
interruptions in the supply of generic medicines.”416  
This should be a strong warning to TTIP negotiators that a final agreement will be closely scrutinised by 
a body unafraid of rejecting dangerous moves to increase the protection of IPRs in the EU’s trade 
agreements. The European Parliament also reiterates that “trade policy is not an end in itself” and 
reminds “all stakeholders that a modern trade policy is required to take into account other policy areas 
such as: a) human rights, b) securing and creation of jobs, c) labour rights and ILO core labour standards, 
d) corporate social responsibility, …..”417 The intended prominence of human rights in the trade agenda 
according to a democratic mandate is clear.  
Nevertheless, some agreements have slipped through. Previous TRIPS-plus provisions in trade 
agreements negotiated by the US and the EU have included efforts to lengthen the period of patent 
protection for new medicines. For example, Annex V, Article 3 of the EU–Macedonia FTA mandates 25 
years of pharmaceutical patent protection in comparison to the 20 years mandated by TRIPS.418 In 
addition, the EU-Morocco agreement extends industrial patents to 15 years compared to the TRIPS’ 10 
years.419 The US–Bahrain FTA explicitly commits both parties to provide protection for patents on 
plants, which is an expressly allowable exception under TRIPS. There have also been provisions linking 
pricing and reimbursement decisions to the market value of patented pharmaceuticals (e.g. US-South 
Korea FTA and EU-South Korea FTA), thereby increasing obstacles for public access to clinical trial data. 
There have been moves to give companies more power to intervene in government decision-making, 
and there has of course been the inclusion of investment protections and ISDS, an indirect if 
nevertheless highly effective limitation on the flexibilities of TRIPS thorough protection of IPRs within 
the meaning of ‘investment’. In addition, provisions in some agreements have sought to wind back the 
flexibilities in TRIPS allowing for compulsory licensing,420 by locking in ‘voluntary’ commitments to 
effectively alter relevant domestic laws thereby limiting the effectiveness of the flexibilities.     
Some provisions will act to reduce democratic control over decisions whether or not to compensate 
companies for delays in the granting of marketing authorisation by locking in regulations that  award 
‘supplementary patent certificates’ that compensate by extending the term of the patent. Provisions 
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on ‘patent linkage’ seek to delay the entry of generic medicines on the market by tying the approval 
process for the generic to the prior ‘status’ of the original medicine. Other provisions allow for the 
extended secrecy of clinical data beyond the term of the patent, which means that generic 
manufacturers cannot have access to information vital to the application for a license. As a result, the 
original company maintains an effective monopoly for the duration of the ban on public access to the 
data, unless the generic manufacturer performs its own clinical trials, which is both costly and time 
consuming. Yet further provisions may interfere with the decisions that governments in the EU often 
make in straightened economic times to limit the prices of certain medicines that have a low cost-
benefit ratio, or to control the rates of reimbursement for their purchase or even to directly cut prices 
in some cases. The US has historically sought to ensure limits on government price controls in its trade 
negotiations. There are also requests from the pharmaceutical industry to allow companies a ‘voice’ in 
such government decisions through the imposition of ‘procedural safeguards’ that would involve 
mandatory consultation with the industry. And even calls for provisions allowing companies to directly 
challenge government pricing and reimbursement decisions in the courts. If accepted, these provisions 
could seriously hamper the ability of the Member States to ensure public health and manage their 
finances.  
The impact of lengthened patent terms and the protection of clinical trial data can add up to 11 years 
to the monopolies that pharmaceutical companies already enjoy,421 greatly extending profit-making 
opportunities and equally reducing public budgets. Rules denying public access to clinical trial data can 
even create a de facto monopoly even in the absence of a valid patent. The financial consequences of 
TRIPS-plus provisions are clearly quite large. Extending patent terms and protecting clinical data in the 
EU-Colombia-Peru free trade agreement may cost Colombia alone up to US$ 620 million by 2030.422 
Protected data in the US-Jordan FTA has been estimated to have cost between USD$ 6 million and UDS$ 
22 million over the period 2002-2006.423 A closer comparison is provided by a study on the effects of 
IPR provisions in CETA, which were found to be likely to comprise an additional 15% drain on the 
Canadian government’s budget for medicines.424 However, it should be noted that the price of generic 
medicines is generally higher in Canada than the EU.425 Aside from the financial cost, the protection of 
clinical data has been found to risk the underestimation of harms associated with potential medicines 
and to interfere with the safe conduct of rational evidence-based research techniques, with obviously 
negative health consequences.426  
In this context, where trade agreements as reciprocal commitment devices that also tie the hands of 
EU Member States with respect to their ability to protect public health, The European Parliament is 
evidently worried, not only for the negative effects on the people of developing countries but also for 
Europeans. As such, The Parliament has requested the Council 
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to adopt a Joint Policy Statement with Parliament to the effect that the Member States remain 
free to use all exceptions from the TRIPS Agreement under their domestic patent laws to 
authorise production and export "to address public health needs in importing Members" and 
asks the Council to ensure that the Commission refrains from taking action to interfere with these 
proceedings.427  
The ‘action’ referred to would clearly encompass the conclusion of further international agreements 
containing TRIPS-plus provisions.  
As is clear, these provisions may take a large variety of forms. The notion of TRIPS-plus has been 
described as “is an evolving concept and has proven to be case- and country-specific.”428 It is therefore 
difficult to make distinct recommendations along a theme that advises the non-inclusion of provisions 
expanding the range of the intellectual property regime. Little of concrete substance can be said in the 
absence of a specific text to analyse. However, on the basis of previous TRIPS-plus provisions in other 
agreements and the known requests of the pharmaceutical industry regarding TTIP a few suggestions 
can be made.  
The direction of change should logically be in the direction of greater restrictions on IPRs, earlier 
licensing for generic manufacturers, shorter patents, and an alternative research and development 
model that better acknowledges the public stake in the financing already both directly and indirectly 
provided for in R&D, and moves towards greater public financing with more patents being publically 
owned such that their proceeds may be recycled into health and other common goods. In the face of 
the fact that the US and the EU are the leading proponents of TRIPS-plus however, these rational 
proposals begin to look like a little like a wishlist, as they represent a complete about-face in respect to 
current US and EU policy. In addition, this change of direction would clearly require a new mandate for 
the European Commission, as it could not take this direction and continue to negotiate in good faith.  
In light of this the next level of recommendation is to exclude the section on intellectual property from 
the agreement and further negotiations on the grounds that by nature, and given the Commission’s 
mandate, it will raise the level of IPR protection above that which currently applies and that is already 
posing serious health and other risks. Such a result would seem to go against the wishes of the European 
Parliament. Therefore an exclusion of the IPR chapter may in this way save the broader agreement, 
which would otherwise be in serious jeopardy if placed in front of a Parliament that only has the power 
to accept or reject the agreement in whole. This is the same argument as can be made with respect to 
ISDS, and is indeed made by many, including the Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the 
highly conservative Cato Institute.429 It is argued even by TTIP supporters that, similar to the issue of 
domestic courts, the levels of IPR protection at the domestic level in the EU and US are already so high 
that further international legislation would achieve very little, other than threaten advances in far more 
beneficial areas. In fact, according to one US Congressional Research report there is an ongoing debate 
over exclusion of the IPR chapter at the highest levels in the US.430  
                                                          
427 European Parliament, Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines, (P6_TA(2007)0353), 
para 10.  
428 Mohammed El Said, Public Health Related TRIPS-plus Provisions in Bilateral Trade Agreements: A Policy Guide for 
Negotiators and Implementers in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region (World Health Organization and International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2010), p. 94.  
429 Daniel Ikenson, ‘A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, 
Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Free Trade Bulletin, No. 57, 4 March 2014.  
430 Shayera Akhtar and Vivian Jones, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations’, Congressional 
Research Service, 2014.  
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Failing this, it is suggested that in the interests of their people’s health and access to medicines, among 
other risks, the parties should seek to limit any developments in the IPR regime within TTIP to a level as 
closely aligned with the standards of TRIPS as possible. This would mean an exclusion of most of the 
TRIPS-plus provisions referred to above and many others as yet unidentified. The considerations here 
also reinforce the exclusion of ISDS from any investment chapter as it is as yet unknown how far 
tribunals will interpret the rights of intellectual property holders under investment standards, but it is 
almost certain that these interpretations would equate to a standard of protection significantly higher 
than that of the TRIPS agreement. Alternatively, IPRs should be excluded from the meaning of 
‘investment’.  
Finally, there should be more flexibility built into the agreement for government regulation in the public 
interest through the same measures as expressed above relating to the case of plain packaging and 
TRIPS. This would better ensure that any increased threat to public health inherent in the provisions of 
the IPR section will be more easily mitigated, even if it cannot be removed.  
These are general recommendations and it will be necessary for the European Parliament and all 
concerned sections of civil society to pay very close attention to the final section on IPR at the 
conclusion of negotiations to give them substance. In particular, there should be particular care taken 
to protect the recent moves by the EU to increase public access to clinical trial data through a regulation 
adopted by the European Parliament in 2013.431 This regulation in particular should not be subject to 
change under any moves towards regulatory ‘harmonisation’ in TTIP. As stated by the European Generic 
Medicines Association with respect to clinical trial data; “in the light of the different historical 
circumstances and intentions behind the respective intellectual property/data protection rights, we 
strongly recommend not to attempt creating harmonisation in this area, but to recognise the different 
approaches between the parties.”432 This is a live issue, as according to a recent document outlining 
the EU’s approach to pharmaceuticals both parties are seeking the “[h]armonisation of requirements 
for the authorisation of biosimilars”,433 otherwise known as generics.  
 
4.3 – Technical Barriers to Trade (Non-Tariff Barriers) – Regulatory Harmonisation 
 
Very closely linked to the issues swirling in relation to intellectual property is the question of regulatory 
convergence, cooperation and harmonisation in TTIP, which is widely viewed as one of the most central 
to the negotiations. Where past trade negotiations were focussed almost entirely on issues of freeing 
trade by lowering or eliminating actual tariffs or straightforward financial barriers to trade, we now live 
in a world where most tariffs have already been effectively removed, especially with respect to trade 
between developed countries. With tariffs largely gone, attention has shifted more and more towards 
technical barriers to trade. This category of trade offensive barriers is potentially extremely large, and 
is not clearly defined, however, as they are the chief source of frustration for business, regulations and 
regulatory procedures are currently the focus.  
                                                          
431 European Parliament, Legislative resolution of 2 April 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC (COM(2012)0369 
– C7-0194/2012 – 2012/0192(COD)) (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading), (P7_TA(2014)0273). The regulation 
provides for access to previously ‘commercially confidential’ information on clinical studies and requires pharmaceutical 
companies to release their trial data.   
432 European Generic Medicines Association, ‘Position Paper: EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’, EGMA, 
6 May 2013, pp, 12-13.  
433 European Commission, ‘Towards an EU-US trade deal: Making trade work for you - The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) Regulatory Issues - EU position on pharmaceutical products’, 14 May 2014, para 2.3.  
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Differences in these regulations between countries are also known as non-tariff barriers, or NTBs. Trade 
negotiations now centre on eliminating or minimising regulations and regulatory divergence as the 
principle obstruction to increased trade and investment, measures that should therefore be altered, 
removed or harmonised in order to facilitate economic growth.  
 
4.3(a) – The EU Negotiation Mandate 
 
The EU and US have placed regulatory harmonisation at the centre of TTIP, seeking to create 
institutions, rules and processes that are intended to identify and minimise differences in regulatory 
practices, and to cooperatively vet future regulations. The EU’s negotiating mandate on regulatory 
harmonisation is lengthy in comparison to other sections, and states the following: 
The Agreement will aim at removing unnecessary obstacles to trade and investment … through 
effective and efficient mechanisms, by reaching an ambitious level of regulatory compatibility for 
goods and services, including through mutual recognition, harmonisation and through enhanced 
cooperation between regulators. Regulatory compatibility shall be without prejudice to the right 
to regulate in accordance with the level of health, safety, consumer, labour and environmental 
protection and cultural diversity that each side deems appropriate, or otherwise meeting 
legitimate regulatory objectives.434 
Together with the US, the EU seeks to ensure what seems to be an equivalent level of risk assessment 
in the process of regulatory framing, that is to be science-based, following the US model, but which 
recognises “the right for the Parties to appraise and manage risk in accordance with the level of 
protection that each side deems appropriate, in particular when relevant scientific evidence is 
insufficient”, in deference to the EU’s precautionary principle.435 However, the EU approach is to be 
“applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and developed 
in a transparent manner, without undue delay.” The use of the word ‘necessary’ again, as with the 
exceptions clauses of GATTT and GATS, implies an intention to impose highly restrictive conditions on 
the exercise of the precautionary principle,436 and the EU concession to commit to the elimination of 
‘undue delay’ is worrying to the extent that accurate knowledge generation for informed decisions 
often takes a long time. The precautionary principle is enshrined in EU law and cannot be overridden 
by TTIP, however TTIP can certainly place external legal and practical constraints on its factual use.  
According to the EU mandate, “pharmaceuticals and other health industries” are expressly included in 
the scope of regulatory harmonisation, which is intended to ensure “the removal of existing NTBs” and 
                                                          
434 Council of the European Union, ‘Directives for the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the European Union and the United States’, Brussels, 11103/13, 17 June 2013, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.  
435 This principle allows regulators to take action in situations of risk to public health or other common goods where insufficient 
scientific evidence exists to definitively prove causation or negative effects. This allows for regulatory action before the effects 
become fully apparent or obvious. Decisions taken in accord with the precautionary principle are not permanent but are in 
force only until sufficient scientific evidence has been found on which to base a clearly justified permanent position. Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, ‘Precaution, Proportionality, and Cost/Benefit Analysis: False Analogies’ 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation 
2 (2013). 
436 Rene von Schomberg, ‘The Precautionary Principle: Its Use Within Hard and Soft Law’ 3 European Journal of Risk Regulation 
(2012). For a concise overview of the debate between proponents of the cost-benefit US style and the precautionary EU 
approach see, David Driesen, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can they be Reconciled?’ Michigan State 
Law Review (2013), pp. 771-772. The article itself argues that they can be reconciled within an overall cost-benefit approach. 
The author advocates that cost-benefit analysis be made precautionary through adjusted (more pessimistic) assumptions in 
the foundation of the analysis.  
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prevent “the adoption of new NTBs.” It is aimed to “establish a mechanism for improved dialogue and 
cooperation” that would seek “to reduce redundant and burdensome testing and certification 
requirements, promote confidence in our respective conformity assessment bodies, and enhance 
cooperation on conformity assessment and standardisation issues globally.” 
The intention is also to create an institution forming a permanent body tasked with “identifying 
opportunities and for guiding further work on regulatory issues”. In addition, the agreement will put in 
place rules on “regulatory coherence and transparency for the development and implementation of 
efficient, cost-effective, and more compatible regulations for goods and services, including early 
consultations on significant regulations, use of impact assessments, evaluations, periodic review of 
existing regulatory measures, and application of good regulatory practices.”  
These are very ambitious goals with very extensive ramifications. Finally, the agreement “shall be 
binding on all regulators and other competent authorities of both Parties.” 
 
 
4.3(b) – The Draft Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation  
 
The European Commission has recently released a textual proposal for the chapter on regulatory 
cooperation in TTIP,437 together with a detailed explanation.438 The ideal is to turn TTIP into a ‘living 
instrument’ that will establish mechanisms and institutions for the further development of the 
principles established through the expansion and development of its scope well into the future. Besides 
the possible extension of ISDS, this is this single aspect that has the most power to reshape the future 
of both Europe and the US. Through the deep integration of the principles of the agreement into the 
process of government regulation itself, as foreseen in these documents, the regulatory cooperation 
chapter will arguably have more significant but less visible effects on economies and societies than ISDS, 
as the latter is increasingly in the spotlight and operates clearly outside the normal democratic process 
and the day-to-day running of governments.  
In contrast, the key innovation of the regulatory cooperation chapter is the establishment of a 
Regulatory Cooperation Body “in order to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the provisions 
set out” in the chapter and in other, as yet unspecified, sections of the agreement.439 This essentially 
sets up a soft enforcement or supervisory body for the agreement,440 which, although limited in title to 
‘regulatory cooperation’ and nominally to the provisions of that chapter, will also have power to enforce 
other commitments under the agreement. This is important. Although this Body would not have any 
legal power to enforce the agreement through concrete sanction or penalty, it will presumably be given 
powers to execute its functions to ‘monitor’ and ‘facilitate’ the implementation of the agreement, and 
is by design situated within the regulatory processes of governments.  
                                                          
437 European Commission, ‘TTIP - Initial Provisions for CHAPTER [ ] -Regulatory Cooperation’, EU Commission’s proposal on 
regulatory cooperation submitted during the 9th round of TTIP negotiations, made public on 4 May 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf.  
438 European Commission, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation - 
Detailed Explanation on the EU proposal for a Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation’ (as per revised version made public on 4 
May 2015), 6 May 2015.  
439 European Commission, ‘TTIP - Initial Provisions for CHAPTER [ ] -Regulatory Cooperation’, EU Commission’s proposal on 
regulatory cooperation submitted during the 9th round of TTIP negotiations, made public on 4 May 2015, Article 14(1), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf. 
440  Article 14(2)(c); “The RCB will not have the power to adopt legal acts”.  
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The specific functions of this institution would be to decide on what should comprise its Annual 
Regulatory Cooperation Programme, which is detailed to the level of envisaging follow-up to past 
commitments and evaluating the steps taken towards their fulfilment, those envisaged in the future 
and the timeframes for regulatory change.441 This should be understood as a very intrusive advance 
into the formulation of government regulation. The institution will monitor and report on progress 
made in regulatory convergence to the Joint Ministerial Body. It is charged with considering new 
initiatives for regulatory harmonisation and with the preparation of joint initiatives to develop new 
international rules on government regulation that would factor into proposals for new treaties in this 
area. The institution is also given an open mandate in the sense that it may address any issue related 
to regulatory cooperation that a Party brings to its attention. Transparency is provided for by making 
the agenda and the minutes of meetings of the Body public.  
The participation of stakeholders is limited to an annual event, which will be coordinated through “Civil 
Society Contact Groups, including a balanced representation of business, consumers, trade unions, 
environmental groups and other relevant public interest associations”.442 It will not be necessary for 
participants to demonstrate that they are directly affected by the issues at hand. The exact mechanics 
for outside participation are not further specified, beyond a note that the RCB will receive “concrete 
suggestions” from stakeholders “for further regulatory co-operation between the Parties”, which will 
be “given careful consideration by the relevant sectoral working group that shall present 
recommendations to the RCB.”443 A reply in writing will be provided without undue delay”, and these 
replies will be published in the Annual Regulatory Cooperation Programme.  
Besides whatever other parts of TTIP may be brought into the scope of this institution, it will administer 
rules on regulations with respect to goods and services that have a significant impact on international 
trade and investment. The Parties will have to make early provision of information on planned acts of 
regulation, as well as the process of impact assessment applying to the ongoing development of 
regulations, the timing of their adoption and planned stakeholder engagements.444  
The text mandates stakeholder consultations that must be open to “any interested natural or legal 
person”, with no qualification. The idea is that consultations would not be limited to citizens but must 
take into account the view of those in the other country or region. This is a very significant widening of 
usual stakeholder consultations, and is not to be opposed on principle. However, it will add a very 
significant extra burden to the present regulatory process in terms of time and cost. It will also be very 
highly biased in favour of those stakeholders who are financed sufficiently and are structured in such a 
way as to be able to take advantage of cross-Atlantic participatory mechanisms. Obviously, 
multinational corporations with subsidiaries in the EU and the US fit this description precisely. Diverse, 
underfunded and often highly localised civil society actors are thereby structurally disadvantaged from 
the start.  
Impact assessments are given a certain flexibility, as they are to be carried out in accordance with each 
Party’s own “respective rules and procedures”. It is mandated that these impact assessments must 
“take account of the regulatory approaches of the other Party”, as well as the impact on international 
trade and investment.445 A bilateral cooperation mechanism is to be established for the facilitation of 
                                                          
441 Article 14(2)(a).  
442 Article 15(2).  
443 Article 15(3).  
444 Article 5.  
445 Article 7(2)(b) and (c).  
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knowledge exchange between the Parties and “to seek increased compatibility between their 
respective regulatory frameworks, where appropriate.”446 
Of interest is that fact that the text envisages the establishment of “an exchange on planned or existing 
regulatory acts”.447 This would sound quite innocuous until the text is read closely, which would imply, 
by stating that when one Party makes a request the other Party “shall enter into” such an exchange, 
that if a request is made there is no room for the opposite Party to refuse. Typically, the word ‘shall’ in 
legal texts connotes a mandatory obligation. This analysis displays a sleight-of-hand in the statement 
by the Commission that  
[a]s regards cooperation on regulatory acts adopted by an EU Member State or a US State, Article 
11 of the EU proposal ('Information and Regulatory Exchanges on regulatory acts at non-central 
level') provides for voluntary cooperation based on common interest.448 
Article 11 applies only to government bodies at the non-central level, which means the state level in 
the US and the Member State level in the EU, and says: 
If one Party makes a request to engage in a regulatory exchange on specific planned or existing 
regulatory acts at non-central level, the requested Party will take steps to accommodate such a 
regulatory exchange.17 The regulators and competent authorities at non-central level concerned 
will determine their interest in entering into a regulatory exchange. 
The language would suggest an obligation through use of the word ‘will’. This is confirmed by footnote 
17, which states that “The US Party, upon receipt of a request, shall solicit the responsible regulators 
and competent authorities at non-central level to engage in regulatory exchanges”. ‘Shall solicit’ would 
imply that an obligation is at issue. However, the last sentence in Article 11 suggests that an exchange 
is voluntary. Therefore Article 11 is at best ambiguous and possibly internally contradictory. In any 
event, Article 9(3), which applies at the central level (at the levels of the EU and US federal government), 
and which the Commission does not discuss in its detailed explanation, uses clearly mandatory language 
as described above. If the Commission does not intend exchanges to be interpreted as mandatory upon 
request it should attend more closely to the language in Articles 9 and 11. Confusion would be avoided, 
and the Commission’s statement that only “voluntary cooperation” is envisaged would be clarified, if, 
in both articles, the words ‘will’ and ‘shall’ were replaced by ‘may’.  
These ‘exchanges’ have further legal significance in the Commission’s text. For example; “The Parties 
shall participate constructively in regulatory exchanges”.449 Again, shall is mandatory. Furthermore, “a 
Party shall provide to the other Party, if the other Party so requests, complementary available 
information related to the planned regulatory acts under discussion.” In addition, “[e]ach point of 
substance raised by one Party shall be addressed and answered by the other Party.” Finally; “When a 
regulatory exchange on a planned or existing regulatory act … is requested … it shall start promptly.”450  
                                                          
446 Article 8(1).  
447 Article 9(3); “Upon the request of a Party made via the respective Focal Points, the Parties shall enter into an exchange on 
planned or existing regulatory acts at central level.” 
448 European Commission, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation - 
Detailed Explanation on the EU proposal for a Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation’ (as per revised version made public on 4 
May 2015), 6 May 2015, p. 7 (emphasis in original).  
449 Article 9(5) (emphasis added).  
450 Article 10(1).  
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It is provided for that all of these extra mandatory measures “shall not prejudice the right to regulate 
in a timely manner”.451 In relation to this point the preamble provides the following:  
The provisions of this Chapter do not restrict the right of each Party to maintain, adopt and apply 
measures to achieve legitimate public policy objectives, such as those mentioned in paragraph 
1, at the level of protection that it considers appropriate, in accordance with its regulatory 
framework and principles.452 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a high risk that in fact they could prejudice the right to regulate in 
a timely manner.453 Again, it must be emphasised that the document as a whole treats the right to 
regulate is an exception. Despite formal reiteration it may be factually eroded through significant delays 
that would be very easy for a Party to cause through numerous requests for information that may not 
in fact be relevant but must be provided, through raising numerous ‘points of substance’ that must be 
answered, and through the requirement that Parties must participate constructively, which would not 
appear to be met if regulation was legislated while requests for information and points of substance 
from the other Party were pending. There is little doubt that powerful and well-resourced 
multinationals could utilise this process either informally through influence over relevant organs of the 
State Parties or even blatantly in a form of diplomatic protection.454  
 
4.3(c) – Analysis 
 
Both the mandate and the Commission’s proposals are obviously extremely broad and they set out a 
worrying understanding that regulations are almost automatically a bad thing, restricting markets, 
complicating the trade, investment and business process, and adding to the overheads of employers 
and corporations who argue that this amounts to wasted finances that would otherwise allow them to 
employ more people. In this context, the State’s right to regulate could easily be seen to have gotten 
lost in passive language in the EU’s mandate. The active language is all reserved for the fight against 
costly regulations. NTBs must be ‘removed’ and their future adoption ‘prevented’. However, the vast 
majority of regulations that could easily be understood as NTBs are there for good reasons, to 
compensate for what economists call ‘market failures’. Many of them are related to the protection of 
public health and safety, or to ensure provision of goods and services not valued by the market, and 
many are also essential to our standard of life.  
In fact quite a few of our regulations have evolved in response to long and arduous civil campaigns and 
legislative debates. So, regulations have costs and benefits, and regular research by the US Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs definitively demonstrates that the benefits of modern regulation far 
outweigh the costs, by an average factor of 6.455 Yet with regard to regulations, often one person’s 
                                                          
451 Article 10(3).  
452 Article 1(2).  
453 The authors maintain this conclusion of likelihood despite the Commission’s clear statement that “according to Article 1 
paragraph 3 -in combination with Article 12 paragraph 3 -any regulatory exchanges shall not prejudice the right to regulate in 
a timely manner in accordance with deadlines under domestic law. Neither side would be required to suspend or delay its 
respective regulatory processes.” European Commission, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Chapter on 
Regulatory Cooperation - Detailed Explanation on the EU proposal for a Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation’ (as per revised 
version made public on 4 May 2015), 6 May 2015, p. 10.  
454 Jennifer Sass and Daniel Rosenberg, ‘The Delay Game: How the Chemical Industry Ducks Regulation of the Most Toxic 
Substances’, National Resources Defense Council, October 2011. 
455 See further on the relative costs and benefits of regulation, Frank Akerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the 
Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (WW Norton, New York, 2004); Frank Akerman, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of 
Regulatory Costs’, Global Development and Environment Institute, Working Paper No. 06-02, Tufts University, February 2006.  
 136 
 
obstacle to free trade and investment is another’s protection from precisely the same thing. The foreign 
owner of a chain of private hospitals may view a set of regulations as onerous or hampering economic 
opportunities and efficiency, while the local staff and patients may view the same regulations as vital 
to health and wellbeing. On the other hand many businesses support greater regulation to provide 
certainty under which they will not incur liability, or to standardise procedures such that less scrupulous 
competitors cannot gain economic benefits.  
Regulations exist at a critical point where common economic conceptions of efficiency and other social 
conceptions of efficiency and socio-economic justice come into direct contact, and can often collide. 
For good reason many believe that a technical framing of regulations and related procedures as well as 
a distancing of these issues from local and democratic control should therefore be resisted if not 
rejected on principle. If there is no principled rejection then this raises the question of how contact and 
collision is managed at this crucial juncture, and most importantly how average people can come as 
close as possible to being involved and informed in this management. TTIP is planned to set up a new 
regime of concepts, rules or ‘disciplines’ and institutions that will have a very large influence on this 
conjunctive environment, and many commentators would agree that 
[f]rom the information available so far, the workings of the TTIP institutions and the overriding 
legal force to be granted to them may well lead to the control of regulations being largely 
removed from effective democratic control. With an apparent likely core position for large 
businesses and their associations in these TTIP regulatory processes, and an incentive to push for 
regulating in their private interest, regulating in the broader public interest appears under threat. 
This in itself could be the most problematic outcome of the TTIP.456 
Current differences in regulation between the EU and US arise because of a range of factors, but 
importantly they include the different will of the majority of the respective populations. Nevertheless, 
businesses operating across the Atlantic must therefore simultaneously satisfy two sets of regulations 
some of which overlap in terms of their function, leading to opportunities for business to save on costs 
if these are harmonised. The general approach in TTIP has been a regular economic approach focusing 
on eliminating regulatory differences, duplication and financial costs. It has not, generally speaking, 
taken a social approach to regulation that would alternatively focus on the social benefits of regulatory 
behaviour. It can easily be seen how this approach may conflict with democratic ideals. Social aspects 
have been addressed in a ‘negative’ or ‘passive’ fashion, in the sense that the public interest and other 
social aims of regulation are to be considered or defended as best they can through existing 
mechanisms, relative to the positive and active force of negotiations to enhance cross-border economic 
activity and to institute new rules and institutions based on common economic rationales. The social is 
peripheral in comparison to the economic drive to lower financial costs for transatlantic business, which 
it is hoped will spur greater economic activity and growth. For negotiators under these structural 
conditions “the normative commitment to free trade and open markets will tend to shove other 
normative concerns to a secondary status – reinterpreting these as a “by-product” of the primary 
normative concern”.457 
The understandable preoccupation within a broad section of civil society is that such a logic will 
underpin the operation of any new regulatory institutions created under this general approach to TTIP, 
despite the regular assurances that the public interest and other social concerns will be adequately 
                                                          
456 Martin Mynant and Ronan O’Brien, ‘The TTIP’s Impact: Bringing in the Missing Issue’, European Trade Union Institute, 
Working Paper 2015.01, Brussels 2015, p. 6.  
457 Marija Bartl and Elaine Fahey, ‘A Postnational Marketplace: Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP)’, in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship 
between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014).  
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protected, ‘as they always have been’ under existing arrangements. The tale of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
above is precautionary in this respect. If the general approach does foundationally inform any new 
institution then there is a high probability that the social benefits of any given regulation will be 
underestimated or even ignored in the processes of risk assessment and risk management, crucial 
processes in the formulation and evaluation of any given regulation.458  
What is often lost in discussions of transatlantic regulatory harmonisation is that this very process will 
institute yet another new and additional regulatory regime, as there is no intention or possibility that 
this new regime could entirely replace those in existence in the EU and US, at least for the foreseeable 
future. On a very fundamental level then, the whole enterprise is somewhat contradictory. 
Furthermore, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a regulatory cooperation chapter as envisaged 
above “will result in adaptation of regulatory frameworks that apply in the US and the EU following 
procedures outside the normal democratic processes” and that “negotiating powers have been 
entrusted to non-elected officials, which imply a shift of legislative power from the elected to the non-
elected.”459 
Compatibility of regulations and regulatory approaches between the EU and the US is to be achieved in 
three ways. The first mode is thorough a harmonisation of standards and tests, which would apply to 
future regulations and methods. The other modes operate through the ‘recognition of equivalence’ 
between standards and the ‘mutual recognition’ of those pertaining in the jurisdictions of both parties, 
which apply mostly to present regulations and standards. In the absence of clear rules that 
‘harmonisation’ must be upward to the highest level currently established and ‘recognition’ must not 
impinge on the democratic choices of the people of each State to exclude or include goods or services 
according to the criteria they independently set, these methods of dealing with regulatory differences 
effectively put different regulatory preferences in competition with each other. Again, in the absence 
of such rules, this competition will occur under the rules of economic and market logic described, which 
accord no significant initial place in considerations to the social value of regulation. What may easily 
result is then a ‘race to the bottom’ as popularly phrased. But to be clear, this would not represent the 
bottom according to common economic criteria, but the top. It would only represent the bottom in 
terms of social criteria; the social criteria that TTIP attends to only in a negative or exceptional manner.   
While regulatory coherence is most often presented by the Commission and the supporters of TTIP as 
primarily, if not purely, a technical endeavour, seeking to adjust differences relating only to small and 
minor variations such as the colour of electrical wiring, due simply to the extremely broad nature of the 
subject matter this will often not be the case. Within one study identifying a range of regulatory 
differences between the EU and US there are many that are technical and reflect only formal 
differences between the two, like the example of electrical wiring and the duplication of paperwork.460 
However, there are also many that represent significant divergences that, if subsequently converged 
or harmonised, would have non-trivial effects on public health and welfare, particularly in the areas of 
chemicals, automobiles, food and beverages, pharmaceuticals, insurance services and transportation. 
                                                          
458 Martin Mynant and Ronan O’Brien, ‘The TTIP’s Impact: Bringing in the Missing Issue’, European Trade Union Institute, 
Working Paper 2015.01, Brussels 2015.  
459 Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, ‘Resolution on Regulatory Coherence in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
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There are very significant differences in the areas of food, beverages and chemicals,461 where 
regulations are far more lax in the US, which has led to a number of well publicised international 
disputes at the WTO over genetically modified organisms,462 the washing of poultry463 and beef 
hormones.464 These cases clearly underscore the levels of divergence in understandings of scientific 
evidence, scientifically proven risk and the precautionary principle between the US and EU.465 In 
addition there are very significant differences between the US Toxic Substances Control Act and the 
EU’s REACH regulations on the chemical industry, with US regulations being widely criticised for their 
ineffectiveness.466 Yet in the compiling or regulations there are no objective measures in place to clearly 
sort the two groups out according to social criteria, and therefore all these regulations, trivial and non-
trivial, are treated the same in the economic analysis.   
This situation is likely to be reflected in the operation of any future transatlantic regulatory body. The 
sorts of regulations that will be subject to future harmonisation will often be of high significance to 
many public interests, yet there is no clear mechanism in the Commission’s proposals for sorting out 
innocuous elimination of difference from the potentially far reaching and dangerous. There is only 
provision for the groping of regulations according to sectors.467 It may be argued that some sectors are 
‘obviously’ more relevant to the public interest than others, but this would be difficult to reliably 
substantiate. The formulation of regulations even in ‘non-obvious’ areas may still have detrimental 
external effects that will not be known in advance unless the social dimension is structurally 
incorporated from the start. In addition, the institution is designed to include future regulatory areas 
for attention that will not be acknowledged in the TTIP text. This is the purpose of the ‘living instrument’ 
notion. Inevitably the reach of the TTIP will then expand over time with no mechanism for democratic 
oversight or mechanism for rejection of any proposed expansions that the public disagrees with.  
There is therefore a legitimate concern that important issues will slip ‘under the radar’ and be decided 
in the dark and on solely economic and highly technical criteria, producing a result that may be socially 
sub-optimal but highly difficult to reverse once in place. The issue of clinical data protection is a good 
example. Its relevance to public health is orders of magnitude greater than the issue of coloured 
electrical wiring, however, in the process of regulatory harmonisation outlined by the Commission there 
is no prior or structural mechanism to necessarily distinguish between the two, or to ensure that social 
criteria are adequately accounted for in the impact assessment procedures agreed to by the new 
institution created.  
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The only indirect mechanism would be the transparency of the process and the operation of a vigilant 
and well-funded civil society. Yet it is easy to see how the structure of the process places those whose 
health and safety is most directly affected by government regulation one or two steps behind the ball. 
There is not likely to be much opportunity for substantial influence through ‘submissions’ of 
participation in a single annual event that will inevitably, by nature of the size and unwieldy nature of 
the subject matter, be superficial. Notably, an “EU-US multi-stakeholder advisory committee” that 
“would regularly meet with and work with EU competent authorities and US regulators in crafting 
regulatory measures or taking decisions” that was mentioned in an earlier leaked Commission position 
paper has since disappeared.468 The replacement is the fare less impressive ‘Civil Society Contact 
Group’.  
It could be argued that business interests are equally behind, but this would be to ignore the fact that 
the entire process itself is not created with public health at the forefront of intent, business occupies 
that forefront position. Regulatory harmonisation is a creation for business. Therefore, even if it is 
equally excluded from the process in a formal sense this will make no difference in fact, as its interests 
are structurally included. They are the very foundation of the process. In this respect it is of concern 
that the inclusion of social criteria in existing impact assessments on both sides of the Atlantic may be 
watered down, when there would evidently be a need for them to be expanded and strengthened.   
The issue of participation in the institution proposed is of course yet to be settled,469 however, it all but 
goes without saying that if the public interest and civil society are not structurally placed on a 
substantively or factually equal level, as compared to a merely formal equality, then the process will be 
disproportionately influenced by multinational corporations. They have the connections, power, 
finances and by nature well-defined structural linkages across the Atlantic through subsidiaries. In any 
formally equal system their ‘voice’ will inevitably crowd out that of local communities and disparate 
pressure groups that are still organised largely at a national level. This new institution then may amount 
to a new forum for multinationals to push their agenda where they have the ‘ear’ of powerful official 
standard-setters capable of significantly shaping the regulatory framework in the largest market in the 
world. This is a forum that is far out of reach for most civil society actors, which are under-funded, over-
stretched and localised.  
The fate of the EU’s precautionary principle is central to the debate. The Commission and others point 
to the fact that it is enshrined in EU law and cannot be removed by TTIP. Yet others argue that this is a 
mere formalisation and that everyone really knows that decisions on when and if the precautionary 
principle is invoked are political decisions not legal ones, making them subject to significant influence 
in practice.470 Some note the significance of the omission of the term ’precautionary principle’ from all 
of the EU’s draft texts.471 There has been significant pressure from the US government and US 
multinationals for many years on the EU to weaken the precautionary principle and to introduce more 
‘scientifically based cost-benefit’ assessment methods that are by most measures more risky. This has 
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had some results in that the EU has begun to change its methods to some degree and in some areas.472  
Although the extent and significance of this change is disputed,473 and many believe it to be minimal. 
TTIP has heightened this pressure, sometimes explicitly through the comments of US officials,474 which 
scholars have shown to effectively allow the European Commission to in turn push Member State 
legislatures for reform through appeal to ‘international pressures’.475 Reports suggest, for instance, that 
planned EU regulation on certain chemicals linked to cancer and male infertility were shelved due to 
insistence from US trade officials at the behest of the American Chamber of Commerce.476 The US 
interests pushed for ‘scientific’ cost-benefit assessments that would “set looser thresholds for 
acceptable exposure” to the chemical than those set by the EU.477 While the regulation was delayed 
until 2016, estimates of the health costs incurred by the delay stand at € 150 billion per year. Scholars 
argue that US style cost-benefit assessment can have many direct benefits for business,478 as it opens 
up a process of regulation that would otherwise be more closed to powerful interest groups, providing 
ample opportunities for manipulation of the process. Again it can be argued that NGOs and other non-
business constituencies have the same opportunities. But they do not have the same means, especially 
in the transnational context.   
It is for these reasons that large sections of civil society remain unconvinced by the quite glib statements 
from the Commission in its fact sheet written in response to such serious concerns, that this will all 
occur without “lowering our levels of protection for people’s health, their wellbeing or rights as 
consumers, the environment, [or] other things that benefit society as a whole.”479 
There is a fundamental problem in converging between what are widely agreed to be a higher set of 
current standards in the EU and a lower set of current standards in the US; that the most likely endpoint 
will be in between, that is it will represent a raising of standards for the US and a lowering of standards 
for the EU. It is highly unlikely that the US will accept the EU standards across the board, thereby 
ensuring a total upward harmonisation to the highest standards currently enforced. Regulatory 
convergence in and of itself would seem, on the face of it, to essentially be all but defined as a lowering 
of EU standards, in at least some areas, as is confirmed by a study done for the European Parliament in 
the food sector.480 This is the central dilemma for the EU people and a fundamental point that brings 
the entire TTIP endeavour into question from a public European viewpoint. The dilemma has been met 
by the European Parliament by a statement which “emphasises that an alignment of EU and US 
regulatory standards should aim at reaching the highest common standard”.481 However, it seems that 
the Parliament will have very little say over this issue. The new supra-national institution to be set up 
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will be comprised of regulators not parliamentarians, and it has been pointed out that in current drafts 
there is no provision for the involvement of the European Parliament in the subsequent inclusion of the 
results of the institutions deliberations into the EU legal order.482  
In any event, it must be ultimately asked how likely is overall upward harmonisation? And is it worth 
the risk. The fact remains that the benefits from regulation are large, in many respects essential to 
human wellbeing and easily identified, while the expected economic gains from TTIP are small to non-
existent and at best hard to distinguish. Even a small lowering of standards across the EU would easily 
outweigh the economic gains that can be foreseen.   
The issue of regulatory coherence is also tied very closely with the rarely mentioned peak of ambition 
regarding TTIP. This ‘TTIP crescendo’, is, as Commissioner Malmstrom puts it: 
to strengthen our voice in the world” and “to project European values on a global scale”, because 
“who else is there with us at the international top table of the future, along with China, Russia, 
and India? Who, like us, firmly believes that globalisation needs to be framed by a clear set of 
rules on everything from product safety to human rights? Which of those other top five world 
economies will share our high standards of regulation, democracy, and the rule of law? And that's 
why we need the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. To strengthen our 
transatlantic partnership for long term! The clue is in the name. 483 
Yet the crucial question is, whose voice will the ‘voice’ of TTIP be? If ‘our voice’ means a European voice 
pre TTIP, will TTIP change that? After a process of regulatory harmonisation will it ultimately be 
‘European values’ that are in the end projected upon the world? This would seem highly unlikely. Tens 
of thousands who have peacefully demonstrated in Europe’s streets and squares would argue that 
‘European values’ are already being compromised in the process of negotiating TTIP. It is anyone’s 
guess what these values will be after TTIP or who they will belong to. Some fear that whatever the EU’s 
intentions may be, it could nevertheless be used by US interests to downgrade average standards in 
the world’s largest market and then export these to the rest of the world. This is a simplification of an 
argument returned to below.  
To summarise, we conclude that the risks of lowered standards through the operation of the 
mechanisms foreseen in the Commissions latest draft are high and most likely to outweigh any 
perceived economic gain. Although it would no doubt disappoint many who have been working hard 
for regulatory convergence between the EU and US for years, and who have been hoping that TTIP and 
a new institution with wide influence would be a quantum leap in this field, the loss of democratic 
control over the convergence process that would seem to underlie the whole of this chapter in TTIP is 
too great to allow its inclusion in the present form. Even if it has been slow the regulatory convergence 
process has moved forward over the years, and most importantly it has done so under regimes of 
democratic accountability. Perhaps in this area slow convergence that the people are clearly aware of, 
can follow and can more easily control is best given the degree of difference in approaches. As the 
Commission and others state, there are clearly identified current areas where steps could be taken 
without any controversy, such as the standardisation of inspections of pharmaceutical manufacturing 
plants to avoid unnecessary flights across the Atlantic and the unnecessary duplication of paperwork. 
The chapter should be limited to commitments on these ‘easy’ issues in the traditional manner of trade 
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negotiations. In the end, if so many of the divergences creating economic loss are really so small, 
insignificant, technical and uncontroversial, as the Commission and others argue, it is difficult to see 
why there is a need for a new supra-national regulatory oversight regime to overcome them.  
In the event that a drive towards establishment of this new regime proves too strong, we would 
recommend some specific adaptations to the Commission’s proposal. Firstly, the Commission should 
clarify that ‘regulatory exchanges’ between the EU and US under the agreement remain clearly 
voluntary at all levels, central and non-central, by amending the language in Articles 9 and 11 as 
suggested above, replacing the words ‘will’ and ‘shall’ with ‘may’, to align with the statements made by 
the Commission in this respect. Secondly, the text should establish, or re-establish, a multi-stakeholder 
advisory committee in addition to the Civil Society Contact Groups proposed. This advisory committee 
should have a permanent, fully integrated and formal place in the structure of any new institution with 
continuous engagement in deliberations, and be comprised of four equal parts representing business, 
consumers, trade unions and civil society.  
Third, the European Parliament and the US Congress must be given a formal role in the modalities by 
which 1) the existing regulatory agenda of the institution is expanded, and 2) any adaptations to existing 
regulations and regulatory processes are incorporated into law. Fourth, the complete transparency of 
the institution must be ensured, and clear clauses adopted to ensure that processes will not take 
inordinate time and delay the making of necessary decisions in haste to protect public health and other 
established public interests. Fifth, it should be ensured that the institution does not have any final 
authority, but be limited to making recommendations. There should be no requirement to wait for such 
recommendations beyond a reasonable and clearly specified time, and there should be safeguards 
against abusive delaying practices of whatever origin.  
Sixth, clear provisions must be added that require regulatory convergence to be in an upward direction, 
the precautionary principle should be expressly set out as a principle that is to be protected, and there 
should be a clear expectation that the bias should be towards the US incorporating the precautionary 
principle into regulatory analysis. In addition, there should be an early warning mechanism in place to 
distinguish which regulations have a significant social benefit or costs, to group them accordingly and 
to treat then differently. Finally, it should be specified that any form of impact assessment that is 
adopted must include not only the highest standards of social criteria but also must apply human rights 
standards and be conducted in the light of the human rights obligations of all levels of government. 
Specifically, assessment should be based on established methodologies of human rights impact 
assessment that, in particular, take into account the progressive nature of socio-economic rights.   
It is advised that civil society pay very close attention to the precise definitions of key terms in any final 
agreement, such as ‘mutual recognition’, ‘convergence’, ‘regulatory coherence’ and ‘harmonisation’, 
because the devil is, as always, in the details. These terms should at least be as clearly and concisely 
defined as possible, allowing minimal room for extensive interpretation.  
 
4.4 – Trade in Services 
 
According to the European Commission’s mandate;  
The aim of negotiations on trade in services will be to bind the existing autonomous level of 
liberalisation of both Parties at the highest level of liberalisation captured in existing FTAs, in line 
with Article V of GATS, covering substantially all sectors and all modes of supply, while achieving 
 143 
 
new market access by tackling remaining long-standing market access barriers, recognising the 
sensitive nature of certain sectors. … The high quality of the EU's public utilities should be 
preserved.484 
Given the conflicting aims represented here, and given that there is no assurance that the quality of 
the EU’s public services and utilities will be preserved, there is significant concern that TTIP could lead 
to greater privatisation of the health services sector and an increasing loss of government control, 
service quality and democratic accountability in this area. These concerns persist despite regular 
protestations from politicians, diplomats and negotiators that they are overblown and that health 
services will assuredly be protected in the agreement.485 The experience of the UK with regard to the 
latest amendments made to its Health and Social Care Act 2012, whereby even the conservative 
government has been somewhat surprised at the apparently unintended consequences of creating a 
competitive market in health services, has sparked a loud debate within that country on the perhaps 
equally unintended consequences of TTIP.486   
Section 75 of the Act relates to requirements for opening up the provision of health services to a 
“competitive tendering” process, which has resulted in progressively more contracts being won by 
private operators, and subsequently to fears that the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) is being slowly 
privatised and that “[v]ital cash from NHS budgets is flowing … into private companies seeking profits 
from health care.”487 A motion was even tabled in the UK House of lords to annul Section 75, but 
failed.488 The reduction of public health budgets under conditions of austerity has also contributed to 
widespread anger. This has spilled over into a negative perception of TTIP’s consequences for the 
national health services that are the pride of many British people, and worries that the amendments to 
the Health and Social Care Act were a planned prelude to the creation of a market based health care 
system along US lines through the action of TTIP.489  
These concerns are not limited to the UK. The European Commission has reported that 17 million 
people were employed in the health sector Europe-wide in 2010, constituting 8% of jobs in the EU at 
that time.490 There is a general perception, supported by in depth studies,491 that privatisation and 
forced competition with US health providers will drive down wages and working conditions, as well as 
the quality of care.  
It remains to be seen whether some of these fears may be overblown, however, even if perhaps 
somewhat exaggerated they do rest on highly valid concerns. Unilateral liberalisation or privatisation 
of a certain sector, or in other words the decision of a government to liberalise outside of the context 
of negotiations with another country, can be locked in by a subsequent international trade agreement. 
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This is the meaning of the phrase “to bind the existing autonomous level of liberalisation of both Parties 
at the highest level of liberalisation” in its mandate. In the absence of specific undertakings, the services 
section of the agreement would act to bar moves by a government to increase interference in the 
market by winding back liberalisation and returning certain services or aspects of the services sector to 
public control. Indeed this is one of the central purposes of trade agreements, to make such moves 
towards greater liberalisation effectively irreversible, either through legal sanction or financial cost. 
Again, unless specific undertaking are made, which are addressed below, the trade regime will operate 
in the same way as the investment regime as discussed above in regard to the attempted reversal of 
privatised health insurance markets in Slovakia. That is, by design it will prevent ‘backsliding’ into public 
control and accountability. However, there are specific actions governments can take to prevent this 
from occurring.  
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), on which any services section in TTIP will be 
modelled, may possibly deal with this issue through its own general exception clause, Article XIV, which 
is virtually the same as Article XX GATT. It has a similar structure and is routinely applied in the same 
way by WTO dispute panels. The WTO Appellate body frequently looks to the jurisprudence on GATT 
XX when applying GATS XIV and vice versa. The crucial terms that the articles have in common, such as 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’, ‘necessary’, and ‘disguised restriction on trade’, are all 
interpreted in the same manner, and there are no significant differences between the articles in 
terminology.492 Therefore, the analysis applied to the case study of plain packaging and GATT Article XX 
applies equally to an exceptions clause in the case of services.  
Many measures that a government may wish to legitimately take in the interests of public health may 
not rise to the same levels of ‘necessity’ as plain packaging and may involve necessary discrimination. 
The reversal of imprudent or failed privatisation measures regarding health services would be a good 
example of a legitimate government measure that would only pass a necessity test with very great 
difficulty. As such, it would be wise to seek methods for lowering this standard such as those mentioned 
above. This conclusion is reinforced by a consideration of the importance of retaining the precautionary 
principle and not having it eroded, especially in such an important area as public health. In this respect, 
States could take note of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and incorporate that 
understanding throughout the interpretation process of all trade provisions, not just those on 
intellectual property. This would aid significantly in protecting the State’s right to regulate or to reverse 
ineffective, inefficient and wasteful privatisation.  
Providing the most security and clarity, public services in general, and health services in particular, may 
simply be excluded or ‘carved-out’ of the entire services chapter of a prospective agreement.493 For 
example, Article I.3(b) of GATS defines the word ‘services’ for the purpose of the agreement and states 
that “"services" includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority”. As such, the only services that are explicitly carved out from the entire 
agreement are those related to the exercise of governmental authority. Despite the broad sound of this 
phrase its meaning is quite narrow. It is generally understood as applying only to those services relating 
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directly to the core of State sovereignty and State power,494 such as the penal system and justice 
administration, and police and military activities.  
This means that most public services, including health, education, post and telecommunications for 
example, are not covered by this form of broad exception. Nevertheless, this demonstrates that it 
would be possible in theory to exclude particular services of high sensitivity through express exclusion 
from the definition of services for the purposes of a given agreement. For example, Article 135(2) of 
the EU–Chile Association Agreement of 2002 states that the “provisions of this Title shall not apply to 
the Parties' respective social security systems or to activities in the territory of each Party which are 
connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority.” This explicitly carves out social 
security in addition to the scope of Article I.3(b) GATS.  
Given the controversy surrounding health services in the EU this is an option that the Commission may 
wish to consider. On the other hand, some Member States may not wish to have their health services 
entirely excluded, which may make this broad exclusion in the TTIP technically difficult, even if other 
Member States favoured this approach. This was not the case in CETA however, and would represent 
a departure in the practice of the EU. In CETA it is up to the Member States to each enter their own 
preferences relating to exclusion of their public services.  
More flexible alternatives are provided in the body of the agreement. The most important substantive 
obligations in services agreements are the non-discrimination obligations of most-favoured nation and 
national treatment and obligations of market access. National treatment and most-favoured nation 
treatment operate in the same way as described above with respect to investment. Market access 
provisions potentially restrict the regulation of public services by barring public monopolies and the 
ability of governments to confer exclusive rights and capacities on particular service providers. These 
provisions also prevent the operation of ‘economic needs tests’, which can restrict the number of 
service providers in a given market in accordance with public interests that require the maintenance of 
a high quality and security of access to certain services through the prevention of the negative effects 
of competition.  
Market access provisions therefore are aimed at preventing the most common and traditional ways in 
which governments regulate public services. Within the context of the agreement the presumption is 
that these provisions will apply to all services (with the usual exception of those pursuant to 
governmental authority) unless specific undertakings are made to expressly limit the services to which 
these provisions apply. In the absence of these undertakings the agreement will make it difficult to 
introduce or reintroduce measures regulating public services. The EU and the Member States each have 
significant latitude in determining their own limitations and the extent of market access provided. This 
may be delineated as finely as is desired, specifically excluding particular sectors, aspects of sectors and 
degrees of market access by declaring certain regulatory measures to be allowed under the agreement. 
Given the consequences of not ensuring that proper limitations are expressly included in the text, the 
phrasing of commitments by the EU and by each Member State in relation to public services is of crucial 
importance, as is the position of the limitation in the text of the agreement.  
With regard to the structure of services agreements there are two critical distinctions; the first is 
between a ‘positive list’ and a ‘negative list’ approach, and the second is between Annex I and Annex II 
exceptions. On the first distinction, liberalisation and increased market access may occur in two ways. 
In the positive list approach it is only the specific sectors and areas that are nominated in a particular 
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list included in the agreement that are taken as subject to the provisions of the agreement. This is 
generally regarded as the slower or more restrictive approach to liberalisation of services. Liberalisation 
will not occur except in relation to the sectors and services expressly listed. In the negative list approach 
liberalisation is assumed to apply to all services except for those expressly nominated in the list. This is 
usually understood as the faster or more open approach to liberalisation. Only those services on the 
list will be protected. Basically, a negative list approach makes it far more difficult for governments to 
ensure appropriate levels of protection for given services. A prior determination of which services are 
sensitive and in need of protection and exclusion, or, more importantly, those which may become 
sensitive in the future, is not an easy task. Furthermore, the very definition of terms such as ‘services’, 
‘public services’, ‘public utilities’ and ‘health services’ are far from clear and settled. These factors mean 
that a positive list approach is clearly the safest as it does not assume liberalisation and market control, 
and makes it far easier for governments to maintain control over services. In fact, under the positive 
list approach democratically accountable government control is the default assumption.  
The EU has typically followed the positive list approach not least because of the complexity of specifying 
all of the services to be exempted at the level of the EU as a whole and at the level of each of the 28 
Member States.495 However, in CETA it changed direction and applied a negative list approach. This 
prompted a resolution from the European Parliament demanding that this divergence from usual 
practice in CETA “be seen as a mere exception and not serve as a precedent for future negotiations”.496 
Despite this resolution it is highly probably that another ‘exception’ will be made in the case of TTIP. 
The US has always followed a negative list approach in its bilateral agreements and the EU will find it 
very difficult to reverse from CETA in negotiations with the US. For the purposes here it is assumed that 
a negative list approach will be followed. This ensures preparation for the ‘worst case scenario’. If a 
positive list is in the end adopted the methods of excluding health services will be much simpler, and 
will essentially amount to not mentioning them at all, except in the context of a general exclusion clause 
for good measure.  
On the second distinction, there will be two annexes included in the agreement. Under a negative list 
approach Annex I specifies existing measures that are currently in operation in relation to particular 
services which contravene the substantive obligations of the agreement. These ‘existing non-
conforming measures’ may only be retained if they are listed in Annex I. This may be a very difficult 
enterprise, to accurately list every measure that a government or public authority at any national level 
currently uses to regulate particular services and wishes to retain. To be properly excluded there needs 
to be a description of the relevant sector or sub-sector, a declaration of which substantive obligations 
of the agreement the measure should be protected from, and a description of the measure at issue.  
With respect to the EU it is important to stress that measures may by both to the EU as a whole and 
each Member State individually. Each Member State therefore has the ability to formulate its own 
exceptions and commitments. If an individual Member State wishes to exclude all public services from 
the agreement, for example, it is not necessary for the EU to do so at the supra-national level, however 
the given Member State must be sure to enter the limitation itself in an appropriate and clear manner 
in consciousness that anything not expressly mentioned is subject to the terms of the agreement.  
Importantly, Annex I measures are subject to a ‘ratchet clause’. Only changes in these measures that 
involve equal or greater degrees of liberalisation are allowed. This means that changes to the measures 
                                                          
495 Markus Krajewski and Britta Kynast, ‘Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on the Legal 
Framework for Public Services in Europe’, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1 October 
2014, p. 26.  
496 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on EU-Canada trade relations, P7_TA(2011)0257, 
para 5.   
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listed in Annex I that are in a more liberal direction cannot be reversed. Measures that are taken in 
order to regulate health services that are listed here, for example maintaining a certain level of 
privatisation or rules excluding for-profit health insurance providers from the market, and which are 
later liberalised, for example increasing private access to the health services market or allowing for-
profit health insurance providers to operate, cannot then be undone. This is the case even though the 
measure remains listed in Annex I. Clearly the ‘ratchet clause’ has a particularly negative effect on the 
scope of the State’s right to regulate. Of particular concern in the case of Ireland, which is now debating 
the privatisation and marketization of its water supply, is the fact that in a number of European States 
water supplies and services have had to be re-municipalised as a result of poor private performance 
and widespread public dissatisfaction, thereby reversing previous liberalisation in this sector. 
Therefore, such measures “could be prevented in principle using a ratchet clause. Thus in particular 
with regard to reforms that are likely to lead to less competition this can have a restrictive effect.”497 
Annex II also contains a list of measures that do not comply with the provisions of the agreement. 
However, Annex II also applies to new or future measures, and importantly, the ‘ratchet clause’ does 
not apply to Annex II. Therefore, as Krajewski and Kynast conclude,  
it is clear that states have significant autonomy only in relation to public services that are listed 
in Annex II. In order to ensure that autonomy concerning the provision and organisation of public 
services is not restricted by the liberalisation obligations of TTIP these would have to be listed in 
Annex II.498 
Here again, measures must be specified carefully, setting out the sector or subsector, the provisions in 
the agreement from which measures are to be excepted, and providing a clear description of the nature 
of the exception, perhaps with examples of measures currently adopted and those that may be taken 
in the future, for added clarity. Protection for certain services may be provided through either or both 
horizontal exceptions or through sector-specific exceptions. A horizontal exception for public services, 
for example, will apply to all measures, present and future, that apply to all sectors relevant to all public 
services. Alternatively, sector-specific exceptions may be listed on an individual basis, such as for all 
health services.  
Given that the definition of ‘public services’ is not settled, it would be safest to include both a horizontal 
exception for public services and specific sectoral exceptions, particularly in the case of health services, 
which should be defined broadly. Furthermore, care should be taken to ensure that the exceptions 
apply to all of the substantive obligations of the agreement, national treatment, most-favoured nation 
treatment and market access. This dual approach, ensuring detailed textual coverage of each sector to 
be protected, provides the greatest level of protection in the body of the agreement for sensitive 
service sectors. Roughly speaking, this was the approach taken by the EU in CETA, and according to 
Krajewski and Kynast it is also the approach currently being taken in TTIP; whereby there is a planned 
horizontal exception for ‘public utilities’ and “sector-specific exceptions for environmental services, as 
well as publically funded education, health and social services, although they refer only to national 
treatment.”499 
This last point could be of importance, and indicates an improvement that could be made to better 
protect health services. They should be excluded also from the other major provisions of the agreement 
                                                          
497 Markus Krajewski and Britta Kynast, ‘Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on the Legal 
Framework for Public Services in Europe’, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1 October 
2014, p. 28.  
498 Ibid, p. 28. 
499 ibid, p. 28 (emphasis added). 
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relating to most-favoured nation treatment and market access, with the last being the most important. 
Member States would be free to ensure such exclusion individually in their own entries to Annex II. 
  
Despite these relatively clear options to exclude public services completely, and health services 
specifically, reports persist that the European Commission has not decisively removed health services 
from the scope of the final agreement.500 As noted elsewhere,  
there remains a clearly articulated view coming from industry and some elements of Member 
State governments resistant to a blanket exemption for health and keen to consider the potential 
benefits that could accrue to health from greater levels of market liberalisation. One of the most 
recent comments by a government Minister in the UK was quoted as saying that they “should be 
included because Britain’s healthcare industry is a major exporter and would benefit from more 
open trade.501  
This leads to understandable confusion in the public domain, particularly around certain services such 
as hospital, medical and dental services. Given the lack of clarity there is a need to maintain a focus on 
the details of the negotiations and to pay close attention to the scheduled annexes of the final services 
chapter to ensure that the health sector is properly excluded. What is of prime importance is that the 
ultimate decision may be made by the Member States of the EU independently. The EU may make a 
blanket exclusion, however, if this does not occur each Member State has the power to ensure that its 
own health services are clearly excluded by use of their own entries into Annex II of the agreement, 
taking care that they apply to all of the substantive obligations of the agreement by naming each 
specifically.502 This is the safest method of ensuring that health services will remain under local public 
control.  
 
  
                                                          
500 John Hillary, ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and UK Healthcare’, The BMJ, 4 November 2014.  
501 Usman Khan, Robert Pallot, David Taylor and Panos Kanavos, ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: 
International Trade Law, Health Systems and Public Health’, London School of Economics and Political Science, January 2015, 
pp. 41-42.  
502 A concise wording is suggested by Krajewski and Kynast; “With regard to public services the party shall reserve the right to 
restrict the number of services and service providers, to impose specific obligations on service providers and to regulate the 
provision of these services in the general interest”. Markus Krajewski and Britta Kynast, ‘Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) on the Legal Framework for Public Services in Europe’, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Friedrich-
Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1 October 2014, p. 32.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
The clear conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the predicted economic benefits from TTIP 
are too small or speculative to justify the associated social risks. The underlying structural causes of 
the 2008 global financial crisis—and its ongoing impacts—were defined and exacerbated in large part 
by excessive power being granted to the market, and by failures to foreground the social effects of 
government policy and regulation or (more importantly) the social effects of a lack of government 
regulation. The TTIP process ultimately risks the further disintegration of social fabrics, rather than 
their restitution. 
One of the other main justifications put forward for TTIP is that it will consolidate the transatlantic 
marketplace and fortify the economic dominance of the global North in the face of increasingly 
multipolar axes of ‘globalisation’ tilting towards Asia and the global South. This is a dubious 
justification at best, and is again rooted in the projected economic effects of TTIP. Any such economic 
benefits will be exclusionary of the global South and will pose threats to social protections within the 
EU and US. As such, this study finds that the economic, social, legal and democratic cases for the 
imperative of TTIP are weak overall, and as such that available political avenues should be pursued to 
bring about the suspension of its negotiation. 
Given the stated and, for now, apparently irreversible commitment to concluding the TTIP 
negotiations, however, civil society groups and the public health community should maintain an 
engaged and proactive approach to ensure that at the least, a precautionary approach underpinned 
by holistic societal perspectives forms the basis for the agreement’s formulation. 
With this in mind, and on the basis of the analysis presented in the study, we make the following 
recommendations. Where necessary the recommendations are graded, from those measures 
appropriate to best ensure the security of public health, to those measures viewed as minimal 
safeguards for public health within the framework of the agreement as it is currently being negotiated.  
 
5.1 – European Commission 
 
We recommend that the European Commission, with respect to the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership agreement as a whole: 
- Provide for the conduct of a fully independent ex ante human rights impact assessment 
(HRIA), in addition to, but not as a part of, a social impact assessment and an 
environmental impact assessment, as soon as possible to guide and inform future 
negotiations, including assessment of the investor-State dispute settlement 
mechanism and the proposed Regulatory Cooperation Body. The HRIA should conform 
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to the framework set out by the Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact 
Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements.503 
- Provide all the necessary information, assistance and openness to each Member State 
in the conduct of their own human rights, social and environmental impact 
assessments at the national level.  
- Provide complete transparency to the public in the conduct of negotiations, with 
respect to all documents and communications.  
- Not reopen negotiations on investment until there is a clear public consensus on the 
future direction and shape of this chapter.  
- Include a general clause that establishes the State’s right to regulate, which applies to 
the entire agreement, and which is modelled on such previous clauses in the Havana 
Charter and Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This clause 
should also incorporate the principles of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health and apply them to the whole agreement.  
- Include a general exceptions clause, and if so this clause should not adopt a test of 
necessity, but should employ a lower standard of proof as indicated by phrases 
connecting government measures to the stated public aims such as ‘related to’ or 
‘reasonably understood as required for’. This clause must expressly refer to the 
fulfilment of States’ human rights obligations under international and domestic law as 
one of these stated aims.  
- Include a provision that recognises the obligations of States and the responsibilities of 
corporations and investors under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, requiring the provisions 
of the agreement to be read in consistency with these international instruments, in 
addition to further international instruments detailing the specific obligations of States 
under international human rights law, as well as any future treaties or instruments 
relating to human rights and business enterprises.  
- Include a general exception clause that specifically excludes measures related to 
tobacco control in alignment with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control from 
the scope of the whole agreement. 
 
We recommend that the European Commission, with respect to the investment chapter of the 
agreement: 
- Exclude investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) from the terms of future negotiations. 
                                                          
503 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, 
Addendum, Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements, UN Doc.  
A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, 19 December 2011.  
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If this does not occur, we recommend that with respect to the procedural provisions of the 
chapter: 
- There be a provision requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
- The adjudication process be fully judicialised in line with the structure of WTO dispute 
settlement, including full transparency, a rule of precedent, ethical guidelines on the 
conduct of adjudicators, and criteria for appointment equal to that of domestic judges.  
- An appellate body be established and operate in the same manner as the WTO 
Appellate Body.  
- In the case of claims involving human rights issues, a communications mechanism be 
established between the investment courts and the UN and regional human rights 
treaty bodies such that recommendations may be made and advice given on the scope 
and application of human rights norms, to better inform the investment court’s 
decision. 
- There be provision for the acceptance of amicus curiae, with directions that this 
acceptance be allowed broadly, in the public interest.  
With respect to the substantive provisions of the chapter we recommend:- 
- The substantive provisions of the investment chapter be restricted to national 
treatment and most-favoured nation treatment, excluding provisions on minimum 
standards of treatment and indirect expropriation. 
If this does not occur, we recommend that: 
- The right to regulate be set out clearly as a separate clause in the substantive body of 
the text.    
- There be a provision setting out clearly that the treatment to be accorder to foreign 
investors under the agreement cannot exceed the level of treatment afforded to 
domestic investors. 
- Provisions establishing pre-establishment rights be excluded, and that if they are 
included it be set out clearly that such rights do not come within the understanding of 
and dispute settlement institution created or foreseen by the agreement.  
- The FET provision be limited to the understanding in customary law, and f a closed list 
approach to the FET standard is taken then it must be specified clearly that the list is 
certainly exhaustive. 
- The clause on indirect expropriation set out clearly that non-discriminatory measures 
taken in the public interest through the appropriate legal channels never amount to 
compensable expropriation.  
- The MFN clause cannot justify the importation of higher standards of protection or the 
existence or standards of dispute settlement provisions from other treaties.  
 152 
 
- That an exceptions clause be included and be worded in such a way as to replace 
‘necessity’ with a lower standard of causation as set out above, reflecting the need to 
protect the right to regulate broadly not narrowly, and including reference to States’ 
human rights obligations as specified grounds.  
- That there be attention paid to a balance of substantive obligations and rights of both 
States and foreign investors to be reflected in the text.  
- That there be a provision barring foreign investors from the protections of the chapter 
where there is sufficient evidence of direct or indirect violation of national laws and 
international human rights obligations and responsibilities, both their own and those 
of the State in which they operate.   
- That there be a provision barring foreign investors from the protections of the chapter 
where a contribution to the economic development of the host State cannot be 
sufficiently demonstrated. 
- That there be a provision allowing for States to initiate counter-claims in cases where 
foreign investors are suspected to have failed to meet their own obligations and 
responsibilities under national and international law.  
 
We recommend that the European Commission, with respect to the chapter of the agreement on 
technical barriers to trade: 
- Exclude a Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) from the terms of future negotiations. 
If this does not occur, we recommend that the Commission: 
- Ensure the inclusion of a clause making clear that regulatory harmonisation must be in 
an upward direction to the level of the highest standards of safety and security of the 
public interest currently adopted.504  
- Ensure that entry into ‘regulatory exchanges’ be clearly specified as a voluntary and 
not a mandatory endeavour.  
- Allow for the establishment of a multi-stakeholder advisory committee, in addition to 
the Civil Society Contact Groups proposed, which would have a permanent and fully 
integrated place in the structure of the RCB, with continuous engagement in 
deliberations, and be comprised of four equal parts representing business, consumers, 
trade unions and civil society. 
                                                          
504 European Parliament, Resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to 
the European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
Provisional Text, P8_TA-PROV(2015)0252, (2014/2228(INI)), para 2(b)(x). 
 153 
 
- Ensure that the European Parliament be given a clear role in the modalities by which 
the existing regulatory agenda of the RCB is expanded, and by which any adaptations 
to existing regulations and regulatory processes are incorporated into law. 
- Ensure that any form of impact assessment adopted includes not only the highest 
standards of social criteria but also applies human rights standards. 
- Ensure that the precautionary principle is clearly mentioned and protected.  
- Ensure that the RCB is completely transparent, does not hamper timely regulation and 
is limited to a recommendatory capacity.   
 
We recommend that the European Commission, with respect to the intellectual property chapter of 
the agreement: 
- Ensure that the provisions of this chapter do not extend further than the level of 
protection in the TRIPS agreement, and that the flexibilities included in the TRIPS 
agreement are not jeopardised, and are indeed reflected in TTIP and enhanced if and 
where possible.  
 
We recommend that the European Commission, with respect to the services chapter of the 
agreement: 
- Exclude public services from the agreement as a whole through express exclusion of 
‘public services’ from the definition of ‘services’ for the purpose of the agreement, for 
greatest certainty. 
If this does not occur we recommend that the Commission:- 
- Ensure that public services, and health services in particular, are appropriately 
protected in the Annex’s of the services chapter through a horizontal exception as well 
as a clear entry of exclusion in Annex 2.505  
- Adopt a positive list approach to the structure of the Annexes in the service chapter, 
and only adopt a negative list approach if significant concessions are gained in other 
parts of the agreement, such as the investment chapter and with respect to the express 
inclusion and protection of the precautionary principle in the section of regulatory 
cooperation.   
- Ensure that exclusions for public services and health services apply to all of the clauses 
of the services section and not only national treatment obligations.  
 
  
                                                          
505 Ibid, para 2(b)(vii). 
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5.2 – European Parliament 
 
We recommend that the European Parliament: 
- Take all available measure to ensure that the concerns of the people have the greatest positive 
impact possible on the course of negotiations, and to this end seek to reflect the clear opposition 
to the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP evident from the response to the Commission’s consultation in any 
votes regarding the future scope of negotiations, specifically those relating to ISDS.   
- Ensure that any dispute settlement system in TTIP mandates the prior exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, as indicated by the Parliament’s own resolution of 8 July 2015 requiring that “the 
jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States is respected”.506 
 
- Closely attend to the text of any final agreement, considering all of the specific points made 
above, to ensure the security of public health in Europe.  
- Reject any final text that does not meet the minimum safeguards for the public interest and public 
health as set out above.  
 
5.3 – EU Member States 
 
We recommend that all EU Member States including Ireland: 
- Conduct their own ex ante, and separate, human rights, social and environmental impact 
assessments, according to established methodologies and the Guiding Principles on Human Rights 
Impact Assessments, as soon as possible, in order to provide greater detail and to verify the 
assessments of the European Commission at the EU-wide level. 
- Communicate the results of these assessments to the Commission such that negotiations may be 
better informed and guided.  
 
5.4 – Irish Government 
 
We recommend that the Irish government, in addition to the timely conduct of the impact 
assessments already mentioned: 
                                                          
506 European Parliament, Resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to 
the European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
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- Formulate a clear policy advocating exclusion of ISDS (in any form) from TTIP, given the country’s 
high risk of incurring serious costs from ISDS and its evident success in attracting US investment 
without taking this risk. 
- Begin a cross-departmental discussion regarding the costs and benefits of TTIP, equally including 
government departments concerned with health, social issues and the environment.  
- Foster and engage with a broader public discussion on the costs and benefits of TTIP, engaging 
with the full range of political parties, social partners and civil society.  
- Closely attend to the text of any final agreement, considering all of the specific points made above 
in the recommendations to the European Commission on specific issues and aspects, to ensure 
the security of public health in Ireland.  
- Ensure that Irish public and health services are properly protected by entry of the necessary 
exclusions in the appropriate Annex’s of the services chapter of TTIP (Annex 2), and are covered 
also by a horizontal exclusion.  
- Ensure that exclusions for public services and health services apply to all of the clauses of the 
services section and not only national treatment obligations.  
- Reject any final text that does not meet the minimum safeguards set out above.  
 
5.5 – Civil Society 
 
We recommend that civil society: 
- Remains vigilant and vocal regarding the progress of negotiations and endeavours to utilise the 
information presented here pursue the recommendations outlined above at the relevant 
institutional levels and to influence local, national and regional institutions in the interests of 
public health, democratic self-determination and broader understanding of the potential 
implications of TTIP.   
 
- Pay special attention to the details of any prospective final text in the areas of possible TRIPS-plus 
provisions, the precise wording and positioning of exclusions for public services and health 
services, and any provisions that may expand the terms of the agreement in the future without 
democratic control, such as provisions relating to investment and regulatory cooperation. 
 
- Consider creating a broad alliance aimed specifically at achieving a two-tiered goal: Firstly, to 
press for a halt to the negotiations and a thorough re-evaluation of the purpose and rationale of 
a TTIP in light of the severe imbalance between minimal economic benefits and significant social 
costs; Secondly, if the first goal is not attained, to press for the exclusion of the two main threats 
to social wellbeing that are contained in TTIP, the ISDS mechanism and the establishment of  a 
Regulatory Cooperation Body.   
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